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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis looks at the function of signatures in visual art using the theory of Jacques 
Derrida and a series of paradigmatic historical examples. Specifically, it departs from 
‘Signature Event Context’ (SEC) to establish signature outside the idiom of visual art as a 
social process. Having established signature as process designed to guarantee presence, it 
suggests that signature should be considered a method of production. As a method of 
production, signature has a significant contemporary relevance for dematerialised and 
Relational Art practices which are frequently held to be ‘unsigned’. This thesis suggests 
grounds for questioning the unsigned quality of Relational Art, and looks at what 
signatory production means for it. Until the 1990s, signature was mostly ignored as a 
subject for serious art historical scholarship. It is still rarely indexed as a subject even 
when it warrants a mention in the body of a text. Although a clutch of recent studies have 
addressed its occurrence in the work of individual artists, or within the boundaries of 
narrowly defined eras, there is little work - if any - which attempts to connect these 
pockets of knowledge with a conceptual grounding of what signature does in order to 
develop a connected narrative and broad understanding for its place. As a result, there is 
little interrogation of signature’s mechanism alongside historical examples, and 
scholarship is instead focused on its appearance. This thesis attempts a broad, 
conceptually informed, historical survey, using examples that date as far back as the sixth 
century BC. The aim is to unpack the signature-form ‘R. Mutt’ which appears on Marcel 
Duchamp’s Readymade, Fountain (1917), a work with great conceptual importance for 
contemporary dematerialised and Relational Art practices. In bringing SEC into close 
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proximity to Fountain, the thesis establishes potential grounds for reading a significant 
theoretical relationship between Derrida and Duchamp, a pairing which has been 
neglected by scholars despite conceptual sympathies between them.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis aims to provide a critical analysis of the historically variable role of signature 
in visual art. In this, it is delimited by Marcel Duchamp’s Readymade Fountain (1917) 
(Fig. 1), and by Jacques Derrida’s essay ‘Signature Event Context’ (SEC) (1977), which 
have sympathetic points of contact and are necessary constraints on the project.1 My 
initial interest in pursuing research in this area was prompted by an academic engagement 
at undergraduate level with the mechanistics of art prizes, which focused on the Turner 
Prize of 1993 and the associated intervention by the K Foundation; at graduate level with 
the materiality and geographical contingency of Sherrie Levine’s ‘rephotographs’, which 
substantiated a claim for works of appropriation to be read as ‘still life’; and led from 
those foundations to an engagement with the legacies of the discourse of 
‘dematerialisation’ which have filtered through to ‘Relational Art’. In my studio practice 
as an artist, I have been very much concerned with the relationship between anonymity 
and seriality. The proposal for this thesis developed in the combination between studio 
practice and academic research, and my motivatation to produce it was initially informed 
by experience gained in practical engagements with contemporary art and its markets.  
 
In this thesis, I am concerned with investigating signature as a process rather than as a 
sign. However, I am not principally engaged with its dissolute, ‘invisible’ manifestation 
as ‘style’ or ‘touch’, a manifestation which would appear to serve its most ambiguous 
definitions well. As a process, signature most obviously results in names on artworks and 
                                                
1 Derrida, J. ‘Signature Event Context’, Limited Inc (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1988) 
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as the clearest expression of signature, they permit complex analysis of the process. I am 
investigating written signatures through various exemplars in order to try and recover 
aspects of the  signatory process that are otherwise obscured. My thesis treats the 
signature ‘R. Mutt’ on Fountain (a signed urinal) as an historical form which references 
the autographic signatory habits of 19th century painters, Courbet in particular. In doing 
so, I aim to provide a platform from which the invisible activity of signature in 
dematerialised art practice can be addressed: Fountain is an important foundation in that 
narrative, so understanding its signature – a pictorial form - is a crucial step. I want to 
suggest that examination of signature’s historical written forms in art can substantiate a 
claim for it to be related to modes of artistic production in a contemporary context. So, 
despite the fact that my thesis is not directly concerned with ‘diffuse’ notions of signature 
and does not analyse dematerialised works per se, the desire to produce it has nonetheless 
been motivated by contemplation of the operations of Relational Art in which notions of 
both signature and style might be seen to be extraneous and irrelevant. Relational Art - 
the orchestration of circumstances and situations for aesthetic ends - does not necessarily 
involve the artist in producing any manual effects or objects, and it may seem 
counterintuitive to suggest that a historical understanding of written signatures can have 
anything to do with it. Scrolling back through the signature on Fountain, I suggest that 
the history Relational Art assumes for itself is too short. If Fountain can be shown to 
demonstrate that the operation of signature liberates the hand from the object and from 
manual production, this is operation is permitted by the sum of what artists’s signatures 
have been used to do previous to it and it is as important an agent of operation as 
Fountain’s ‘anti-art’ form. Simply stated, I build a position using signature’s material 
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history from which the behaviour of signatory processes in dematerialisation might be 
looked at.  
 
The aim of the thesis, then, is to consider ‘pre-Conceptual’ signatures. My contention is 
that the 19th century signing conventions that enabled Fountain are indicative of legacies 
and behaviours relating both to the artist and the object which have been mediated over 
centuries by the changing form and operation of signature. Such legacies and behaviours 
have a very long, textured history and my contention is that deeply sedimented, widely 
dispersed signatory conventions were fundamental in allowing a urinal to perform as art. 
Key examples are used to demonstrate the historical contigency of signatory forms in 
order to question the motivation for their existence and the effects of their establishment.  
The thesis relies upon a detailed reading of Derrida’s signatory theory to provide a 
conceptual basis for understanding the general function that signature performs. Reading 
Derrida, the sequence of encounter is almost as important as the substance. The reading I 
have derived from SEC – as a starting point - has influenced engagement with all the 
other Derridean texts that I trace the concept of signature through. Derrida’s concern with 
signature was life-long, complex and defining. His work points to the liberatory potential 
in signature as well as its role in determining property. He understands signature to be an 
operation rather than an appearance and his work allows me to suggest that signature can 
be understood to be an important process of production in art. 
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1.1 FRAMING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1.1.1 BOURRIAUD AND RELATIONAL ART 
 
The term ‘Relational Art’ was coined at the end of the 1990s by the French curator and 
writer, Nicholas Bourriaud, to describe artistic practices that take the sphere of human 
interaction as material to be worked: 
When Gabriel Orozco puts an orange on the stalls of a deserted Brazilian market (Crazy 
Tourist, 1991), or slings a hammock in the MoMA garden in New York (Hamoc en la 
moma, 1993), he is operating at the hub of “social infra-thinness” (l’inframince social), 
that minute space of daily gestures determined by the superstructure made up of “big” 
exchanges, and defined by it. Without any wording, Orozco’s photographs are a 
documentary record of tiny revolutions in the common urban and semi-urban life (a 
sleeping bag on the grass, an empty shoe box, etc.). They record this silent, still life 
nowadays formed by relationships with the other.2 
Several points of interest in this passage are relevant to formulating research questions 
which investigate the problem of signature. Firstly, it is specifically ‘Gabriel Orozco’ 
who actions the placement of the orange – to what extent does the specificity of the 
individual matter? Does the artwork change if the individual is not Gabriel Orozco but 
Jenny Saville (a painter) or Marina Abramovic (a performance artist)? Peter Doig or 
Chris Ofili? A. N. Other or me? Does the action require an artist known as such – what if 
celebrity artist, James Franco, actioned the placement of the orange? Secondly, in 
                                                
2  Bourriaud, N. Relational Art (Paris: Les Presses du Réel, 2002) p17 
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marking a ‘Brazilian’ market and ‘the MoMA’ garden, Bourriaud marks the provenance 
of place – the importance of terroir: does the artwork change if the market is in Bolton, 
not Brazil; the garden that of a post office in Cromarty, not a museum in New York? 
(Increasingly, we can see Bourriaud's use of ‘or’ is slightly disingenuous). Thirdly, 
Bourriaud describes the action as operating at ‘the hub of social infra-thinness’ and in 
doing so, deliberately opens his text out onto the legacies of Duchamp: the neologism 
inframince (translated as ‘infra-thin’) is a private term coined by Duchamp in order to 
structure aspects of his thought.3 Duchamp did not conclusively define inframince, but 
the working concept involves those notions of ‘difference’ and ‘betweenness’ that can 
transform an everyday object into a work of art. How do these inheritances enable 
Relational Art and why does Bourriaud deliberately call on them? What can be learned 
about the way Relational Art operates (as a dematerialised practice) from looking closely 
at the conditions that allowed the Readymade to take shape in the early 20th century, and 
then to deploy ‘fully’ some 50 years later in the context of Conceptual Art? How does 
Duchamp’s inframince relate to Derrida’s différance (a concept which invokes difference 
and delay simultaneously)? Bourriaud draws attention to the ‘documentary record’, 
constructed ‘without any wording’ – is it possible to document artistic projects, seeming 
to rely so heavily on provenance ‘without wording’, and why should that even be an 
aspiration? Issues of provenance and documentation are very much implicated in the 
functioning of the traditional art market which deals with paintings, sculptures, prints and 
the like. They are relied upon not just by dealers, gallerists and collectors, but by art 
historians, validating foundations and institutions. Ideally, Relational practice does not 
                                                
3  Sanouillet. M. and Peterson, E. (eds.) The Writings of Marcel Duchamp (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1973)  
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produce permanent, physical objects – how does this change the operation of 
provenance? Can an examination of how signatures have behaved when they are visible 
and ‘unambiguous’ on an artwork help reformulate understanding of the location of 
‘commodity’ in/as provenance? And what might this mean for the claims of difference 
made for Relational Art vis-à-vis traditional sculptures, paintings, drawings, photographs 
etc.?  
 
The questions I’ve formulated above give on to broader questions concerning the general 
nature of work and position in late capitalism. About the same time as Bourriaud 
collected certain art practices together under the rubric of Relational Art, Daniel Pink’s 
short but frequently cited article, ‘The MFA is the new MBA’, marked an increasingly 
important general segue between creativity and entrepreneurship.4  Pink suggests that as a 
consequence of the globalized out-sourcing of service industries in the 21st century, 
corporate recruiters began to scout industry talent from leading art schools rather than 
business schools because art graduates represented a quality – ‘creativity’ – that cannot 
be outsourced. Differentiating product in an over-stocked marketplace requires lateral 
‘right-brain’ thinking and the production of ‘transcendent’ offerings that are ‘physically 
beautiful and emotionally compelling’. Simply stated, art adds value. Conversely, art 
itself might be said to operate in an over-stocked marketplace that requires ‘left-brain’ 
thinking and the reduction of ‘creative’ open ends to USPs and reliable products, a 
situation that Pink deftly ignores, but one that has implications for the role of signature in 
                                                
4  Pink, D. H. ‘The MFA is the new MBA’, Harvard Business Review (February 
2004) pp21-22; see also Florida, R. The Rise of the Creative Class (New York, NY: Basic 
Books, 2002); Hoffman, R. & Casnocha, B. The Start-Up of You (New York: Crown 
Business, 2012) 
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art. Can a theory and history of signatures in art inflect an understanding of how artists – 
as opposed to artworks - are and have been produced? 
 
 
1.1.2 BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO: THE PROJECTIVE CITY 
 
More significant than Pink’s aphoristic comment on the desirability of MFA graduates is 
Luc Boltanski & Eve Chiapello’s The New Spirit of Capitalism, which was published in 
France in 1999 (almost exactly contemporaneous with the publication in France of 
Bourriaud’s Relational Art in 1998).5  In The New Spirit of Capitalism, Boltanski & 
Chiapello analyze changes in the language of (French) management literature between 
the 1960s and 1990s, tracing and demonstrating the adaptive capacity of capitalism in 
terms of creativity. They note that, having assimilated artistic critique - the ‘repertoire of 
1968’ - business literature produced in the 1990s routinely reflected the values of 
‘autonomy, spontaneity, rhizomorphous capacity, multi-tasking, conviviality and 
openness’.6  They contend that first order global capitalism in the 21st century – ‘Third 
Spirit Capitalism’ – is characterized by what they call the ‘Projective City’, a system of 
organization that detaches capital entirely from material forms of wealth, dissipating it 
through high status social networks. Capital is reconstituted through encounters, events 
and projects – ‘pockets of accumulation’ - that exist for as long as they are needed. 
Material forms of wealth constitute obstacles to capital’s generative power which has a 
                                                
5  Boltanski, L. & Chiapello, E. The New Spirit of Capitalism, (London: Verso, 
2005) 
6  Ibid p5 
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‘genuinely abstract character that makes accumulation an interminable process’ (‘growth’ 
is achieved through esoteric transformation rather than physical expansion).7 
Organisation in the Projective City seeks to erode boundaries and erase the difference 
between work and non-work, with the result that neither labour nor products can be 
distinctly separated from people. Existence – which shares attributes with ‘visibility’ – is 
a ‘relational attribute’.8  Those who fail in the Projective City - who fail to connect, 
collaborate and establish useful networks - cannot reconstitute capital (they may not even 
be able to exchange their labour): they are invisible, denied existence. In the Projective 
City, a connected individual finds it easier to make future connections and reconstitute 
capital in their favour and this radiates outwards - for example, a connected institution 
can trade on the successes and positions of its alumni. As a conduit for visibility, 
signature irrigates general social position in the Projective City and its operation can be 
traced usefully in the history of art. 
 
Representing itself as a lived world of participation, accessibility and inclusion, an 
experience of the everyday in which private blurs into public, the Projective City shares 
ideological features with Bourriaud’s notion of Relational Art: ‘its theoretical horizon [is] 
the realm of human interactions and its social context, rather than the assertion of an 
independent and private symbolic space.’9 In Bourriaud’s view, Relational Art works to 
establish the artwork as ‘social interstice’, a space excepted from the temporal diktats, 
over-arching law of profit and general conditions governing human relations in 
                                                
7  Ibid xx 
8  Ibid p126  
9  Bourriaud, Relational Art, op.cit. p14 
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capitalism. So, to add to the set of questions posed above, we might ask if the 
abandonment of the ‘object’ in Relational Art is an attempt to flee the processes of 
commodification and if it is, does Relational Art succeed in that aim (given that 
Conceptual Art - also described by a desire to avoid reification - failed in this respect)? 
Unquestionably influential, Bourriaud, and the coterie of artists whose work he uses to 
progress his theory, have been accused of reproducing those commercial forms and 
imperatives of neo-liberalism that are predicated on creating and selling ‘experience’. 
The accusation is that far from proposing a space apart from capitalism as it is organized 
in the experience economy, Relational Art augments it.10 
 
Bourriaud observes the reification of social relations in everyday life as ‘standardized 
artefacts’ in order that he can construct an excepted, aesthetic space of art relations as 
fluid and free. He aspires to move Relational Art beyond those circuits of reification and 
commodification which appeared to hinder the Conceptual project by crediting it with the 
ability to produce temporary interstices in the everyday, free from the strictures of the 
‘White Cube’, (the contradictions between ‘temporary’ and ‘documentary’ are not 
resolved by Bourriaud, nor does he address the affinity between any ideologically 
excepted, aesthetic space and the White Cube).11  Bourriaud contends that as interstice,  
art partly ‘protects’ social relations from uniformity and reification: art is not the space in 
                                                
10  The term ‘experiential economy’ derives from the work of Pine, J. & Gilmore, J. 
The Experience Economy: Work is Theater and Every Business a Stage (Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press, 1999) 
11  The term ‘White Cube’ was initially used to differentiate contemporary art 
galleries which seemed to accept the discourse of Conceptual Art from those which 
departed from earlier Academic and museological models:  Doherty, B. Inside the White 
Cube: The Ideology of the Gallery Space (Expanded Edition) (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999)   
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which reification occurs, but the space in which it is dissolved. There is an implication 
that anything which is not uniform can thereby avoid reification - the relationship 
between uniformity and reification is anachronistic, rooted in ideas of early capitalist 
mass-production, and in this respect, Bourriaud’s theory is nostalgic. He ignores the 
important and obvious fact that Relational Art projects are usually organised under the 
auspices of established art institutions and successful Relational Artists, (those who are 
historicized and reputationally secured by curators and theorists like Bourriaud), are 
‘represented’ by conventional commercial gallery concerns. To posit art as capable of 
avoiding reification because it appears to maintain some physical distance from the 
gallery and does not make recourse to traditional genres, objects or materials is 
problematic.  
 
In Bourriaud’s formulation, Relational Art operates at an aestheticized distance from the 
‘everyday’ which is described as a qualitively different locale – it is the place where 
‘standardization’ and reification happen. Consequently, there are aspects of Bourriaud’s 
formulation which reiterate well-established antinomies between high and low culture; art 
and kitsch; between uniformity and difference, generality and particularity, transience 
and permanence; space and non-space. Bourriaud says the Relational Artist ‘dwells in the 
circumstances the present offers him so as to turn the setting of his life (his links with the 
physical and conceptual world) into a lasting world.’12  The use of ‘lasting’ contradicts 
the impermanence Bourriaud is required by his theory to read into Relational Art. Here, 
                                                
12  Bourriaud, Relational Art, op. cit. p14 
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again, his ideas give on to the aporiae that characterize signature and that is the point at 
which his theory collapses, at least as far as reification goes. 
 
 
1.1.3 RELATIONAL ART CONTESTED 
 
Stewart Martin challenges Bourriaud’s assumption that by prioritizing the social relations 
between people as mediums of experience, Relational Art avoids reification.13  For 
Martin, Bourriaud’s notion of Relational Art is caught in the same trap as those who, in 
the 1960s, believed that the dematerialised artform could resist commodification. Martin 
illustrates this point with a quote from Postproduction, (a follow-up to Relational Art), in 
which Bourriaud develops his theory through a configuration of culture as a bazaar (‘the 
wrong kind of shops’) and artists as ‘DJs’: 
artists might seek to rematerialize (the basic functions of our daily lives), to give shape to 
what is disappearing before our eyes. Not as objects which would be to fall into the trap 
of reification, but as mediums of experience.14 
It seems naïve of Bourriaud to suggest - in the late 1990s - that avoidance of (simple) 
objects (augmented by an avoidance of the White Cube) is an effective avoidance of the 
trap of reification. Martin states, ‘capitalist exchange value is not constituted at the level 
of objects, but of social labour, as a measure of abstract labour.’15  Bourriaud’s theorizing 
                                                
13 Martin, S. ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’ Third Text Vol. 21, Issue 4, (2007) 
pp369-386 
14  Bourriaud, N. Postproduction: Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprograms the 
World, (New York: Lukas & Sternberg, 2002) p7  
15  Martin, op. cit. p378 
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of Relational or Postproduction Art avoids admitting the superstructural importance of 
this and of the fact that human relationships are the foundation for ‘social labour’. Martin 
welcomes Bourriaud’s theorizing of Relational practice for the contribution it (ideally) 
makes to focusing the project of contemporary art on the political project of opposing 
capitalist ideology, but he judges Bourriaud to have fetishized ‘the social’ exactly as an 
impossible realm apart. Bourriaud’s failure to acknowledge signatory process leads his 
idealistic fetishization of ‘the Relational’ outside the general economy. 
 
As a Bourriaudian interstice, despite being released from the bounding, physical 
architecture of the White Cube, art is nonetheless bound by a process of reification that 
can be considered metaphorically as a process of sclerosis, a measurable arterial 
hardening of human relations - what for Boltanski & Chiapello is a stabilizing 
‘reduction’.16  Does the artist’s signature trade on any specific inheritances that equip it to 
operate as a measure of stability - a point of reduction that is simultaneously a point of 
accumulation and aggregation; a reification of the person (no longer able to separate life 
from work) and of the social relations producing that person; as the dematerialised 
principle of the White Cube? Is the artist’s signature (an old guarantee of presence and 
authenticity) evident in the structures which enable the Bourraudian Relational Artist? 
Just when signature seems most materially dissolute; deferred to interpretive ‘stuff’, 
(anecdotes, reviews, adverts, CVs, statements of practice); physically invisible in the 
artwork, is it assumed and omnipresent, configured as a stabilized nodal point, with the 
qualitative action of material? Far from proposing a space beyond reification, does 
                                                
16  Boltanski & Chiapello, op. cit. p145 
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Bourriaud require the delimiting, quasi-materialistic effects of signature and does 
Relational practice thus represent the manner of reification in the Projective City? The 
Dutch economist, Olav Velthius says: ‘In the unmasking of the equivalence bewteen art 
and economy, the signature plays an important role’: why is it ignored in Relational Art 
practice? 17 
 
Claire Bishop, whose analysis of Relational Art counterposes ‘antagonism’ to  
‘conviviality’, accuses Bourriaud of reifing himself and of establishing his signature, (and 
those of several artist-exemplars), through his curatorial activities. 18  She observes that 
certain artists favoured by Bourriaud in his exhibitions at the Palais de Tokyo, Paris and 
elsewhere appear with ‘metronymic regularity’ in Relational Art. The use of the word 
‘metronymic’ is hardly incidental and alludes simultaneously to the importance of 
signature in Relational Art, and to what might be styled a key operation of signature in 
the Projective City, that of homeostatic regulation. Despite this reservation, Bishop sets 
Bourriaud’s group of ‘mostly European’ artists against the ‘conservative’ generation of 
Young British Artists (YBAs), vindicating the former through the apparent erosion of 
individual subjectivity that seems to flow from Relational practice: 
unlike the distinctively branded personalities of young British art, it is often hard to 
identify who has made a particular piece of ‘relational’ art, since it tends to make use of 
existing cultural forms – including other works of art – and remixes them in the manner 
of a DJ or programmer. Moreover, many of the artists Bourriaud discusses have 
                                                
17  Velthius, O. Imaginary Economics: Contemporary Artists and the World of Big 
Money (Rotterdam: NAi, 2005) p47 
18  Bishop, C. ‘Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics’ October 110 (Fall 2004) 
pp51-79 
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collaborated with one another, further blurring the imprint of individual authorial status. 
Several have also curated each others’ work in exhibitions… 19 
Here, Bishop seems to exhibit a degree of faith in the interruptive potential of ‘remixing’ 
and ‘collaboration’ per se. She accepts Bourriaud’s definition of the Relational Artist as a 
‘DJ or programmer’ who is someone apparently excepted from producing anything that 
relies on the spurious discourse of ‘originality’. The discourse of originality is yoked to 
material production and in that movement, because remixed, collaborative practice makes 
no claims for ex nihilo ‘newness’, the Relational Artist is excepted from material 
production. This underpins the rationalization of Relational Art as a practice which 
avoids commodificiation.20  Bishop associates ‘distinctive branding’ with the ‘imprint of 
individual authorial status’, formulating a generative opposition between YBAs and 
Relational Artists in terms of how overtly and closely they appear to manifest their 
signatures in discrete objects for exhibition. The passage reads as if she believes 
Relational Art operates specifically against ‘signature’, (thereby according signature a 
defining and productive role in art that is previous, or counter to, Bourriaud’s 
formulation).  
 
Even as Relational Art gains traction by appearing to oppose signature as it is seen to 
expunge ‘branding’ and ‘individual authorial status’, as Bishop notices, its artists are 
nonetheless established by ‘metronymic regularity’, by a curator whose signature 
                                                
19  Ibid. p55 
20  The fact that the1990s saw the commercial rise of the ‘Superstar DJ’ is not 
addressed by either Bourriaud or Bishop. On this subject see, for example, Brewster, B. 
and Broughton, F. Last Night a DJ Saved My Life: The History of the Disc Jockey 
(London: Headline, 1999); Phillips, D. Superstar Djs Here We Go!: The Incredible Rise 
of Clubland’s Finest: Glory, Excess and Burnt Out Dreams (London, Random House, 
2009) 
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overrides and elaborates those of the artists he works with.  This operation mirrors the 
establishment of ‘brands’. Brands are essentially intangible (reputational) and in this 
respect dematerialised artworks operate through processes that mirror the legal notion of 
‘goodwill’. The mechanisms of branding have a long historical and conceptual 
association with the notion of ‘guarantee’ - branding attempts to attach value verifiably 
and traceably to source - and as such does not necessarily require or result in anything 
inherently ‘distinctive’, original or individual. Of course, originality is what the artist’s 
signature presumes to sign, to guarantee, so ‘original’ artworks embody a degree of 
paradox. Bishop’s desire to oppose Relational Artists to YBAs on the grounds of 
‘distinctive branding’ attaches signature reductively to YBAs as a stable appearance 
mainfest in the manual production of artworks, and does not recognise it as a process. 
 
Bishop’s alignment between ‘individual authorship’ and ‘conservatism’ assumes that 
collaboration necessarily mitigates against the imprint of the individual author. In the 
Projective City, does collaboration - the labour of global connection - inherently blur 
individual authorial status? How does the word ‘individual’ qualify ‘authorship’ in such a 
way as to posit collaborative authorship as necessarily less a point of accumulation than 
individual authorship? The author-function, as theorized by Michel Foucault in the late 
1960s, may well operate as single point of collection, but it is not the function of an 
individual, who, in any case, is not a water-tight, non-permeable being.21  Like Bourriaud, 
Bishop reads individually authored works as ‘complete’ and therefore ‘inactive’. 
Complete artworks, it is adjudged, have easily identifiable (‘signed’) authors and can 
                                                
21  Foucault. M. ‘What is an Author?’ (1969) in Preziosi, D. (ed.) The Art of Art 
History: A Critical Anthology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) pp321-334 
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only offer the spectator the opportunity for contemplation, unlike those experiential, 
Relational artworks that require the participation of the spectator in a productive process 
orientated towards creating interstice. One of the problems with faith in participation per 
se is that there is no necessary leveling of roles within Relational artworks: testament to 
this is Rikrit Tiravanjia’s inclusion of ‘lots of people’ in his inventory of ‘materials’ 
(something Bishop draws attention to). ‘Participation’ does not blur the distinction 
between artist and spectator any more than collaboration blurs or erases the imprint of 
individual authorship. Who or what claims credit on participatory projects; who fosters 
the conditions for participation and directs the action (at the most minimal level) really 
depends on who overwrites the ‘project’, who signs it off, to whom it accrues. If 
anything, participation enforces (certain) distinctions. Nor are there compelling grounds 
for adjudicating objects ‘complete’ by virtue of their materiality: the possibilities of 
encountering artworks is no better served by Relational Art simply because it is styled as 
‘experiential’ and its materiality is apparently transitory. If signature is a process not an 
appearance, how does this affect the criticial counterposition of ‘experience’ to ‘object’? 
 
So far, the problems and questions I have discussed may be broadly summarized as 
follows: Why does the specificity of the individual matter in Relational Art? What is the 
place of provenance in dematerialised artworks? Do dematerialised artworks avoid 
circuits of commodification by virtue of their dematerialisation? Does collaboration blur 
the imprint of individual authorial status? These are problems and questions that I think 
can be reframed through an analysis of how signatures have behaved historically, and 
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through developing a parallel understanding of what signatures are supposed to do 
conceptually. 
 
 
1.1.4 DEPARTING FROM FOUNTAIN 
 
As already mentioned, Bourriaud’s use of inframince opens his theorizing of Relational 
Art directly and deliberately onto the legacies of Duchamp, including the legacy of his 
critical engagement with signature. Duchamp signed work (including Readymades) in his 
own name, but it is the peculiarity of the pseudo-signature, ‘R. Mutt’, that brings his 
understanding of signature into focus: on Fountain, the name, R. Mutt, and date, 1917, 
are staged as the representation of a ‘proper signature’. Treatments of Fountain tend to 
depart from its object quality as an industrially produced ceramic, sometimes in terms of 
its physical beauty, sometimes on the basis of its rejection from the Society of 
Independent Artists (S.I.A.) exhibition in 1917, a rejection that is recovered latterly as a 
‘success’, (i.e. Fountain proves that an artist can get anything ‘non-art’ accepted as art in 
an exhibition).22  Though Fountain is often paraphrased as ‘a urinal signed by Marcel 
Duchamp’, there is a qualitive difference in the representative nature of its false signature 
when compared with other Readymades which carry Duchamp’s ‘own’ signature. This 
difference is not noticed or thought significant by Peter Bürger, who comments: 
                                                
22  e.g. Rowell, M. Objects of Desire: The Modern Still Life, (New York: MoMA, 
1997) 
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When Duchamp signs mass-produced objects (a urinal, a bottle-drier) and sends them to 
art exhibits he negates the category of individual production… The signature, whose very 
purpose is to mark what is individual in the work, that it owes its existence to this 
particular artist, is inscribed on an arbitarily chosen mass product, because all claims to 
individual creativity are to be mocked. Duchamp’s provocation not only unmasks the art 
market where signature can mean more than the quality of the work; it radically questions 
the very principle of art in bourgeois society according to which the individual is 
considered the creator of the work of art. 23 
Bürger’s understanding of what signature is and does relies on the commonplace, 20th 
century acceptance of signature as an autograph that completes and ties what it signs to a 
verifiable, creative individual. He also accepts that, at this point in history, signature is 
largely what makes art marketable, (Bürger produced this work in the early 1970s, but his 
reading does not acknowledge that Fountain did not wholly enter the market or general 
discourse at that time it was first produced). The material and historical circumstances 
that enable and lead to the pseudo-signature on Fountain are passed over even as the 
consequences of it are taken for granted. Specifically, Fountain’s signature is never 
figured against the prevalent signing practices of the early 20th century. The fact that 
Fountain can be routinely thought of as a urinal ‘signed by Marcel Duchamp’ illustrates 
the hazy operation of signature, hovering between counterfeit and truth as something that 
relies on being taken for granted and accepted as genuine. Duchamp signed a urinal but 
not in his name, or, at least, not in his given name: the signature is transvestite. It is 
necessary to the function of signature in general that it is accepted prima facie. What 
Duchamp does with R. Mutt is expose this quality. R. Mutt is not merely executed as an 
                                                
23 Bürger, P. Theory of the Avant-Garde (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1984) 
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autograph, it is a ‘false’ autograph and it was not merely designed to ease the passage of a 
mass-produced object into the art market, it was designed to affront a committee of 
initiates and solicit rejection from an open exhibition.  
 
In Kant After Duchamp, Thierry De Duve comes near to indicating the importance of 
signature to Fountain, devoting some attention to the circuits of mediation that produced 
it in 1917. He writes about the implications of Fountain’s appearance in ‘The Blindman’, 
(a journal produced in two issues by Duchamp in apparent association with Henri-Pierre 
Roché and Beatrice Wood around the time of the S.I.A. Exhibition), and describes 
Fountain as an enactment orchestrated by Duchamp through a nexus of social 
connections in which the qualities represented by the people and institutions involved 
coalesce around their names.24  Imperative in this orchestration is Duchamp’s own 
authorizing name, which appears to shift in proximity to the object and his various 
psuedonyms: distanced, perhaps it appears in sharpest focus. Besides ‘producing’ 
Fountain as a sculpture, Duchamp was one of the founder members of the organization 
that rejected it for exhibition; he was behind the name ‘Richard Mutt’ under which it was 
submitted to the S.I.A, and he organized publication (in ‘The Blindman’) of the 
photograph, taken by Alfred Stieglitz, which documented Fountain, (in fact, there is a 
strong case for stating that it is the photograph which enacts the Readymade). Of 
Stieglitz’s photograph, De Duve says: 
…one can be certain that if Duchamp addressed Stieglitz it was not just to obtain a 
photograph. The photograph had to be signed, and what better signature than that of 
                                                
24 De Duve, T. Kant After Duchamp (Cambridge: MIT/October, 1996) 
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Stieglitz, the artist, the maker of the American avant-garde, the former honorary vice-
president of the Armory Show, the prestigious and irascible guru of 291…25 
However, aside from indicating the erstwhile ‘Sunday Painter’, Louis Eilshemius, as R. 
Mutt’s painterly ‘Other’ (for De Duve, Eilshemius is a shadow figuration of Duchamp’s 
abandonment of painting), De Duve does not address the established practices and norms 
of what could lead to a counterfeit autograph being applied in black paint to a urinal in an 
effort to make it operate and be recognised as art. Perhaps, as with Bürger, this is because 
those practices and norms seem to be so commonplace and obvious as to be insignificant. 
Alternatively, it could be that signature is passed over because it seems to belong so 
prosiacally to an art that was of a different, disappearing order, the kind typified by the 
easel bound, figurative painting of a Sunday painter. The signed artwork seems - in 1917 
- to be obsolete. Even in those discussions that take the mediation of Fountain seriously 
and explore the nature of the delay that permitted it to deploy within the theorizing of 
Conceptual Art, the materiality, history and effectiveness of the signature is taken for 
granted, without sufficient analysis. This thesis addresses that deficit. 
 
 
1.1.5 DUCHAMP AND A NEW AESTHETIC REGIME 
 
If R. Mutt might be considered the ‘final’ signature of an aesthetic regime De Duve styles 
as one in which art was governed by evaluative judgments, (by ‘taste’), it is also styled 
one that is simultaneously the ‘first’ of a regime in which art is governed by declarations 
                                                
25  Ibid. p118 
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of eligibility, (by nomination). The title of De Duve’s study, Pictorial Nominalism, 
derives from a note in Duchamp’s White Box and generates Freudian psychoanalysis and 
Duchamp’s avant-garde practice as historically delimited ‘heuristic parallels’.26  De 
Duve’s method of heuristic parallelism involves discerning strong points of connection 
between two apparently incommensurate historicities and is described in Pictorial 
Nominalism. ‘Pictorial Nominalism’, fully in De Duve’s consolidating work in Kant After 
Duchamp, describes a scheme in which the ‘baptism’ of an object - the ‘choice’ of it - can 
effect it as art. As Pictorial Nominalism, Duchamp’s Readymades deliberately draw 
attention to the non-manual constructions at play in delivering ‘everyday’ objects as ‘art’, 
i.e. dissonant to self-similar objects in everyday life. Pictorial Nominalism reveals art as 
an ‘autonymy’, (a self-naming, autogenetic regime), and not as an ‘autonomy’, (the ideal 
and effective Modernist self-sufficient object). 
 
 In Kant After Duchamp, De Duve extrapolates a general scheme for art in which taste, 
(since the 18th century, the arbiter of aesthetics rationalized according to the ideals of 
‘beauty’), is displaced by nomination, represented ipso facto by the Readymade. The 
category of beauty is replaced by a category of art in which Kantian aesthetics have no 
place to negotiate. Duchamp is seen to usher in a conceptual anarchy in which ‘anything 
goes’ against the category of the beautiful because he appears to disavow taste: as an 
autonymy, art is an absolute heterogeneity in which the exercise of choice is the only 
necessary determinant - ‘it is art if I say it is art’. Setting aside the complexities that 
determine ‘I’ as an institution empowered to choose effectively, (these complexities go to 
                                                
26 De Duve, T. Pictorial Nominalism: On Marcel Duchamp’s Passage from 
Painting to the Readymade (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) 
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the heart of what is at stake in signature), such a position on the Readymade styles it the 
result of a ‘speech act’ avant-la-lettre. De Duve accepts the basic condition that after 
Duchamp and the Readymade, irrespective of any residual artisanal or material qualities 
carried through by the appropriation of everyday objects, art is a field of absolute 
heterogeneity constructed and navigated by speech acts. As a field of absolute 
heterogenity, differences between the tangible and intangible qualities of art are levelled. 
In speech act theory, the issue of signature is foundational, and it is in speech act theory 
that the work of Derrida is indicated in proximity to both the Readymade and signature. 
 
 
1.1.6 SPEECH ACT THEORY 
 
Speech act theory was formulated in the 1950s by J. L. Austin in How To Do Things With 
Words. 27 According to his formulation, speech acts are performative utterances that 
accomplish actions or effects in the real world: Austin uses the example of wedding 
vows, which, recited according to convention, effect a change of status. Applied to the 
Readymade, speech act theory holds that in positing a urinal as a work of art, Duchamp 
effects it as such: he changes its status from a functional object to an artwork. 
Theoretically, the power to make art is a power to ‘action’ art, to bring it into view, not 
merely or principally to physically manufacture objects. In Austinian speech act theory, 
hand-written signatures are veritable and verifiable proxies guaranteeing ‘presence’: they 
                                                
27  Austin, J. L. How To Do Things With Words (Second Edition) (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1975) 
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represent speech acts in written form and are the means by which statements, declarations 
and confessions can be attributed to specific individuals. Signatures are empowered to 
say ‘a speech act has taken place’ and that power is derived from their physical 
connection to the signatory. If there is a tendency in visual art theory to treat the speech 
act as orientated (purely) towards transforming something that is manifestly not art into 
‘art’, a tendency to which De Duve subscribes, that tendency entails ignoring the place 
that the speech act - as written signature - has potentialy had in the general scheme of art 
prior to Duchamp, in art that is manifestly ‘art’. One of the consequences of tying the 
speech act to the Readymade is that it is seen only to relate to the transformation of pre-
produced objects. Can the signature of Vincent Van Gogh on a painting be seen to mark a 
speech act in the same way as the appearance of the pseudo-signature on Fountain marks 
a speech act? Addressing this question marks a place where strong theoretical links 
between Duchamp and Derrida begin to intersect. There is no coherent body of work in 
this area: this thesis aims to define and draw attention to the gap and to begin to develop 
the grounds for considering Duchamp and Derrida fraternally. It advances a plea for 
understanding the continuing legacy of the written signature in dematerialised art 
practices. 
 
 
1.1.7 THE DIVIDED SEAL: CECI N’EST PAS UN AUTOGRAPH 
 
The title of my thesis derives from Derrida’s definition of signature in SEC as an 
‘enigmatic paraph’, a ‘divided seal’, at once unique and iterable. In SEC, Derrida engages 
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with Austin’s formulation of the speech act and the essay represents his most direct 
engagement with written signatures. Most existing work that extends the construction of 
signature in SEC proceeds to positions principally established in philosophy, 
jurisprudence and literature, rather than in visual art, (thus John R. Searle’s famous 
rejoinder to SEC, Reiterating the Differences: A Reply To Derrida was published in a 
journal devoted to literary criticism).28  Neither is SEC the usual starting point for 
consideration of Derrida’s theories in art and aesthetics. The segue between signature in 
literary, jurisprudential and pilosophical registers and aesthetics is not unproblematic on 
any of the grounds of iterability, originality, biography, body, trace or ‘enigma’ that 
appear to have particular emphasis in art. The relationship between Derrida’s theorizing 
of signature in SEC and his engagement with visual art is complicated by his observation 
that there is a processual incompatibility between visual art, (which he takes to be 
paintings and sculptures), and the written signature, (which he sees as necessarily foreign 
to visual art form because it is alphabetic). Nonetheless, in Deconstruction and the Visual 
Arts, Peter Brunette & David Wills comment that: 
…it is the visual arts that bring the signature effect into clearer focus, for there the 
signature acts as a rigorous internal frame, defining the work as a commodity and 
assigning the limits on the basis of which the whole proprietorial institution will operate. 
Yet the signature is also foreign to what it defines, a piece of writing within the figural 
space that disturbs the homogeneity of the medium; what seals the work is therefore what 
breaks it open to reveal the otherness that resides within it. Conversely, the authority that 
the signature represents as a mark of authenticity and as institutional inscription is 
dispersed within figural space. Just as in Derrida’s analyses of literature the proper name 
                                                
28  Searle, J. R. 'Reiterating the Differences: A Reply To Derrida' , Glyph 1 (1977) 
pp198-208 
  31 
is found to operate as a common noun, so the signature in the painting becomes a series 
of lines or traits, participating in the graphic design, at the extreme, evoking the 
anonymity of the X.29 
Signature is seen to have a role in defining artwork, and though there are hints that the 
artist’s signature is something which completes artworks as commodities and its primary 
relationship is thus with the market, Brunette & Wills realise that signature operates on a 
sliding scale which runs from anonymity to renown, from coherence and simultaneity 
with medium and material to distance and peripheral attachment. The terms in which they 
describe signature foreground its potential as a radical action - dispersing, disturbing and 
breaking open. 
 
Derrida, who considered the palpable materiality of Van Gogh’s impasto in this interview 
with Brunette & Wills, states that ‘Van Gogh signs with his body’, meaning that in visual 
art, signature is implicated in every moment of production.30 It is not just (or most 
importantly) an ‘appended name’. However analysis of how appended names work is 
useful in revealing how ambiguous and invisible signatures also operate. Herman 
Rapaport points out that Derrida’s understanding of the artist is predicated on a ‘Kantian’ 
notion of visual art, and certainly his engagement with visual art is notable for a lack of 
specific attention to the dematerialised practices which characterized the artistic milieu 
contemporaneous with the genesis and publication of SEC.31 Perhaps Derrida’s own 
‘blind spot’ in this regard is to blame for the lack of attention paid to the many 
                                                
29  Brunette, P. & Wills, D. (eds.), Deconstruction and the Visual Arts: Art, Media, 
Architecture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p5 
30  Ibid. p15 
31  See Rapaport, H. ‘Brushed Path, Slate Line, Stone Circle: On Martin Heidegger, 
Richard Long, and Jacques Derrida’. Ibid pp151-167 
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sympathetic parallels between his work and the work of Duchamp.32 Equally, it is 
possible that Derrida saw no essential difference between ‘Kantian’ and ‘post-Kantian’ 
artforms, (he reads the the bodily signature of Van Gogh as equivalent to the appended 
name of Van Gogh: in a sense, he considers that issues of signature in art proceed from a 
position of dematerialisation ‘always and already’). In general, Derrida treats the notion 
of dematerialisation with circumspection: 
It is not in itself a novelty or a mutation that the modes of appropriation are becoming 
spectral, are “dematerializing” [sic] (a very deceptive word, meaning that in truth they are 
moving from one king of matter to another and actually becoming all the more material, 
in the sense that they are gaining potential dynamis).33 
Aside from ‘Kantian’ artworks, Derrida was concerned with the status of the photograph 
in ‘Right of Inspection’ and Copy, Signature, Archive: in the latter, he makes clear that 
the process of photographing is a signatory one.34  This is an important point for 
consideration, (and relevant for reconfiguring the appreciation of Fountain), however it is 
one that requires the ‘pre-photographic’ analysis pursued in this thesis before it can be 
properly addressed.  
 
 
 
                                                
32  One study (not concerned with signature) is Tucker, T. D. Derridada: Duchamp 
as Readymade Deconstruction (Lanham: Lexington, 2009) 
33  Derrida, J. Paper Machine (Cultural Memory in the Present) (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2005) p56  
34  Plissart, M-F. & Derrida, J. Right of Inspection (New York: Monacelli Press, 
1998); Derrida, J. Copy Signature Archive (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2010) 
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1.2 METHODOLOGY 
 
1.2.1 THE LIMITS OF A SEMIOTIC APPROACH 
 
In advancing the notion that the contingency and importance of the signature R. Mutt on 
Fountain has been ignored or marginalized in critical and historical treatments of the 
Readymade and Duchamp’s legacy, this thesis advances the notion that signature has 
been misunderstood and misplaced in art history in general. It is true that in the second 
half 20th century, in the wake of linguistic studies by Ferdinand Saussure and Claude 
Levi-Strauss, signature began to be recognized as a subject for study. In art history, ‘L’art 
de la signature’, an essay which appeared in Revue de l’Art in 1974, is highly profiled as 
a source which initially propagated interest in the subject.35  Not surprisingly at this time, 
there was a tendency to treat the issue of signature in terms of its semiotic potential. 
There are, however, serious limits in approaching signature semiotically, stemming from 
the fact that such approach is neither historically sensitive, nor philosophically reflexive. 
For example in his essay ‘Semiotics of Signatures in Paintings’, Claude Gandelman seeks 
to construct a semiotic grid for signatures in paintings based on Charles S. Peirce’s 
categories of ‘object’, ‘representamen’, ‘interpretant’ and ‘combinatory dynamics’.36 
                                                
35  Chastel, A. et al. ‘L’art de la signature’, Revue de l’Art 26 (1974) pp8-54. This 
issue of Revue de L’Art is frequently cited in such academic work as there is: Kooper, E. 
S. ‘Signature and Art and the Art of the Signature’ in Burgess, G. (ed.) Court and Poet: 
Selected Proceedings of the Third Congress of the International Courtly Literature 
Society (Liverpool 1980) (Liverpool: Francis Cairns, 1981) pp223-231; Gandelman, C. 
‘Semiotics of Signatures in Paintings’, The American Journal of Semiotics Vol. 3 No. 3 
(1985) pp73-108. (A subsequent issue of Revue de L’Art (36/1976) returned to signature 
as a subject). 
36  Gandelman, ibid. 
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Gandelman’s taxonomy does not respond to historical models as much as wholly split 
them from their context in order to squeeze them into exemplifying his typology, (he 
does not even consistently mention the dates of the works he uses to illustrate this 
typology).  
 
Thus, the categorical difference between James Ensor’s signature-as-bird-droppings in a 
drawing, Les Squelettes Jouant Au Billard (c.1890) (not dated by Gandelman) – an 
‘ironic’ instance of ‘self-persiflage’ - is differentiated, despite stylistic sympathies, from 
Pisanello’s signature in the painting Virgin, St Anthony and St George (c.1435-41) (again, 
not dated by Gandelman), which is rendered as blades of grass in the central foreground 
of the work on the basis that the latter is an ‘iconic’, ‘non-integrated’, ‘figurative’ 
signature. Gandelman does not apply similar descriptors to the former, so it is difficult to 
ascertain how he views it, (the signatures can be chronologically separated by some 500 
years, but Gandelman is not concerned with this). If the difference in this example is 
neither stylistic nor historical, it seems to be quite an arbitrary distinction, based on a 
subjective appreciation of scatology and humour, not logic. Pisanello’s painting is 
likewise contrasted with Manet’s signature on a wine bottle in Le Bar des Folies 
Bergères (1881-82) (not dated by Gandelman): Manet’s signature is an ‘iconic’, 
‘integrated’ signature that is a ‘dicent-indexical sinsign’, presumably different from 
Ensor’s signature on this basis. For all that Gandelman illustrates his text with compelling 
examples, because he has forced a ‘Peircian’ analysis on them - an analysis which floats 
free from history - his typology of 15 forms of signatures is frequently confusing, with 
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semiotic jargon obfuscating rather than clarifying the form and function of artists’s 
signatures: 
Qua representamen signatures, therefore, can only be sinsigns and legisigns, sinsign 
because they are unique, concrete signs actually realized on canvas; legisigns because 
they are necessary ‘art historical particles’ belonging to a symbolic rule elaborated 
mainly between the 17th and the 19th century… As objects (object-signs) we have seen 
already that they belong to three categories: icon, index and symbol. As interpretants, 
signatures can either be rhematic or dicent. Rhematic when they merely designate their 
“contact” in the more basic manner, as thumbprints or handwritten names. But signatures 
can also be dicent whenever they tell us something about the artist (Holbein is Hohl Bein 
like, the artist is (is not) Christ-like (Ensor)…Signatures can be indexic: indeed they are 
usually seen as indices. If so they are either rhematic-indexic-sinsigns or dicent-indexic-
sinsigns…37 
At the very least, the circumstances that lead Gandelman to equate thumbprints and 
handwritten names cannot be fully explored in a semiotic grid. His semiotic approach to 
signature is unclear and inconsistent, caught between idiosyncracies of individual artists 
and paintings and the urge to reflect those idiosyncracies fully within a general taxonomy 
based on a pre-determined, abstract grid.  
 
Gandelman allows particularities of depiction to lead him in constructing his taxonomy. 
He does not attempt to look at the broad historical trends that signatures necessarily 
embody, preferring to construe the practice of signing as the result of individual habit and 
preference. At the level of appearance, the behaviour of signature is at once too general 
                                                
37 Ibid. p104 
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and too particular to fit any taxonomy or history. Gandelman has no theoretical basis for 
understanding signature as a process, consequently his work is mired in the seemingly 
expressive potential that artists’s signatures seem to possess. Gandelman is, in the end, 
concerned with how signatures appear rather than what they do. His semiotic grid works 
against signature’s ability to play many roles simultaneously and it prevents him 
conceptualising signature’s functions. Signature exists in a state of flux. To understand 
the signature on Fountain semiotically according to Gandelman’s scheme would entail 
fixing it on a semiotic grid according to its substrate, form and wordplay, leading to a 
serious misunderstanding of what it actually does.38 
 
 
1.2.2 CHALLENGING THE ‘CLASSIC’ POSITION 
 
Although ‘L’art de la signature’ is an important marker to consider in developing a 
critique of signature in art, a specific discussion of signature occurs earlier than this in the 
work of Jean Pierre Rossignol, who published Trois Dissertations: Sur L’Inscription de 
Delphes… Sur L’Ouvrage D’Anaximènes de Lampsaque… Sur La Signature des Oeuvres 
D’Art in 1850.39 As an antiquarian, Rossignol’s field of interest was Ancient Greek and 
Roman artefacts, and it is significant that in many of the discussions stemming from the 
                                                
38 Gandelman also looks at signature as subversion, though his discussion suffers 
from some of the problems inherent in adopting a semiotic approach. See Gandelman, C. 
‘By Way of Introduction: Inscriptions as Subversion’ Visible Language Vol. 23 No. 2-3. 
(Spring/Summer 1989) pp140-169  
39  Rossignol, J-P. Trois Dissertations: Sur L’Inscription de Delphes…Sur 
L’Ouvrage D’Anaximènes de Lampsaque…Sur La Signature des Oeuvres D’Art. (Paris: 
Auguste Durand, 1862) 
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‘L’art de la signature’, notwithstanding the ‘indexical’ place of rhematic thumb-prints 
(which open the issue of signature out directly onto Neolithic art), the focus has been on 
analyzing and describing artworks produced during and after the Renaissance, rather than 
any contemporary, 19th century or Ancient examples. The bias towards accepting the 
Renaissance as the key period for the study of signature has been reinforced by the 
publication of a clutch of recent studies examining its practice at that time, both in 
general and in the work of individual artists.40 This bias is indicative of the (still strong) 
tendency to view the Renaissance as the point of origin for the history of artists, if not for 
‘art’ in general. The general assumption is that prior to the Renaissance, those involved in 
the production of images and objects are to be viewed as ‘artisans’ rather than ‘artists’ 
and are thus ‘anonymous’. Artisans are perceived to lack an artistic self-consciousness or 
awareness of their creativity inviduality, and therefore signature - a mark of creative 
individuation - is seen to be irrelevant for them. The fact that the majority of pre-
Renaissance images and objects are unsigned is accepted as evidence of this fact, and the 
default position is that pre-Renaissance signatures were unimportant or unknown.  
 
The basis for these assumptions needs to be questioned. Firstly, the class of ‘unsigned’ 
objects is comprised of those that might be determined as coming within the ambit of art 
history by virtue of their painted or sculpted forms, so there must be classes of objects 
                                                
40  For example: Bohn, B. ‘The construction of artistic reputation in Seicento 
Bologna: Guido Reni and the Sirani’, Renaissance Studies, Vol. 25 No. 4 (2010) pp52-
79; Goffen, R. ‘Raphael’s Designer Labels: From the Virgin Mary to La Fornaria’ 
Artibus et Historiae  Vol, 24 No. 48 (2003), pp123-42; Matthew L. C. ‘The Painter’s 
Presence: Signatures in Venetian Renaissance pictures’, Art Bulletin, Vol. 80 No. 4 
(1998) pp616-48; Rubin. P ‘Signposts of Invention: Artists’s Signatures in Italian 
Renaissance Art’, Art History, Vol. 29 No. 4, pp563-599 (September 2006)   
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and images for which are excluded, (goldsmiths, for example, have a long history of 
applying monograms to their work, but their work is not historically constituted as ‘art’). 
Secondly, there is a risk of overlooking the importance or purpose of those pre-
Renaissance, art historically enabled objects that were signed. Thirdly, there is the risk of 
assuming that, from the Renaissance onwards, art historically enabled objects have a 
straight-forward relationship with signature to the extent that it can be assumed even 
when it is not present, (indeed, signatures are not present in most Renaissance and post-
Renaissance work, despite their use a measure of individuation). Consequently, signature 
is seen to be relevant only for ‘creative’ individuals. 
 
The default position assumes that written signatures have played an important role in 
secularizing art during the Renaissance, (in securing a place for art outside liturgical 
service), and to have produced a gradual but definite bifurcation in terminology: ‘artisan’ 
(artesano) and ‘artist’ (artista) are both terms which date from the 14th century in Italy.41 
According to John Roberts, the terminological bifurcation marks a new division of labour 
in studio workshops as the work of the artist became associated with disegno – 
preparatory drawing and design – and the more mundane work of preparing canvases, 
grinding pigments, blocking in backgrounds and peripheral elements was entrusted to 
skilled assistants.42 Defined by tasks in this way, artists and artisans attenuate along 
                                                
41  ‘artist, n.’ OED Online. June 2013. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/11237?rskey=eZA2IK&result=1&isAdvanced=false 
(accessed 27th July 2013). 
 ‘artisan, n.’ OED Online. June 2013. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/11235 (accessed 27th July 2013). 
42  Roberts, J. The Intangibilities of Form: Skill and Deskilling in Art after the 
Readymade (London: Verso, 2007) 
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hierarchical lines of cultural and social status, with the former becoming ‘elevated’ and 
more skilled according to the division of labour in the painter’s studio. There are some 
grounds for suggesting that the division of labour necessitates signature as a device for 
collecting differentiated tasks together, and as such it belongs to artists who take credit 
for all the work done. So, in the division of labour, the artwork itself becomes subject to 
division, and the tasks which must be fulfilled into order to produce it are separated and 
categorised as either ‘artistic’ or ‘artisanal’ – it is the artistic tasks which are taken to be 
signed. Despite this, the appearance of personal signatures at this time does not – by itself 
- mark a schism between artists and artisans: if the artisan is imagined as ‘anonymous’ 
this is counteracted by historical exemplars for Renaissance artisans were at least as 
likely to have marked their work with a signifiying stamp or monogram as artists were to 
use signatures. 
 
Looming large in the routine that assigns signature to artists rather than artisans is 
Giorgio Vasari’s Lives of the Great Artists, a foundational text for much art history 
between the 17th and 20th centuries.43 Having placed a narrative emphasis on individual 
‘greatness’, Vasari initiated the means of establishing the European canon of ‘Great Art’ 
and the history of artists which Heinrich Wölfflin took exception to.44 According to 
Griselda Pollock & Rosika Parker, ‘canonicity’ is the disingenuous movement of 
culturally vested interests presented as fait accompli, a naturalized notion of what is 
                                                
43  Vasari, G. The Lives of the Artists trans. Bondanella J. C. & Bondanella P., 
(Oxford: Oxford World’s Classics, 1998) 
44  Wölfflin called for ‘art history without names’. Wölfflin, H. Principles of Art 
History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art (Mineola, NY: Dover, 
1950) 
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(already) great and to be universally valued. 45 In Differencing the Canon, canonicity is 
seen to establish self-perpetuating hegemonies, ignoring and excluding any artworks or 
artists arising illegitimately; it is: 
a discursive formation which constitutes the objects/texts it selects as the products of 
artistic mastery, and, thereby, contributes to the legitimisation of white masculinity’s 
exclusive identification with creativity and with Culture. To learn about Art, through 
canonical discourse, is to know masculinity as power and meaning, and all three as 
identical with Truth and Beauty.46 
In the face of such naturalization, contrary to what might be expected, signatures are 
structurally problematic because they are necessarily particular, and when signature is 
seen solely as a virtue of the artist endowed with ‘genius’, (and is  thereby a ‘higher’ 
valence of the artisan), the irruptive potential of ‘the particular’ can be overlooked. In her 
work on the 17th century Siranis, (father and daughter painters, Giovanni and Elizabetta), 
Babette Bohn observes that Elizabetta signed far more works than did her father or any of 
her (male) Bolognese counterparts. Bohn suggests this may have been down to 
Elizabetta’s struggle for recognition, the misattribution of her works (to her father) and/or 
to the exotic, taboo appeal of owning a painting made by a woman.47  In part, this thesis 
extends the challenge to the naturalized assumptions that read artists’s signatures as 
expressively marking genius. It describes the potential that signature has as a pollutant, as 
a disruptive social, rather than creatively stabilizing, element. 
 
                                                
45  Pollock, G. & R. Parker Differencing the Canon: Feminist Discourse and the 
Writing of Art’s Histories (Oxford: Routledge, 1999); Parker, R. & G. Pollock, Old 
Mistresses: Women, Art and Ideology (London: Pandora, 1981)  
46  Pollock & Parker, ibid. p9 
47  Bohn, op. cit. 
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1.3 THESIS PLAN  
 
1.3.1 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
 
Aside from the specialist studies to which have been referred to, there is not much 
sustained analysis of signature in art history (at least in English). More often than not, as 
a subject, ‘signature’ does not even make the indices of art histories or theories, whether 
those are broadly scoped or not. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no similar 
attempt to understand signature functionally and apply that functional understanding to a 
broad range of historical examples. My thesis works to address the gap in four principal 
ways: it expands and connects the periods for which signature is thought to be a relevant 
consideration; it shows how signature operates as a problem and pollutant in opposition 
to purist readings of art history; it states the case for considering signature’s curious 
relationship with temporality to be of primary significance, and it considers how 
signature acts to produce hierarchies of realism through contests with materiality. 
Essentially, it treats signature as a process which produces appearances by using the 
historically variable appearance of signatures to locate and orientate the signatory 
process.   
 
Finding limits in the semiotic approach to signature typified by Gandelman, I hope to 
provide an historical basis for understanding the signature, R. Mutt, and in doing so,  aim 
to establish new lines of material inheritance for it. This is a unique approach to Fountain 
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in the considerably populated field of Duchampian scholarship.  Consequent to the 
establishment of this foundation for Fountain, I also suggest that the place for 
understanding the speech act in the general scheme of art prior to Duchamp ought to be 
recast. The appearance of signatures on ‘conventional’, ‘Kantian’ artworks potentially 
establishes those artworks as operationally equivalent speech acts to Fountain, regardless 
of their prima facie status as paintings and sculptures. Signature suggests a way of 
disregarding the empircial substrate in order to pursue the artist as a function in history. 
To put it another way, I suggest that as a signature, R. Mutt expresses continuity between 
Fountain and the paintings and sculptures which precede it, and I question whether it can 
be understood to arise ex nihilo as the art of an entirely new aesthetic order.  
 
The clutch of fairly recent specialist Renaissance studies I have already mentioned look 
at the practice of signature in order to show how it might be seen, variously, to have 
reflected the movement of art in terms of ‘invention’, ‘market’, ‘transgression’ and 
incipient ‘feminism’. They tend not look beyond the confines of a specific period to 
describe the precedents for signature, nor do they interpret the practices and artists that 
follow. Largely, they seem to accept that the Renaissance is when the practice of signing 
artworks meaningfully began. One of the aims of this thesis is to illustrate the fact that 
signature is subject to stylistic and functional changes on either side of the Renaissance – 
it does not ‘begin’ then. Whilst the importance of the Renaissance for the study of 
signature is acknowledged, the thesis takes a much longer historical view overall and 
makes the case for considering the study of signature in art as a general element, i.e. not 
solely as a chronologically or subject-delimited interest for specialist historians. The 
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visibility, location and function of signature is historically variable and it is a relevant 
theoretical and formal consideration before, during and after the Renaissance. 
 
On this basis, I suggest that Duchamp used signature to take apart the structural legacies 
that have contributed to establishing the artist, and that these legacies are not just found in 
immediate 19th century predecessors, but in a long, complicated history of art production 
that extends further back beyond the Renaissance, through the Byzantine era into 
Antiquity. In doing so, I ask whether R. Mutt allows us to seek historical models for the 
artist other than those that are currently accepted: is the figure of the medieval donor as 
necessary in the figuration of the ‘proto-artist’ as the artisan? Is this view is permitted 
when the artist is read as a function and the history of art is viewed with a post-
Duchampian model in mind, rather than a Romantic or Modernist one? Academic 
analysis of examples shows that the appearance of signatures on Antique artefacts can be 
theoretically underpinned by a performative aspect.48 Derrida’s signatory theory 
underscores this work by demonstrating that signatories are not intact throughout the 
process of signing, nor are they entire to begin with. It interrupts purist tendencies in 
readings of art history, questions the nature and locus of creativity and addresses the 
notion that artistic presence can ever be fully restituted. In its particularity, signature is 
indicative of an emanicipatory impurity and indicates an unstable subject. It demonstrates 
the impossibility of textual hyigene and I look to Marcy L. North’s study of Renaissance 
                                                
48  Osbourne, R. ‘The Art of Signing in Ancient Greece’, (Spring 2010), Arethusa, 
Vol. 43, No. 2, Spring 2010 
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authorship to show how ragged authorial boundaries can be.49 Michel Camille’s study of 
manuscript marginalia shows how signature can mark authorship indirectly, as an ‘aside’ 
which marks social affinity rather than individual, creative ambition.50 I contend that 
anonymity varies in visibility and interpretability and that signature is the device which 
modulates that. The slippery, symbiotic relationships between signature, text and author 
mean that signature is at once the place for ‘lowest common denominator’ authorship and 
for the radical equivalence of subject and thing. In this, Derrida’s reading of Francis 
Ponge is of particular relevance.51 
 
Throughout my thesis, the complicated issue of the unusual temporal claims signature 
makes is of significance; particularly so in terms of the relationships between 
temporality, materiality and signature. In SEC, Derrida demonstrates that signature 
includes absence as a structural necessity and this absence is an important factor in how 
signature behaves in contrast to how it appears to behave. Not only is signature a 
revenant which ‘begins’ by coming back, it is an apparition of permanence, a guise which 
has the appearance of fact, a general maintenance. Signature has a function to play in the 
act of witness, and I address this in relation to the signature which appears on Jan Van 
Eyck’s Arnolfini Portrait (1434) (Fig. 2). The implication that signature marks an act of 
witness requires an acceptance that it simultaneously marks an act of completion: if 
signature is not a mark of completion - if it does not attempt to set seal - can it have any 
                                                
49 North, M. The Anonymous Renaissance: Cultures of Discretion in Tudor-Stuart 
England (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2003) 
50 Camille, M. Image on the Edge: The Margins of Medieval Art (London: Reaktion, 
1992) 
51  Derrida, J. Signsponge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984) 
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persuasion as an act of witness? Thus, the type of witness artists attest to when their 
practice is allied to naturalism is also addressed. If naturalism was a key driver in the 
relocation of materiality in Renaissance artworks, (as I contend), the role of trompe l’oeil 
in permitting artistic skill to be asserted as the primary value in an artwork is of critical 
importance. On this basis, I suggest that art history can accommodate a narrative that sees 
the artist emerges against the object rather than out of the artisan during the early 
Renaissance. In turn, this emergence can be linked to a ‘decluttering’ - a clearing of space 
in 12th century illuminated manuscripts which become visually less dense in order that 
scripts may become more legible. 
 
 
1.3.2 OUTLINE 
 
My thesis falls into two parts, with the Introduction listed as Chapter 1 and the 
Conclusion as Chapter 7. The first part concentrates on Derrida’s conception of signature 
and his engagement with visual art, the second part on a functional analysis of signature 
in specific art historical exemplars. In Part 1, Chapter 2 concentrates on Derrida’s 
construction of signature through several key texts, emphasizing its importance in 
Derrida’s conceptualization of ‘presence’. Derrida understands ‘presence’ as general 
maintenance, a transcendental and impossible ‘presentness’ on which speech, the voice 
and entirety of being depend. His conception of the signature incorporates an element of 
temporality that interrupts ‘presence’. Whilst signatures aspire to verify and reconstitute 
the signatory by proxy, Derrida demonstrates that the operations of signature mean that a 
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signatory ‘source’ can never be conclusively guaranteed. I argue that signatures can be 
figured as ‘lowest common denominators’ and that recognition of their operative 
processes represents the opportunity to configure an emancipatory impurity.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on Derrida’s more direct engagements with visual art, concentrating 
specifically on ‘Restitutions’, an essay which forms part of a collection published as The 
Truth in Painting.52 ‘Restitutions’ is an important essay for my thesis as it illustrates how 
signature operates art historically through an inscribed name, that of Van Gogh. Derrida 
demonstrates how the vested interests of competing ideological claims attempt to exploit 
this signature, which never wholly belongs to those who claim it nor who signed it. 
Consideration of ‘Restitutions’ is supported by critiques of the work of other theorists 
relevant to the notions of ‘sacrament’ and ‘autograph’. 
 
Part 2 looks at specific art historical exemplars in which the signature of the artist can be 
seen to perform in historically contingent ways. Under analysis, the exemplars 
demonstrate that despite particularity, signature in general (always) returns to the 
Derridean principle that signature institutes, and is instituted by, division. Historical 
analyses of signatory practices demonstrate the passage of authority from institution to 
individual, (this is never a wholly ‘complete’ or successful transaction). That passage can 
be traced through different significations of materiality - from monograms that derive 
from signets or seals (in the control of incumbents) to handwritten autographs (ascribed 
                                                
52  Derrida, J. The Truth in Painting (Chicago & London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987) 
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to speculative producers). The field of study concerned with signets and seals is a 
significant one in itself and I do not have scope to address it specifically in this thesis.  
 
Each of the three chapters in Part 2 of my thesis proceeds under a subtitle relating to the 
function of signature. Firstly to claim presence and ‘presentness’ on behalf of the artist; 
secondly, to assert claims to ‘property’ and inheritance; and finally, to guarantee 
originality. The chapter subtitles allude to an interplay of tense and temporality: past, 
present and future and the potential for (future) studies which reframe ideas about ‘place, 
property and promise’ through signature is implied. Chapter 4 - ‘Signature as Witness: I 
was here’ - looks at the signatory practice of Van Eyck, especially as it abuts the place of 
naturalism in art historical and critical discourse. In its vocabulary, Van Eyck’s signature 
on the Arnolfini Portrait (1434) represents a general shift in significance away from 
material to artist in terms of value. It also represents the point at which Van Eyck’s civic 
(non-artistic) roles are imported into the image. Chapter 5  - ‘Signature as Self-
awareness: This is Mine’ - looks at claims that signature denotes the increasing self-
consciousness of the artist as a creative individual. Special consideration is given to the 
reading of the 12th century signature of ‘Gislebertus’ as that of an artist, and to aspects of 
Albrecht Dürer’s practice as it gives onto notions of intellectual property and claims to 
ownership. Chapter 6 - ‘Signature as Standardisation: I promise’ - reviews the positions 
of several art historians who have considered the operation of signature in Renaissance 
paintings relative to the market. The role of signature as an influence on the itinerary of 
Grand Tourists and on the (related) construction of museum collections is considered 
alongside the place of signature in effecting guarantees of quality and provenance. I also 
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consider the case for stating that the profile and signatory practice of Gustav Courbet is a 
primary precedent in the history of Fountain. 
 
In Conclusion, on the basis of the theoretical work in Part 1 and the historical analysis in 
Part 2, having assessed how R. Mutt works on Fountain in relation to specific precedents, 
I return to reframing the questions I posed with reference to Relational Art, namely: why 
should the specificity of an individual matter for art? What is the place of provenance in 
dematerialised artworks? Do artworks avoid circuits of commodification by virtue of 
their dematerialisation? Does collaboration necessarily blur the imprint of individual 
authorial status? 
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PART 1 
 
 
2.  DERRIDA AND SIGNATURE 
 
This Chapter deals with Derrida’s construction of signature through various general texts 
and interviews, with a particular emphasis on SEC. Although the first English translation 
did not appear until 1977, SEC was written in a period in the early 1970s characterized 
by the publication of several texts and papers collected together in Dissemination, 
Positions and The Margins of Philosophy (in which SEC first appeared). These were 
largely concerned with extending and working into the notion of différance, Derrida’s 
conception of the mutuality of empirical difference and temporal delay. A short text, SEC 
works through the mechanics of that which presents itself as signature against Austin’s 
conception of the speech act, in which written signatures are accepted as verification. For 
Derrida, this verification is a ‘having-been present in a past now or present [maintenant]’ 
of the signatory ‘which will remain a future now or present [maintenant]’.53 
Consequently, he reads in Austin a presumption that the subject (who signs) is a self-
sufficient totality, and that is what he questions. Using ideas connected to the non-
presence of signatory in the act of signing, the structural necessity of citationality and the 
operational effect of ‘iterability’, Derrida dissimulates the general maintenance 
(transcendental presentness) that underscores Austin’s speech act. He contends that a 
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handwritten signature cannot function as ‘an enigmatic paraph’, a unique and 
unrepeatable mark, as is commonly assumed. It is structurally fractured and always gives 
onto other instances of itself. The ‘unique’ signature cannot conclusively (non-
parasitically) ‘tether to source’, for that would require an immobile, finite point of origin 
as ‘source’, and a ‘tether’ which channels or expresses the specificity of the link between 
a ‘signature-event’ (the source) and a ‘signature-form’ (the signature) seamlessly, without 
external reference or différance, i.e. a paraph cannot conclusively evidence that event and 
form have been tied together permanently, irrevocably, as an absolute, hermetic 
singularity. This chapter explores in some detail this position, both prefacing and 
following it through several other texts, (by Derrida and by other theorists). 
 
 
2.1 SIGNATURE AS PRESENCE 
 
 
2.1.1 PLATO’S PHARMACY 
 
In order to generate a useful conception of the place of ‘presence’ in Derrida’s thought, it 
is worth prefacing my consideration of SEC with a consideration of a slightly earlier 
essay, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, which appears in Dissemination.54  In it, Derrida, building on 
Of Grammatology – a ground-breaking work which questions the ideological demotion of 
‘writing’ in comparison to ‘speech’ - takes issue with the naturalized (occluded) 
structures of metaphysics which privilege ‘presentness’ and ‘presence’ as originary truth, 
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and he links this to the perpetuation of hierarchical patriarchy.55 He sees metaphysics 
perpetuating Western philosophy’s vested interest - ‘as violent as it is impotent’ - and he 
traces the operation of that vested interest in translations of Classical philosophy which 
privilege speech over writing. The patriarchal tradition polarizes cultural constructs and 
proceeds by way of binaries which privilege one pole over another: ‘life’ is preferred to 
‘death’; father preferred to mother; first preferred to second, inside to outside, good to 
evil, seriousness to play etc. ‘Deconstruction’ is a process of infinite dissimulation which 
works against the naturalization of presence and this patriarchy. It is alert to those slips in 
language which belie ideological reliance on notions of uncontestable authority.  
 
‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ is a practical exercise in deconstruction in which Derrida questions 
translation of the word ‘pharmakon’ as it appears in Plato’s dialogue, Phaedrus.  For 
Derrida, Phaedrus is a demonstrably ambivalent text in the sense it ‘affirms itself and 
effaces itself at once’.56 On the one hand, this ambivalence has led to its marginality and 
distance from the Platonic canon: Derrida chose Phaedrus partly because it was 
marginalised and the ideological relationship between centre and periphery is 
fundamental to understanding deconstruction.57 On the other, its ambivalent themes make 
it an appealing example through which Derrida can examine issues flowing from the 
privileging of presence. 
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At the beginning of ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, Derrida remarks that the established dismissal of 
Phaedrus as the product of Plato’s juvenilia was controverted in the early 20th century by 
a renewed dismissal of it as the product of Plato’s senility, a neat illustration of the 
instrumental use of age (a marginal consideration) to dismiss work from ‘the canon’ of 
the philosopher’s prime. Either too young, or too old - for ‘almost twenty-five centuries’ - 
Plato was not seen to be fully present to himself when he produced Phaedrus.58  
Canonicity works like a gravitational field pulling together those core works that are 
deemed to define and ‘present’ the author, relegating to the margins – to the outer orbit – 
those that are not. Age is one empirical criterion that might be used as a determinant of 
eligibility to the ‘canon’ of the individual and/or of the cultural field: gender, sexuality, 
ethnicity might be others. 
 
Phaedrus stages an encounter between Socrates and Phaedrus, who has a (written) copy 
of a speech by Lysisas secreted in the folds of his cloak: this is the ‘pharmakon’. 
Phaedrus confesses that he has not learned Lysias’s speech by heart, which is why he 
carries the scroll. The scroll represents ‘words that are deferred, reserved, enveloped, 
rolled up, words that force one to wait for them in the form and under cover of a solid 
object, letting themselves be desired.’59 The possibility of recall is facilitated by the act of 
writing which is seen to exist at a degree of remove from speech, at a degree of remove 
from ‘truth’. By virtue of this, ‘truth’ cannot be written. Derrida contends that when the 
pharmakon scroll is styled as ‘narcotic’ (and this is an etymological possibility), the 
written word is viewed with suspicion, as something not fully constituted and 
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wholesome, as something not to be trusted. Plato depicts Socrates reclining in allegorical 
surrender before the scroll. Figuratively, the written speech has a simultaneously narcotic 
and erotic effect on him and he is prone (incapacitated) when Phaedrus agrees to read it 
to him. Derrida suggests that here, the written word is seen to demonstrate the capacity 
‘to lead astray’, to suspend volition. 
 
The word Pharmakon might be translated as narcotic, poison, drug or philter, 
(connotatively ‘detrimental’), but it may also be translated as remedy or recipe, 
(connotatively ‘beneficial’), and Derrida argues that successive translations have 
suppressed the beneficial translation of pharmakon in order to privilege the self-sufficient 
‘origin’ or ‘source’ which is given proper expression only in ‘live’ speech (written texts 
are poisons not remedies). He contends that in the service of speech and metaphysics, 
translations of Classical texts have routinely neutralized such citational play in which 
words inscribe meanings ambivalently within themselves and the neutralization is 
ideological.  
 
In Phaedrus, the encounter between Phaedrus and Socrates is followed by an account of 
the latter recalling a story concerning Theuth, the Egyptian god of numbers, calculation, 
geometry and astronomy, and Thaumus, King of Egypt. Theuth presents writing to 
Thaumus as an aid to memory for the use of all his subjects. Thaumus, as Ammon - King 
of Kings - adjudicates on the usefulness of Theuth’s invention and decries it, declaring 
that it will produce forgetfulness in those who learn to use it because they will not learn 
to exercise their memory, they will not learn by heart. Learning ‘without instruction’ will 
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give them the appearance of having wisdom, but they will not have true wisdom for 
wisdom (and truth) must be embodied, must be living (and must be passed between living 
beings): it must be verifiably transferred in a process that mimics inheritance. Such a 
contextualization of wisdom and memory as ‘living’, organic and entire is counterposed 
to writing as prosthesis and mechanics. External to the unified subject, the living body 
and memory, wisdom and truth are seen to die. Consequently, writing is a necrophiliac 
art, (it is also, in the construction of the author, a murderous art, killing the living voice in 
every letter). Prefaced by the effect of the scroll/pharmakon on Socrates, the mechanistic 
remembrance (hypnomnesis), enabled by writing, is not to be trusted. It is conceptually 
bound to deceit and opposed to living memory (mneme), absolute presence and 
‘presentness’. Inferior to speech, writing nonetheless has the power to threaten the 
originary cohesion which speech assumes for itself. 
 
The figuring of the King - ‘Thaumus’ - by Socrates allows Derrida to figure the regal 
principle of speech as the source of value which engenders the hierarchical structuring of 
binary oppositions. As the source of value, the principle of speech manifests as ‘capital’, 
conceptually connected to capita - ‘the head’. It is thereby accorded to an originary, 
kingly father: 
The figure of the father is, of course, the figure of the good (agathon). Logos represents 
what it is indebted to: the father who is also chief, capital and good(s). Or rather the chief, 
the capital, the good(s). Pater in Greek means all that at once. Neither translators nor 
commentators of Plato seem to have accounted for the play of these schemas.60 
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The hierarchy that the regal principle of speech engenders is economic. Related to these 
expressions of the principle of speech, and their intimacy with the notion of what is 
proper, is the configuration of ‘genius’. Genius has a important role in the construction of 
art history and thereby, a close relationship to issues involving signature, so it is worth 
expanding upon the notion of it here. 
 
 
2.1.2 GENIUS: THE HEAD OF SPEECH 
 
In Gender and Genius, Christine Battersby constructs a history for genius that takes 
account of its conceptualization as a male – and kingly - attribute. Battersby traces the 
etymology of the word genius (It. genio) to its Latin root (genius). She relates this to the 
‘divine forces associated with, and protective of, male fertility’ and the Roman cults of 
genius as paterfamilias.61 Of the paterfamilias she says: 
The genius was not only connected with the vital forces of the gens, but also with the 
ground that it owned. The dependence of city life on continued land ownership might 
explain why the worship of agricultural deities persisted even after the elite moved into 
town …All land within boundary stones was watched over and imbued with the genius of 
the gens as represented by the paterfamilias. There is thus a connection between the 
celebrated genius loci, ‘genius of place’ and the rites associated with the virility and 
divinity of the paterfamilias. 62 
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Paterfamilias is the heritable status as head of the family, intimately connected to rights  
concerning property and ownership.63 In the context of a reference to Vasari’s Lives of the 
Artists - ‘which is often credited with having invented the modern conception of genius’ - 
Battersby looks at a related word ingenium (It. ingenio) which underpins the English 
terms ingenuity, ingeniousness etc.64 Ingenium was associated with the ‘executive power’ 
of reason, good judgment and knowledge, talent, wit and dexterity. Battersby specifically 
mentions ingenium in relation to mimesis. Crucially for this thesis, the interplay between 
genius and ingenium can be seen to reiterate in the interplay between speech and writing.  
 
Considering the construction of artistic genius, Battersby acknowledges the Renaissance 
as the time when a change in the status of the arts and artists relative to the Middle Ages 
resurrected presumptions of patriarchal genius in favour of the individual (male) artist. 
Those who manifested ingenium - practiced skill and dexterity - were gradually accorded 
‘spirit’ in derivation from the procreative force of the gens. To paraphrase this 
movement, a pendulum begins to swing from ingenium to genius between the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance. Ingenium was gradually subsumed in genius, a subsumption 
that produced the ‘modern’ notion of genius during the 18th century: 
sometime during the seventeenth century, the two different words ‘genius’ and 
‘ingenuity’ collapsed into each other. It is not easy to put an exact date on the blending of 
the two concepts since modern histories of ideas also conflate the two term. But certainly 
by the start of the eighteenth century the two Latin words and the two corresponding 
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English words were no longer sharply distinguished…. It is only in the eighteenth century 
that the term ‘genius’ begins to be in general use in anything like the modern sense. It is 
only when the two Latin terms genius and ingenium merge that our modern concept of 
genius emerges. 65 
For Battersby, (writing at the end of the 1980s), Romanticism vaunts the artist /genius as 
heroic (male). It is a ‘disease’ that professional art critics and academics like to pretend 
has been purged from contemporary conceptions of the ‘artist’: 
Post-structuralists assure us that the author is dead, adding their voices to previous 
generations of Marxist critics who have undermined the authority and isolation of the 
lone author. But in popular culture we find the old vocabulary, and the figure of the artist 
as hero, as alive and well as ever. Which pictures are bought, which books are read, 
which plays performed, which films are shown in art centres is largely a product of an 
aesthetics which assumes the centrality of the author to the work of art. 66 
 
Despite being implicitly bracketed by Battersby as one of these ‘post-structuralists’, 
Derrida never explicitly proclaims the author as ‘dead’. His philosophical enterprise is 
founded on the notion that ‘authoring’ is a process which proceeds in liminal territories. 
In a real sense the author never dies, having never lived. Appreciation of this is crucial to 
developing an understanding of how Derrida figures signature functioning. Speech, 
which serves presence and patriarchy, is opposed to the ‘capital cut’ that deconstruction 
seeks to execute. The ‘pure event’, ‘pure origin’ is a ‘brand’ or ‘pole’, ‘a certain 
brandished erection and a certain head of speech that is cut off’ by deconstructive 
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reading; by the recognition of irreducible polysemy.67 Anonymity is headless, and writing 
- écriture féminine - which threatens everywhere to detach from source, is a continual 
threat to decapitate. There can be no feminism without the capital cut. 
 
 
2.1.3 SIGNATURE EVENT CONTEXT / LIMITED INC a b c… 
 
Unlike ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, SEC does not open a gambit through the refiguring of the 
work of a Classical philosopher. Derrida chooses to frame his argument initially through 
Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, an 18th century French philosopher and linguist, before 
generating momentum through a response to Austin. In the opinion of Searle, who was 
motivated to ‘defend’ Austin in Reiterating the Differences, SEC is an obtuse misreading 
of How To Do Things With Words.68 In turn, replying to Searle, Derrida observes that 
Searle is minded to assert a claim to Austin’s legacy as a ‘legitimate’ heir. 69  Thus, for 
Derrida, Searle is interested in asserting the primacy of source, capital and authority as 
represented in the father/king (who represents the ‘Head of Speech’). 
 
Posthumously published, How To Do Things With Words formulates the category of 
verbal utterances as ‘performative’ (more specifically, ‘illocutionary’) when they 
accomplish (or ‘perform’) actions in the very act of their utterance. This performative 
aspect makes them speech acts: illocution is frequently exemplified by the recitation of 
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nuptial vows that effect the change of marital status at a wedding. In Austin’s terms, a 
speech act cannot be effected unless there is a coherence of circumstances in which 
speaker converges with convention in an event which can be accepted as ‘valid’. Derrida 
takes issue with Austin’s insistence on respecting the complete integrity of the 
performative form because speech acts necessarily appeal to conditions outside of 
themselves in order to become effective - there can be no ‘absolute coherence’: 
Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a “coded” or 
iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce to open a meeting, launch 
a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, if it were 
not in some way identifiable as a “citation”? Not that citationality in that case is of the 
same sort as in a theatrical play, a philosophical reference, or the recitation of a poem. 
That is why there is a relative specificity, as Austin says, a “relative purity” of 
performatives. But this relative purity does not emerge in opposition to citationality or 
iterability.70 
For Austin, the speech act must be wholly intentional (controlled) and wholly complete, 
singular and ‘univocal’. It assumes control of ‘truth’. Searle criticized Derrida’s reading 
of Austin on the grounds that he mounted ‘an attack on the idea of writing as intended 
meaning’.71 However, what Derrida does is to interrupt ‘the conscious presence of the 
intention of the speaking subject in the totality of his speech act’, suggesting that there is 
a residue that escapes such totalization, and the speech at is not ‘true’ per se.72 Derrida 
says that intention cannot be conclusively guaranteed, not that it doesn’t exist as 
motivation. Just as the ambivalence of pharmakon as remedy and/or poison is suppressed 
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in translation, so Austin’s understanding of the speech act’s conclusive tethering to 
source suppresses its ‘structural parasitism’, its ‘irreducible polysemy’. 
 
Derrida alleges that Austin does not recognize citationality at play in speech acts despite 
remarking on the necessity of convention in effecting them. If a speech act is successful 
only when it conforms to the conditions of convention, it necessarily cites those 
conditions despite the fact that citation is the circumstance that produces ‘infelicity’. For 
Derrida, infelicity is admitted to the performative at a structurally necessary level. The 
speech act cannot be ‘faithful’ if it incorporates conventions. The implied distance from 
infelicity cannot be obliterated, nor quotation marks erased. Presence/presentness cannot 
be conclusively established. The speech act is not ‘true’, entire or self-sufficient because 
it accomplishes an act. For Austin, speech acts that seem to operate as citations - an actor 
delivering lines, for example - are ‘parasitic’ (a metaphor loaded with negative 
connotation) on ‘ordinary language’ (on the observable success of ‘proper’ speech acts). 
Derrida replies that:  
In excluding the general theory of this structural parasitism, does not Austin, who 
nevertheless claims to describe the facts and events of ordinary language, pass off as 
ordinary an ethical and teleological determination (the univocity of the 
utterance…)…what Austin excludes as an anomaly, exception, “non-serious”, citation 
(on stage, in a poem, or a soliloquy) is the determined modification of general 
citationality - or rather a general iterability - without which there would not even be a 
“successful” performative….a successful performative is necessarily an “impure” 
performative.73 
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Austin’s slip to ordinary language and purity admits that occluded aspect of the 
metaphysical that amounts to a naturalization of presence. He denies the productive role 
of infelicity, in order to tether the speech act to a phenomenologically stable source. 
Austin privileges speech over writing. 
 
One of the strong connections between ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ and SEC concerns the 
undertsanding of presence that Derrida’s signatory theory proceeds on. What appears as 
‘living memory’ in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ appears as ‘source’, ‘transcendental presentness’ 
and general maintenance in SEC : 
By definition, a written signature implies the actual or empirical non-presence of the 
signer. But, it will be claimed, the signature also marks and retains a having-been present 
in a past now or present [maintenant] which will remain a future now or present 
[maintenant], thus in a general maintenant in the transcendental form of presentness 
[maintenance]. That general maintenance is in some way inscribed, pinpointed in the 
always evident and singular present punctuality in the form of the signature. Such is the 
enigmatic originality of every paraph. In order for the tethering to source to occur, what 
must be retained is the absolute singularity of a signature-event and a signature-form: the 
pure reproducibility of a pure event.74 
Taking exception to SEC, Searle - claiming to defend Austin - argued that writing does 
not imply the actual or empirical non-presence of a reader, a receiver, though it may 
facilitate such non-presence: 
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Writing makes it possible to communicate with an absent receiver, but it is not necessary 
for the receiver to be absent. Written communication can exist in the presence of the 
receiver, as for example, when I compose a shopping list for myself. 75 
In Derrida’s analysis the distance (‘spacing’, différance) between sender and receiver 
maybe as ‘infra-thin’ (Duchamp’s inframince) as to collect under the rubric of a single 
individual, but it is no less material for that infra-thinness. Différance, constituted 
through absence, is a structural necessity. Searle, who splits the roles of sender and 
receiver at a physical level (i.e. they are separate entities) does not recognize the 
possibility that the split can be internal. The sender is absent to himself, regardless of the 
role he might also adopt as receiver. In ‘Ltd Inc a b c…’, Derrida demonstrates that  
absence is a structural necessity: 
the absence of my-being present-now, even if this absence is the simple absence of 
memory… no matter how fine this point may be, it is like the stigme of every mark, 
already split. The sender of the shopping list is not the same as the receiver, even if they 
have the same name and are endowed with the identity of a single ego.76 
Like the Phaedrean scroll, like Theuth’s invention, Searle’s shopping list functions as an 
aide-memoire which interrupts presence. The scope of the written model here - a 
shopping list - is hedged, at Searle’s instigation, in functionality, as if its prosaicness can 
distance it sufficiently from the additional complications introduced by ‘creative’ 
authorship. In fact, (any) text acquires density through abbreviation, abridgement and 
concentration, conspiring everywhere to reduce itself to aide-memoire and present as an 
object-form, if only to thereby offer itself as potential for material recombination and 
                                                
75 Searle, op. cit. p200 
76 Derrida, ‘Limited Inc a b c…’, op. cit. p49 
  63 
citation: this is a significant function of ‘signature’ as a point of convenience. It is as 
fundamental to understand the prosaic level at which text potentiates most effectively as 
material as it is to understand the ‘infra-thin’ spacing that divides sender from receiver. 
 
Searle accuses Derrida of confusing ‘iterability’ with ‘permanence’, presupposing that 
writing fixes intent rather like a photograph is seen to fix time. The notional 
‘permanence’ of writing, coupled with assumptions based on the apparent integrity of the 
physical body, is what allows Searle to assume he can legitimately recover Austin’s 
intent from How To Do Things With Words and rescue it from Derrida’s misprision. 
Searle’s idea of permanence matches Austin’s notion of a conclusive tethering to source, 
and gives on to similar notions concerning origin, presence, source, substance and 
singularity. For Derrida, relative permanence (the appearance of permanence) is not a 
process of monumentalizing, but the technical construction of ‘a sort of machine which is 
productive in turn’, perpetually in motion: 
A written sign, in the current meaning of this word, is a mark that subsists, one that does 
not exhaust itself in the moment of its inscription and which can give rise to an iteration 
in the absence and beyond the presence of the empirically determined subject who, in a 
given context, has emitted or produced it.77 
Bringing the legend of Theuth and Thaumus from ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ to bear on this 
passage, the authoritarian suspicion of writing is inscribed as a fear of an emanicipatory 
impurity, the fear of a collectively determined and unstable subject. Readability as 
iterability is not the recovery of authorial intent. Every reading alters and aggregates what 
is read in a never-ending, destabilising process. ‘Iterability’, (a Derridean neologism 
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which invites the Sanskrit root itara - meaning ‘other’ - into partnership with the Latin 
root iter- meaning ‘again’), is ‘the logic that ties repetition to alterity’. 
 
So, in SEC, Derrida uses the handwritten signature to clarify the operation of iterability. 
When he begins a specific consideration of (written) signatures, he focuses on the 
capacity of signature (as enigmatic paraph) to assure Austin’s source because Austin 
treats handwritten signatures as honorable proxies for presence. Derrida alleges that 
Austin’s signature purports to be wholly unrepeatable and unique, sealing the full and 
‘conscious presence of speakers or receivers participating in the accomplishment of a 
performative, their conscious and intentional presence in the totality of the operation’.78  
Signature derives its power to represent transcendental presentness through the ‘unique’ 
manual expression of a material connection to an absolutely singular corporeal entity. 
This is what seduces Searle and underscores his failure to recognise the structural 
necessity of absence in the speech act. However: 
Effects of signature are the most common thing in the world. But the condition of 
possibility of those effects is simultaneously, once again, the condition of their 
impossibility, of the impossibility of their rigourous purity. In order to function, signature 
must have a repeatable, iterable, imitiable form; it must be able to be detached from the 
present and singular intention of its production. It is its sameness which, by corrupting its 
identity and singularity, divides its seal.79 
The handwritten signature, an inked original on cheques, affidavits, warrants, personal 
letters, can only be read as a ‘divided seal’; it can only be verified as ‘true’ in relation to 
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its other iterations and samples, those already effected and those to come – it begs the 
possibility of being re-signed. A wholly unrepeatable signature, a rigorously pure, unique 
signature, is an impossible, unreadable signature, a mark exhausted at the moment of 
inscription, unable to function. It would be an ‘event’. This has obvious and particular 
relevance for visual artworks, their relationship to manual expression and the 
presumption of unrepeatability. 
 
 
2.1.4 SPECTERS OF MARX  
 
It is not too far-fetched to say that Derrida’s early work on signatures, including SEC, 
anticipates his later work on spectres, and that signatures appear to work (and restitute 
presence) by way of spectral logic. 80 Specters of Marx represents Derrida’s engagement 
with the future(s) of Marxism and develops his understanding of spectral operations in 
relation to it. He formulates the concept of ‘hauntology’ to describe the spectral 
(ideological) operations of capital and its serial (re)incarnations. 81 The fascination he has 
with signatures is a fascination with specters which appear through the materiality of 
language. A specific consideration of ‘hauntology’ in the context of Specters of Marx and 
its ‘staging for the end of history’ is beyond the remit of this thesis, nonetheless, the 
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complex action of the revenant (the returning) is a relevant reiteration and extension of 
Derrida’s construction of signatures. 
 
The spectre is a paradoxical incarnation, a ‘becoming-body’, which is generated 
communally. It shares a temporal liminality with signature which is consequent to its 
relationship with the present: the spectre is a becoming-body because it is a revenant, a 
returning, a ghost. Revenant might be understood as the principle of deferral and 
différance in hauntology - ‘it begins by coming back’.82 This, in a sense, is like the 
operation of signature, which, having promised itself in similitude, can also be said to 
begin in the promise to come back, to be re-signed, (in ordinary language, ‘resignation’ 
marks the act of quitting, concluding service).  As the signature commingles the singular 
and the same (the split repetition of itself), the spectre (the ghost) asks questions of the 
‘event’ (which it haunts): 
Repetition and first time: this is perhaps the question of the event as a question of the 
ghost…Repetition and first time but also repetition and last time, since the singularity of 
any first time also makes of it also a last time. 83 
Différance, the disruptive movement of repetition along the seams of the ‘simultaneous’, 
introduces the principle and possibility of hetereogenity, of countersignature and 
disturbing facsimile apparition. As in ‘Ltd Inc. a b c…’, ‘Otobiographies’ and 
‘Countersignature’, (these two essays are considered below), the issue of inheritance 
arrives for Derrida along such seams, and with it, the ethics of choice (implicated in the 
political act of reading): 
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An inheritance is never gathered together, it is never one with itself. Its presumed unity, if 
there is one, can only exist in the injunction to reaffirm by choosing, ‘One must’ means 
one must filter, sift, criticize, one must sort out several different possibilities that inhabit 
the same injunction. And inhabit it in a contradictory fashion, around a secret. If the 
readability of a legacy were given, natural, transparent, univocal, if it did not call for and 
at the same time defy interpretation, we would never have anything to inherit from it. We 
would be affected by it as by a cause – natural or genetic.84 
 
Opening Specters of Marx with a passage from Hamlet, which sees the titular character 
utter ‘this time is out of joint’ following an encounter with the ghost of his father, Derrida 
considers the implications of Marx’s use of the word ‘specter’ [sic], which he notes is the 
first noun of The Manifesto of the Communist Party. Marx’s spectre, he suggests, 
functions as an exordium, a preface.85 Derrida observes that in analyzing the becoming-
fetish of the commodity, Marx invokes metaphorical spectres, in particular the ‘too 
familiar’ apparition of the table. Derrida’s implication is that the commodity of Capital 
behaves like the ideology of The Communist Manifesto, like a spectre, ‘out of joint’ in all 
its relations, never (fully) present. Determined in and by exchange, the commodity is 
irreducible to use, though the notion of use might be said to haunt it. What Derrida names 
the ‘Table-Thing’ is ‘ligneous and dematerialized’ [sic], ‘autonomous and automaton’.86  
As a commodity the table is ‘thought’ (worked) wood: if wood is an empirical 
circumstance (material) of the table, it is as an entropy and might be likened to the 
enigma of the paraph that (misleadingly) presents the signature as a singularity. As the 
                                                
84  Ibid. p18 
85 Derrida, Specters of Marx, op.cit. p2 
86 Ibid. p191 
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Table-Thing, wood promises itself as ‘table’ and ‘table’ promises itself as wood. The 
covering move of the signature presenting itself as an enigmatic paraph (an absolute 
tethering to source) is reiterated in the covering move (thought) of the commodity which 
presents itself mystically – Derrida repeatedly refers to the ‘enigmatical character’ of the 
commodity. Like the signature that promises it can be re-signed and in that promissory 
split risks contamination and the possibility of counterfeit, the commodity is split in 
itself, profiting by exchange (profit results from pollution). The commodity is no more 
self-sufficient than signature. In this line of reasoning, it might be possible to say the 
commodity (a variant of the speech act) cites ‘labour’. 
 
In his contribution to Ghostly Demarcations, a collection of essays written in response to 
Specters of Marx, Werner Hamacher says that for Derrida, the ‘messianic’ is incorporated 
as a dimension of the commodity.87  For Hamacher, it seems as if Specters of Marx 
establishes a conjunction between the appearance of the spectral and the structure of the 
performative: 
In the spectral, something past, itself provoked by something to come, something 
outstanding and as yet still in arrears, demands its rights here and now. The spectral is, 
one might therefore say, that which is most present amongst the things which can be 
experienced because it appears precisely in the open joint between future and past – or 
more exactly, where tight connection is out of joint.88 
Hamacher’s description of the spectral could equally describe the signature of SEC. The 
signature represents a time out of joint, a sender absent to himself: it is not a general 
                                                
87  Hamacher, W. ‘Lingua Amissa: The Messianism of Commodity-Language and 
Derrida’s Specters of Marx’, Sprinker, op. cit. 
88  Ibid. p181 
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maintenance, a conclusive and hermetic intent. Derrida credits Hamacher with 
understanding hauntology as: 
anything but ‘metaphysical’ and ‘abstract’…the spectral logic I appeal to in Specters of 
Marx and elsewhere, is, in my view, not metaphysical, but ‘deconstructive’. This logic is 
required to account for the processes and effects of, if I may be allowed to put it this way, 
metaphysicalization, abstraction, idealization, ideologicalization and fetishization.89 
The close relationship between signature and commodity is perhaps distilled in 
considerations of how art functions in its markets as a luxury good, an autograph, a 
conduit to the vested interests of art histories – those that have been and those that are to 
come. 
 
 
2.2 SIGNATURE AS PROPERTY 
 
2.2.1 COPYRIGHT 
 
As spectral property, signature inevitably opens onto the issue of ‘copyright’. Copyright 
asserts a claim to legitimacy in descent from the nominal/nominated author/father and  
seeks to stabilize and monumentalize authorial intent in order to assert economic and 
moral claims to cultural property. In copyright, signature meets author, artist and 
‘originator’, so the issue of tethering to source is one of legal and economic pragmatism. 
Any apprehension that the jurisprudential roots of copyright might rely on notions of ex 
nihilo creation and truth is misleading, however appealing these notions might be 
                                                
89  Derrida, ‘Marx & Sons’, ibid. pp244-245 
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morally.90 Derrida uses the law of copyright to prove his position on signature. In ‘Ltd Inc 
a b c…’, Derrida argues that by marking Reiterating the Differences as copyright, Searle 
is acknowledging the essential impropriety and illegitimacy of his text at a structural 
level, just as the father he claims in Austin unwittingly admits infelicity to the speech act. 
If Searle’s reply were ‘proper’, ‘true’ and ‘legitimate’ - a truth not a fiction - it would not 
be necessary or possible to copyright it; if it is not ‘true’, Searle has no sure base from 
which to claim a legitimate inheritance from Austin.91 It might be an obvious, somewhat 
facetious, point to make, but that does not make it any less relevant. Assured by 
signature, copyright moves to direct the productive process and potential of writing 
towards a single (not singular) point of accumulation and control. This suppresses the 
radical emancipatory potential of iterability. Copyright secures the self-identity of a 
written text through the univocal figure of the author (a corporate entity rather than an 
individual) and ownership of the rights to claim that status: signature is a point of 
convenience under which the complications of authorship and its associated rights can be 
seen to be resolved.  
 
In the course of framing Searle’s copywritten interest in Austin, Derrida enters into a 
cross-linguistic gameplay with the verbal identity of Searle as ‘Sarl’ (punning on 
S.A.R.L. - an acronym derived from Société À Responsabilité Limitée, the designation of 
                                                
90  Deazley, R., Kretschmer, M. & Bentley, L. (eds) Privilege and Property: Essays 
in the History of Copyright (London: Open Book Publishers, 2010)  
91  ‘property, n.’. OED Online. June 2013. Oxford University Press. 
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a limited liability company in France). Indicating/indicting Searle as ‘Sarl’, Derrida 
explicitly draws attention to Searle’s debt to ‘H. Dreyfus’ and ‘D.Searle’, who are 
acknowledged in the preface to Reiterating the Differences. ‘Sarl’ represents the debt to a 
société plus ou moins anonyme of ‘3 + n’ authors in the fabric of a text which is 
presented as the claim of one author (e.g. John R. Searle). Derrida’s formulation, ‘3 + n’, 
includes Searle’s acknowledgements and also those who figure indirectly in the ‘body’ of 
the text, (e.g. Austin). Satirically, ‘Sarl’ marks the corporate traits of signature, of 
sending/receiving/collecting under copyright, and the irreducible polysemy of authorship 
all at once. Derrida uses copyright to prove the deconstructionist position and moves the 
question of how authorship is asserted into ethical-political regions. He does not posit 
plurivocity as a panacea for the ills of accumulation under a singular name, rather, he is 
moved to show that plurivocity is the sine qua non of authorship, and that the ‘tether to 
source’ is really a ‘point of collection’, (or, to recall Boltanski & Chiapello in this 
context, a ‘point of accumulation’).  
 
Inasmuch, authorship is an abyssal operation, its condition is like that of the mise-en-
âbyme or fractal, a perpetually moving corporate field. Signature, which collects and 
indicates the author as a field of unity under the rubric of a verifiable proper name, 
attempts to direct and focus the movement of the abyss. In providing a sticking point for 
authorship - something that looks like stasis - signature can accelerate or otherwise vary 
the speed of accumulation, but it does not delimit what or who an author is. Signature is a 
leveller between all sorts of texts, a lowest common denominator.  
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2.2.2 ANTI-AUTHORIALISM 
 
Introducing Privilege and Property: Essays in the History of Copyright, Deazley, 
Kretschmer & Bentley note the importance of Foucault’s essay ‘What is an Author?’ (and 
the importance of poststructuralism in general) for renewing interest in issues connected 
with authorship and ownership of cultural products, which they say had been dormant 
since the 19th century.92 It is clear to see the corporate traits of signature operating in the 
character of these debates around Continental ‘anti-authorialism’ in the 1970s. A shared 
nexus of references, inheritances, associations and oppositions gathers mass at this time, 
so when Derrida opens SEC with a discussion of the work of Condillac, he cites his 
earlier interest in Condillac (in Of Grammatology) as well as alluding to Foucault’s use of 
Condillac in ‘The Order of Things’. A similar, palpable sense of indirect dialogue 
between Foucault and Derrida occurs in ‘What is an Author?’ when Foucault (under the 
cover of Samuel Beckett) mentions a contemporary écriture which ‘effaces’ and 
‘murders’ the author, (in other words, murders his notion of a Derridean and/or Barthian 
écriture) and Searle’s Essay in the Philosophy of Language is specifically marked as a 
point of reference for him. The essays by Searle and Foucault were both published before 
SEC, though Antonio Campillo believes that ‘What is an Author?’ would have been 
impossible for Foucault to conceive without Derrida’s earlier work.93  
                                                
92  Kretschmer, M., Bentley, L. & Deazley, R. ‘Introduction. The History of 
Copyright History: Notes From an Emerging Discipline’. Deazley et al., op. cit. pp1-20 
93  Campillo, A. ‘Foucault and Derrida: the history of a debate on history’, Angelaki: 
Journal of the Theoretical Humanities Vol.5, No.2, (August 2000) pp113-135 
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It is not surprising, given the capital investment made by Foucault on behalf of Searle, to 
see the latter use Foucault to disparage Derrida following their argument over Austin. In 
an interview given to ‘Reason’, Searle (re)quotes himself:  
With Derrida, you can hardly misread him, because he is so obscure. Every time you say, 
‘He says so and so’, he always says ‘You misunderstood me’. But if you try to figure out 
the correct interpretation, that is not so easy. I once said this to Michel Foucault, who was 
more hostile to Derrida even than I am, and Foucault said that Derrida practiced the 
method of obscurantisme terroriste (terrorism of obscurantism).94 
None of this is spurious: signature marks the confusion and exploitation of personal, 
institutional and textual interplay, permitting the vesting of interests and the acquisition 
of cultural density. Derrida’s conception of signature, then, developed in the context of 
the anti-authorialism debates in the 1960s and 1970s. Consequently, as well as 
considering SEC and Searle’s related intervention, it is worth briefly looking at the 
‘classic’ texts which were involved it those debates – Foucault’s ‘What is an Author?’ 
and Roland Barthes’ ‘The Death of the Author’.95  
 
In ‘What is an Author?’ Foucault employs the figure of Scheherazade in order to mediate 
the metamorphosis he observes in the ‘idea of narrative or writing’. Narrator of the cycle 
of tales known as the Arabian Nights, Scheherazade survived ritual execution by telling 
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principles-an-intervie, (accessed 27th July 2014)   
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Author’, Image Music Text (London: Fontanta, 1977) pp142-148 
 
  74 
stories, and Foucault uses this to indicate the vivifying power of narrative. If writing as 
narrative (as work or oeuvre) once guaranteed ‘immortality’, as écriture, it ‘transposes 
the empirical characteristics of the author into a transcendental anonymity’ which is 
‘death’. In écriture, the author (an orignating force) is dead, unindividuated, disappeared 
in favour of exegesis and hermeneutics. Significantly, death is associated with 
unindividuation. The tension in the opposition staged between immortality and 
anonymity forces ‘forever’ and ‘never’ to converge, so that the ‘transcendental 
presentness’ which Derrida perecives presents itself to Foucault in écriture as 
‘transcendental anonymity’, (the tether to source is presumed to have broken – it is 
important to note that Foucault assumes the possibility and past effects of the tether, and 
that this sets him critically apart from Derrida). In effacing the individual (as a singular, 
traceable voice) Foucault sees écriture shift text into a position of general maintenance. 
Tethering to, and breaking from, ‘source’ result in the same temporality, it seems. 
 
The property that flows from Foucault’s author function (asserted through, and protected 
by, copyright) realizes ‘discourses’ as ‘objects of appropriation’and ‘works’. There are 
slippery, symbiotic relationships between text, discourse, work and the author-function 
nesting inside each other. If, at the level of the episteme, (the term Foucault used to 
describe the general, historical conditions in which knowledge develops), a discourse 
produces the author-function, the author-function also produces (and controls) the 
discourses which admit it. In doing so, the author-function submits discourse to 
containment, definition and appropriation. In practical terms for Foucault, as ‘a 
pervasively privileged moment of individualisation’, the author-function discriminates, 
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orders, measures and delimits the boundaries of writing as work. The author-function 
institutes the difference between the (general) proper name of a ‘real person’ and the 
(ascribed) proper name of the author that remains at the contours of those texts it 
separates, defines and characterizes as ‘work’ to the exclusion of others (not ‘work’): 
a private letter may have a signatory, but it does not have an author; a contract can have 
an underwriter, but it does not have an author; and, similarly, an anonymous poster 
attached to a wall may have a writer, but he cannot be an author.96 
The status of those discourses and texts that are beyond the author-function (yet still 
marked by signature) is not addressed by Foucault. Liminal, they are remaindered and 
treated as irrelevant to the operation of the author-function even as Foucault calls for the 
unfolding of a pervasive anonymity.  
 
Ideally, in a world without the Foucauldian author-function, previously authored fiction 
and meaning would proliferate freely. Consequently, Foucault does not address the 
problem of what the author-function means for previously ‘unauthored’ texts.  Marcy L. 
North writes that: 
Foucault uses a rhetoric of power and sovereignty in describing the author-function that 
suggests that the text is subject to the author, that the name has been applied to the text or 
has taken control of the text, and that there is a ‘text’ beneath the ‘author’ that has an 
existence apart from the author…(he) reemphasizes the distinction between texts with 
authors and those without, consigning those texts without recognizable authors to a 
category of writings without interpretable production and presentation functions.97 
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Indeed, in his conception of transdiscursivity, Foucault seems to promote the idea that a 
supra- or uber- author-function is liberatory. Transdiscursivity flows from individuals 
recognised as authors who have generated texts that are foundational for the discourse 
that bears the mark of their name e.g. Marx-ism, Freud(ian)-ism, Foucaul(dian)-ism. The 
addition of ‘-ism’ is crucial as it abstracts and essentializes a corpus of originary texts in 
so far as it institutes the hermeneutic spirit that they demand.98  ‘Uber-authors’ of this 
sort, in Derridean terms, exaggerate the corporate action of signature. 
 
For Foucault, the author-function acts retrospectively, following texts in direct 
connection to the penal regimes that establish it. Individuated authors are liable for 
transgressive opinions. Authorship is not a (subject) state that precedes creative ‘work’. 
According to Foucault, around the end of the 18th century, the possibility of 
‘transgression’ resulted in an author-function expressing its own possibility. Foucault’s 
position relies on the kind of presence and authority dissembled by Derrida in ‘Plato’s 
Pharmacy’. Foucault reads a regal schism in the ‘bipolar field’ that reserves speech from 
writing: 
In our culture (and doubtless in many others), discourse was not originally a product, a 
thing, a kind of goods; it was essentially an act – an act placed in the bipolar field of the 
sacred and the profane, the licit and illicit, the religious and the blasphemous. 
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Historically, it was a gesture fraught with risks before becoming goods caught up in a 
circuit of ownership.99 
For Derrida, discourse always reveals the impossiblity of a purity in the bipolar field in 
which the sacred counters the profane; the licit counters the illicit. For Derrida, in this 
field, act and product are twinned not separated. 
 
Foucault goes on to say that the author-function varies historically in relation to the locus 
of ‘truth’ - between, for example, scientific and non-scientific texts. 
There was a time when the texts we today call ‘literary’ (stories, folk tales, epics, and 
tragedies) were accepted, circulated and valorized, without any question about the 
identity of their author. Their anonymity caused no difficulties since their ancientness, 
whether real or imagined, was ignored because their real or supposed age was a sufficient 
guarantee of their authenticity. Texts, however, that we now call ‘scientific’ (dealing with 
cosmology and the heavens, medicine or illnesses, natural sciences or geography) were 
only considered truthful in the Middle Ages if the name of the author was indicated.100 
Here Foucault admits that something like the author-function existed in the Middle Ages, 
pre-dating the Enlightenment regimes of punishment through which he figures ‘modern’ 
authorship developing. Though he varies the author-function historically, he does not 
explicitly vary the temporality that accompanies that function. Having accused écriture of 
transposing the empirical characteristics of the author into a transcendental anonymity, by 
the end of the essay, Foucault paradoxically calls for a ‘free’ present of anonymous 
proliferation, circulation, manipulation, composition, decomposition and recomposition 
in ‘fiction’. Notwithstanding the problems of classifying and recognizing ‘fiction’ 
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without the author-function, and its immanent equivalence with all previously unauthored 
non-fictive texts, it seems that Foucault envisages a (controllable) simultaneity of work 
and origin. If the author cannot precede the work, nor follow it as ideological control, the 
only place for authoring is the present - supra-authorially - the general maintenance. 
 
‘The Death of the Author’ was published by Barthes in 1967, so chronologically it 
prefigures both ‘What is an Author?’ and SEC. It is Barthes who takes the most directly 
economic view of what authorship does, remarking that in its positivism, in discovering 
the ‘prestige of the individual’, the figure of the author marks the ‘epitome and 
culmination of capitalist ideology’. For Barthes, the author channels the unrepeatable 
exceptionality of the individual and the value of interior life towards capital 
accumulation. The author is nothing less than the collectivizing restatement of 
authenticating presence in the face of écriture. In literature, art and music, the author 
results when an individual is understood to be simultaneous with the work they have 
authored, so the genesis of that work is sought in the circumstances of the life from which 
it has emanated post facto. For Barthes, as for Foucault – who refers to the author’s life 
as ‘empirical characteristics’ - the author is a status applied retrospectively. As with 
Foucault’s author-function, Barthes’ author cannot precede the work. There is no simple, 
stable creative condition emanating from the person of an individual (or quasi-individual 
authoring entity) to be recovered. 
 
Barthes says ‘writing is the destruction of every voice, every point of origin. It is that 
neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all 
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identity is lost.’101 ‘In ethnographic societies’, narratives are performed without the 
performer asserting genius – genius in this instance is any indelible claim to, or 
permanent effect on, the narrative code, (there are some similarities with the notion of the 
transdiscursive author). Barthes argues that the instance of writing does not require the 
author’s ‘person’. In the light of this, Barthes replaces the author with the ‘modern 
scriptor’, a function that is seen to be simultaneous with the text, (again altering a 
temporal connection that conceives of the author ‘as the past of his own book’). The 
‘modern scriptor’ is the reader who, in the act of reading, writes and inhabits the space of 
the sign by translating and interpreting. In such a textual space, to seek to authoritatively 
recover or fix intent is to limit and call a halt to writing, to attempt to monumentalise and 
make permanent.  
 
In this respect, the author (genius) stands opposed to the modern scriptor/reader. Barthes 
does not deny the textual space unity, but finds that unity in destination, in the scriptor 
‘who holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written text is 
constituted’. The text no longer records with reference to a life lived, it deploys, reforms, 
extends and performs in the present without (any) origin. For Barthes (as for Derrida) 
writing is wayward, the principle of uncertainty and constant motion: a shopping list, a 
private letter, a contract, a treatise are all equivalently written, equivalently signed. 
Though Barthes does not explicate it in these terms, the figure of the author is asserted 
through a capitalist ideology designed to control the wantonly proliferating signature, 
which does not - cannot - conclusively separate and seal texts apart from general 
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discourse. Signature cannot definitively order texts in an epistemological hierarchy, even 
when it is the instrument used to assert claims to property in them. Despite not wholly 
subscribing to Barthes’s dismissal of the anteriority of the author, Derrida’s conception of 
countersignature shares features with the action of Barthes’ scriptor. In Copy Signature 
Archive, Derrida explains signature with reference to the punctum and he uses the term 
stigme in ‘Ltd Inc a b c...’ to describe ‘the absence of my being-present’, directly 
borrowing from Barthes photographic theory.102 For Derrida, photography has conceptual 
connections with the signatory process and this connection between Derrida and Barthes 
remains to be explored. 
 
 
2.2.4 ANONYMITY AND PRINT 
 
Anonymity is instrumental for both Foucault and Barthes. Writing about the status of 
anonymity in the Renaissance, North accuses both of styling it as a ‘primordiality’ out of 
which the author arose and evolved. For instance, the author-function that permits 
Foucault to imagine a society without it is historically contingent on the emergence of a 
creative individuality co-extensive with the Renaissance and Enlightenment eras. North 
contends that the Foucauldian author-function is pitched against Medieval anonymity. 
Her study offers the grounds for reassessing literary theories that simplistically 
counterpose undifferentiated, anonymous texts against Modern notions of individuated 
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authorship, (which is deemed to coincide with the advent of mechanistic printing). 
Analysing historical examples, North demonstrates that anonymity, far from existing as a 
‘primordial’ state from which the author historically emerged, has been a complex, 
volitional and varied material circumstance for the generation and mediation of texts 
within print culture, (anonymity did not ‘die’ with the evolution of print). North opens 
conduits between the clearly demarcated, historically configured authoring-functions – 
the post-Enlightenment individual and the pre-Renaissance ‘folk’ voice – and resists a 
binary view of ‘Modern’ and ‘Medieval’:  
The anonymity that the print industry disseminated sometimes took the form of a missing 
author’s name, but not always. Pseudonyms, ambiguous initials, and the names of 
institutions or sponsoring groups gave anonymity a textuality that allowed it to compete 
with the author’s name for popularity and marketability. Sometimes the texts were the 
products of communal authorship, in which case no particular name was ‘missing’. 
Certain conventions of anonymity left visible spaces in the texts where an author’s name 
could have been placed, while others created a kind of figurative space made legible by 
the reader’s expectations. Anonymity’s many variations in early modern books and 
manuscripts speak to its popularity and usefulness and also to the fact that it formed a 
coherent enough set of conventions to allow authors and book producers to borrow, 
compare, conflate, and make surprisingly fine distinctions among its forms and potential 
meanings.103 
North constitutes anonymity at the level of choice, making the rigid boundaries of the 
author malleable – it is not ‘imposed’, and it does not ‘remainder’ texts. Importantly, 
North’s work shows that anonymity is not necessarily unsigned, and does not indicate the 
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absence of authoring. Nor does signature necessarily relate to the establishment of market 
presence.  
 
Of the many fascinating examples North gives, perhaps the following is illustrative of 
how ragged the authorial boundaries can be: 
The popular sixteenth century Mirror for Magistrates, begun as a continuation of 
Lydgate’s translation of Boccaccio’s Fall of Princes, gathers together poems about recent 
English worthies and their falls from fortune. The Mirror is a collaborative compliation 
with a named compiler but several anonymous contributers…With each new edition, new 
stories and prose links are added and the attributions to the older stories change and 
shift…Before the first tale has been told a reader has seen references to more than a 
dozen significant sources of authority…The seven unnamed authors are distinguished 
from each other by cues within the prose links.104 
Texts like the Mirror for Magistrates credit and allude to named and unnamed authors 
from within the text; others encode clues to authorial identity in anagrams and acrostics. 
Anonymity varies in visibility and interpretability, it varies in temporality and is not a 
‘fixed’ state. Neither is it necessarily indexed to oral culture - fame is as much a 
consequence of oral narration as it is of written texts which circulate in print. So, despite 
valuing Foucault and Barthes for opening the way to her analysis, North’s detailed 
examination of Medieval and Renaissance texts leads her to conclude that both theorists 
marginalize and over-simplify anonymity. She ‘out-histories’ Foucault in particular. 
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For North, the signature shares a degree of ‘textual instability’ with anonymity: like 
anonymity, signature develops and proliferates within the boundaries of the text (the 
‘work’) and shares materiality with it.105 The structural sympathy between anonymity, 
over-abundance and the impossible tether represented by signature, mean that Derrida 
never empties out the (authoring) subject to the degree that Foucault and Barthes do, 
because he never valorizes or clearly demarcates the subject to the same extent. Derrida 
does not accord the subject ‘authority’ or repleteness. In terms of property, the signature 
is never ‘proper’, it is always contingent, always asserted and claimed. The ‘violence’ of 
signature in constituting property is the assertion of a colonial claim. At the same time, 
signature does not establish ‘stable’ property, it always includes the threat to break 
property open and reconstitute it elsewhere, in other forms, including those which are 
structurally anonymous. 
 
 
2.2.5 OTOBIOGRAPHIES 
 
Derrida does not empty out the subject in order to bound work, nor does he accord it 
permanent stability and impenetrable wholeness. This means the status of biography and 
autobiography has a significant place in his theorizing and in what it means to write and 
be written. For Derrida, it is impossible to assume a position, protected by the boundary 
of a discipline or institution, that is not polluted by those ‘empirical accidents’ that 
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characterize a life and work - what Robert Smith calls ‘blots of specificity’.106 The 
personal nature of the interplay between Derrida and many of his sparring partners - 
Searle and Foucault amongst them - reiterates some of the theoretical issues at stake in 
debates about authorship, textual hygiene and the phenomenological subject. In general, 
Derrida resists the notion that philosophy, (indeed, any epistemological ‘discipline’), can 
be purged of ‘blots of specificity’. In fact, signature has a decisive role in drawing 
attention to them. The character of the jockeying between Derrida and Searle in the 
circumstances of the constitution, translation and reception of SEC is illustrative of the 
intrusions that the infinitely particular and personal signature makes into the process of 
authoring. To reiterate, signature is very much the lowest common denominator in the 
sum of what an author is. At the same time, signature marks the colonial impetus of those 
heirs that claim ‘legitimacy’, so to some extent the intercontinental debate between Searle 
and Derrida reveals the operational lines of inheritance that are channelled through 
signature and constitute  a ‘claim’ to property. 
 
Derrida’s study, ‘Otobiographies’, deals with the mutual intrusions of autobiography and 
philosophy into a written life through the figure of Nietzsche and his ‘tainted’ legacy. His 
central contention is that having lived to extend credit to his name, Nietzsche makes of 
his life an ‘immense bio-graphical paraph’, dated in advance of the eternal return (which 
he has to have faith in). The impossibility of determining a defining ‘auto-biographical’ 
event problematizes the beginnings, origins or ‘the first movement of a signature’. 
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Purifying rites of separation between the philosopher and the personal life lived deny the 
necessary impropriety of the text (interior and exterior are mixed): 
Neither immanent readings of philosophical systems (whether such readings be structural 
or not) nor external, empirical-genetic readings have ever themselves questioned the 
dynamis of that borderline between the “work” and the “life”, the system and the subject 
of the system. This borderline - I call it dynamis because of its force, its power as well as 
its virtual and mobile potency - is neither active nor passive, neither outside nor inside. It 
is most especially not a thin line, an invisible or indivisible trait lying between the 
enclosure of philosophemes, on the one hand, and the life of an author already 
identifiable behind the name, on the other. This divisible borderline traverses two 
“bodies”, the corpus and the body, in accordance with laws we are only beginning to 
catch sight of.107 
When ‘work’ and ‘life’ are mixed, empirical ‘death’ does not bring and end to ‘life’, 
which is entrusted to countersignatures. Throughout his work, Derrida figures the 
dynamis in various forms: it is citationality and ‘parasites’ in SEC, and the principle of 
‘sponginess’ in Signsponge. As dynamis, signature is not split - sender to receiver - into 
stable, definable parts, rather the split permits the action of substition, equivalence and 
countersignature. 
 
The issue of tainted legacies, the circles of credit and debt incurred in friendship and in 
reading, later recurred personally for Derrida in relation to his mentor, Paul de Man and 
again illustrate the impossibility of textual hygiene. In his prologue to Death and Return 
                                                
107 Derrida, J. ‘Otobiographies’ in Mcdonald, Christine (ed.) The Ear of the Other: 
Otobiography, Transference, Translation (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 
1985) pp5-6 
  86 
of the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida, Séan Burke 
interprets the shadows cast on literary theory by the posthumous revelation of de Man’s 
wartime involvement with Le Soir, a collaborationist Belgian newspaper. As de Man’s 
articles surfaced, revisions of his critical position on ‘biography’ followed: 
De Man’s denial of biography, his ideas of autobiography as self-defacement, have come 
to be seen not as disinterested theoretical statements, but as sinister and meticulous acts 
of self-protection, by which he sought to (a)void his historical self.108 
Burke says these revisions of de Man ‘disinter many of the loci of traditional author-
centred criticism’. They posed ethical-political questions not only of de Man himself, but 
of his interest in de-centering the individual author and of those who had invested in his 
theory. Association with ‘Paul de Man’ demonstrates a potential route to ‘prosecution’ 
for these corporate investors (‘Sarl’)  just as, for Burke, the personal apologias issued on 
de Man’s behalf by his friends; ‘confirm(s) that…the signature ‘Paul de Man’ is 
something greatly in excess of a textual effect…his signature ties de Man ethically and 
existentially to the texts he has written.’109 When a legacy is claimed, when proprietorial 
rights are assumed, the signature automatically implicates anyone using it to claim that 
legacy and those rights. The author-function, with its system of institutional hedges - for 
example, an apparently cleansing objectivity which debars some discourses from status as 
‘work’ - does not. As a proprietorial claim, signature is never fully constituted; it is 
intangible, unstable, liable to devaluation, speculation and market fluctuations. 
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The structural instability on which signature proceeds means that the process of reading 
and approving - ‘countersigning’ - is never closed or fixed. As a recovery of intention, 
reading makes (more or less) speculative claims only. In ordinary language, 
countersignatures have legal status as the provision of a second signature in verification 
of a first, or as witness to the authenticity of a document. Frequently, a countersignature 
enacts a financial instrument – for example, it may be used to confirm the identity of an 
account holder on which a cheque is drawn, and it can provide a link to the identity of an 
(otherwise unspecified) bearer who draws on it. The language of financial operations - 
credit, debt - is especially noticeable in Derrida’s construction of signature in 
‘Otobiographies’.  
 
In terms of its approach and central concern with legacies, with the ethical issues that the 
extension of a signature entails, ‘Otobiographies’ bears a purposive relationship to 
Specters of Marx. To read a text in iteration is not only to become caught in the eternal 
return of the proper name, but to make a ‘political intervention’, the character of which 
cannot be conclusively decided in advance: 
There can always be a Hegelianism of the left and a Hegelianism of the right, a 
Heideggerianism of the left and a Heideggerianism of the right, a Nietzscheanism of the 
right and a Nietzscheanism of the left, and even, let us not overlook it, a Marxism of the 
right and a Marxism of the left. The one can always be the other, the double of the 
other.110 
Politics and ethics cannot be written, they can only be read, and to read is to hybridize. 
Derrida does not deny the role of intent, but asks his readers to recognize that intent is 
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itself a hybrid produced in and by the abyss (the mise-en-abyme). Even as Nietzsche 
writes ‘with his name and in his name’, he extends a line of credit to that name which can 
only be honored after his literal demise, by others, who read him politically. The 
signature is extended - and in this extension from ‘the body’ (something Derrida figures 
in Signsponge as ‘dehiscence’) there is something like the movement of an exteriorizing 
prosthesis. In order to be fulfilled by others in pursuit: ‘It is the eternal return that signs or 
seals’.111 
 
 
2.2.6 COUNTERSIGNATURE 
 
The incomplete subject is manifest in the emphasis Derrida places on ‘countersignature’. 
Countersignature is not a term used in SEC, though it is used in ‘Ltd Inc a b c…’ when 
Derrida purports to countersign Searle’s name in the face of Searle’s attempts to execute 
his own countersignature as a warrant over Austin. A paper called ‘Countersignature’ 
was delivered at a symposium in Cerisy and Derrida was motivated by this locus to stress 
the affective contextual links that bind personal and ‘professional’ experiences 
inextricably together.112 In ‘Countersignature’, Derrida reconsiders his relationships with 
Jean Genet and Francis Ponge in terms of the countersignature, reflecting, from a position 
towards the end of his life, that the word contre has always been central to his 
                                                
111  Ibid. p13 
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philosophical enterprise, exemplifying his thinking. Contre, variously ‘against’ and 
‘beside’, conveys the notions of ‘opposition’ and ‘proximity’ equally, describing the split, 
(against and beside), on which the necessary non-presence of the signer in SEC is 
constituted; contre gives on to the vis-à-vis as it gives on to the ‘beside’. 
 
‘Countersignature’ opens with a consideration of three modalities of meaning 
encapsulated in the phrase ‘the betrayal of truth’. First, ‘truth’ might be betrayed by a lie, 
an infidelity, a simulacrum; second, ‘truth’ might be equated to betrayal - ‘truth’ is what 
betrays; third, ‘truth’ might be betrayed in the sense of being revealed, or unmasked, in, 
for instance, a fiction that does not hold itself out to be true. So: 
Supposing that a countersignature betrays the truth of an earlier signature, in what sense 
does it do this? If the betrayal of truth in its three meanings counterfeits and contravenes 
by means of a counterfeiting that can, in certain singular cases make the truth (“Veritatem 
facere”, as Augustine says), it can be said that the countersignature betrays the signature 
by counterfeiting it or, on the contrary, respects it by not imitating it, by not 
counterfeiting it, for example by signing very differently, The question becomes: what 
does it mean to countersign and counterfeit? And, especially, what does it mean to 
betray?113 
If it is not stated outright in SEC that signature cannot be conceived of as anything other 
than countersignature, a necessary consequence of the split - the fractured absence to self 
which is written and is writing - it is made explicit in Signsponge and ‘Countersignature’. 
Every signature is a countersignature and cannot be otherwise. In effect, in a complex, 
spongy intermeshing of tense and citationality, signature - noun behaving as verb - 
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promises it can be resigned in future, having been signed previously and presently. At a 
functional level, this gives onto the process of verification, whether that is styled as the 
attempted recovery of a subject or of a body: signature and countersignature, vis-à-vis 
and beside each other, are performative values, affected by an ‘immediate iterability’: 
When it’s a question of the indelible, irreducible anteriority of the signature, the 
protosignature in relation to the countersignature, authorized or authorizing, things, 
immediately get complicated and is contaminated precisely by the betrayal of truth… 
Iterability haunts the proto-archi signature and is from the outset its own 
countersignature…all future countersignatures come to countersign what was originally a 
countersignature.114 
Signature/countersignature is an abyssal thing, constantly affirming and performing, the 
proximate contre abutting the oppositional contre, a contamination and contagion. The 
act of reading is truly an act of countersigning and as such is an affirmation affected by: 
…a certain passive receptivity in the decision as decision of the other. It is thus not 
merely performative. If the experience of reading a work as such has always been for me 
an affirmation of countersignature, that is, of authentication and repetition without 
imitation, without counterfeiting, a doubling of ‘yes’ in the irreplaceable idiom of each 
‘yes’, as at a wedding where each ‘yes’ says ‘yes’ to the other, doubling it without 
repeating it…well the formulation of what may here resemble a theory or working out of 
a theory or reading-rewriting is linked for me to the tangling together of the different 
Cerisy conferences and my texts on Genet, then Ponge and Genet…I wrote Signsponge 
for Cerisy, in it I elaborated a sort of formalized discourse – that had been a long time in 
the making, dating back as far as texts such as Signature Event Context, where, at the end 
of Margins of Philosophy I play with the imitation by someone else of my own signature 
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– on the experience of countersignature which is to be found in Ponge’s text and which 
finds in that text an extraordinary and exemplary support.115 
Observed by Derrida, the operation of signature necessarily extends it beyond itself, 
requiring a validating partner in spite of the face it presents. The breach which permits 
and demands validation not only permits ‘counterfeit’, it means counterfeiting is 
inevitable: without counterfeit/countersignature, there can be no signature. This permits 
capitalist accumulation around signature as a corporate point of convenience as much as 
it interrupts the omnipotence of individual genius or fixed truth. The emphasis on 
whether signature is directed towards accumulation or interrruption is an ethical and 
political choice. Signature has a complex relationship to temporality but it cannot assure 
transcendental presentness, as is tacitly assumed (by Austin). As signature is revenant, 
what looks like the present is a liminal, haunted state of inbetweenness and a movement 
of returning or coming back. 
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3. DERRIDA AND VISUAL ART 
 
This Chapter concerns aspects of Derrida’s engagement with visual art and expands on 
them in relation to the ‘craft of reproducibility’ and the position of the autograph. It 
develops ideas about the character of the materiality manifest in artists’s signatures. 
Derrida entered the field of visual art at a degree of distance, largely through passages 
opened up initially in literary criticism. His initial reception in the (English) field came at 
a time chronologically linked to the inception of the ‘Pictures’ generation in New York, 
and to those artists engaged with Feminism, Queer Theory and Post-Colonial discourses 
who might be thought of as coming within the ambit of Institutional Critique.116 At this 
time, Conceptual Art was already well established.  
 
Derrida’s approach to visual art departs from consideration of Immanuel Kant’s 
‘parergon’; the claims to the truth in art generated by Heidegger, and the activity of artists 
involved with Narrative Figuration: Valerio Adami, (whose work illustrated Glas), is the 
focus of ‘+R (Into the Bargain)’ and Gérard Titus-Caramel the focus of ‘Cartouches’.117  
Neither Adami nor Titus-Caramel have especially high international profiles. Both ‘+R 
(Into the Bargain)’ and ‘Cartouches’ appear in The Truth in Painting, a collection of four 
essays written around ‘painting’, which was published in French in 1978 (and translated 
into English nine years later). The back cover of The Truth in Painting, carries what is 
almost a manifesto for Derrida’s engagement with art:  
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117  Derrida, J. Glas, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990); The Truth in 
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the philosophy that dominates the discourse on painting…/…to decrypt the singular 
contract which links the phonic trait to the graphic trait…/… to analyze the ductus (idiom 
of the trait as draftsman’s signature) and the system of duction (production, reproduction, 
reduction, etc.)…/…(to witness)…a duel taking place between Heidegger and Schapiro 
in order to find out whom, in truth, are due the unlaced shoes of Van Gogh…118 
Introducing Deconstruction and the Visual Arts, Brunette & Wills group together those 
texts which they determine to represent Derrida’s is most direct engagement with art. 
Alongside The Truth in Painting, they mention ‘Envois’, an essay in The Postcard; Right 
of Inspection, ‘Forcener Le Subjectile’ and Memoirs of the Blind, an illustrated catalogue 
and treatise which accompanied on exhibition Derrida curated at the Louvre in 1990.119 
They introduce Derrida’s thought in terms of ‘spacing’ with reference to Of 
Grammatology, and they remark on his interest in literary signatures in Glas.  
 
The material experiments of Glas, and the initial theoretical burst of Writing and 
Difference and Of Grammatology, are greatly preferred as points of departure for such 
(sustained) analysis of Derrida as there is in (visual) art. It is as if the profusion of 
‘creativity’ in Glas - its difficulty as an academic text - automatically makes it the most 
appropriate text to consider for art. Consequently, the texts of the SEC cycle are absent or 
relegated to footnotes. There is, for example, no mention of SEC by name in Wilson’s 
The Visual World of French Theory: Figurations, (although she makes an unrelated, 
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passing mention of Margins of Philosophy, a collection in which the essay appears); nor 
is there clear reference in Tucker’s Derridada, (a short study devoted to exploring the 
connections between Derrida and Duchamp, itself a neglected field for study); and only 
passing mention in the texts collected together by Brunette & Wills.120 Similarly, in the 
field of art history which deals with culture prior to the 20th century and examines either 
signatures specifically or the notion of authorship more broadly, Barthes and Foucault are 
quite regularly marked as influences for analysis whereas Derrida is not.121  
 
In adopting SEC as a departure point then, this thesis aspires to skew the perspective on 
Derrida for visual art. Politicized largely as ‘institutional critique’, which applies 
‘deconstruction’ to the effects of frames and framing through the institution, the 
structural relevance of some of Derrida’s theoretical subtleties - issues of pace and 
temporality - have been overlooked in visual art. The position from which Derrida was 
approached by artists and art theorists in the 1970s and 1980s was already invested with 
ideas about what deconstruction should be from a position already consolidated in literary 
theory. Harrison & Wood note that consequent to ‘French theory in the late 1960s’, there 
was a tendency to perceive all the objects and institutions of art as ‘texts’ which could be 
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(wholly) read through the devices of literary criticism.122 This thesis does not trade on 
established understandings of what deconstruction is or has been. Rather, its approach is 
to scroll back from those conceptual points which appear to have been decided in 
advance in order to rethink the significance of Derrida’s work on signature for the 
production of visual art, not its appearance or reception.  
 
Brunette & Wills do not deal with Derrida’s engagement with written signatures in SEC, 
‘Ltd Inc a b c…’ or ‘Otobiographies’: these are not seen to be key texts for understanding 
Derrida’s relationship to art which, quite conventionally, proceeds through his dealings 
with images. However, The Truth in Painting was first published a year after the 
translation, reception and reply to SEC in English gave rise to ‘Ltd Inc a b c...’, and the 
texts share noticeable leitmotifs: the title of Derrida’s essay on Adami, ‘+R (Into the 
Bargain)’, evokes the form of the ‘(three + n)’ authors constituting ‘Sarl’ in ‘Ltd Inc a b 
c…’; the acronym ‘Sarl’ is also resurrected in the essay ‘Restitutions’ to demonstrate the 
abyssal, corporate process of investment (attribution) in art historical claims to truth. In 
terms of this thesis, it is productive to place an emphasis on understanding The Truth in 
Painting, (specifically ‘Restitutions’), in relation to the SEC cycle, in order to insinuate a 
path that calls to Derrida’s broader encounters with signature. Rather than finding 
foundation for establishing the place of signature in art in texts that appear prima facie to 
engage with artists and images, I look to signature first as a general practice. Departing 
from Derrida’s SEC cycle offers the potential for generating a new perspective on the 
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relevance of his theories for visual art, especially as they relate to its social (not 
idiomatic) production.  
 
 
3.1 SIGNATURE AS EQUIVALENCE 
 
The preceding Chapter finished with consideration of ‘Otobiographies’ and 
‘Countersignature’, as texts in which Derrida, as Burke puts it, ‘disinters the loci of 
traditional author-centred criticism’ and advances the notion that signatures and 
countersignatures are involved in a never-ending circuit of credit and debt, appealing to 
the future and ‘honouring’ the past. Often playing with the imitation of his own signature 
within the text, Derrida implicates himself practically in this confused and unhygienic 
operation. He does not treat autobiography, biography, literature or philosophy as 
disciplines with boundaries, which is partly why those inclined to circumscribe and 
protect their fields of interest as professionals found (and find) him so frustrating. When 
he redesignates Searle as ‘Sarl’, Derrida uses his own name to ask whether it is possible 
to translate a proper name or a signature: 
And how do the ‘common’, ‘generic’ elements, which always exist even in a proper 
name, withstand contamination in and by foreign languages? In order to account for all 
sorts of necessities that I cannot go into here, I have in other texts, devised countless 
games, playing with ‘my name’, with the letters and syllables, Ja, Der, Da. Is my name 
still ‘proper’, or my signature, when, in proximity to ‘There. J.D.’ (pronounced, in 
French, approximately Der. J. D.), in proximity to ‘Wo? Da.” in German, to ‘Her. J.D.’ in 
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Danish  they begin to function as integral or fragmented entities [corps], or as whole 
segments of common nouns or even of things?123 
Adjunct to this name play, is Derrida’s deliberately inconsistent treatment of names 
within ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ - Thamus and Theuth are indicated as ‘Ammon’and ‘King of 
Kings’; ‘Toth’ and ‘God of Writing’ respectively. Derrida demonstrates in practice the 
structural instability of even these most proper of proper names. 
 
 
3.1.1 SIGNSPONGE 
 
The integrity of the proper name, that which signature purports to sign - the assignable 
commerce (property) between a so-called author and the proper name in general 
(pursuant to the ‘properness’ of the subject) - is taken up by Derrida again in 
Signsponge.124 An important intervention in the chronological narrative of the SEC cycle, 
Signsponge develops ideas about signature, legitimacy, propriety and purity all of which 
permeate SEC oblique to academic method. It is the acuteness of the angle to academic 
method in texts like Signsponge, essential to Derrida’s philosophical engagement, that is 
styled by Searle as the ‘terrorism of the obscurantist’.125 To an extent, ‘Otobiographies’ is 
a less ‘obscurantist’ reiteration of some of the concerns of Signsponge, which is 
constructed performatively, through the abyssal operations it demonstrates - rhythm and 
pace are as important to Signsponge as words. Its translator, Richard Rand, for whom it is 
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the most ‘irruptive essay on literature…since Mallarmé’s La Musique et Les Lettres’, 
hints at the impossibility of translating its myriad fugitive anagrams, homonyms and 
syntax.126 In effect, Signsponge makes the author equivalent with the text in a text that is 
‘about’ a poet who makes his name an equivalence within his poems. Signsponge is an 
important description and demonstration of how Derrida figures signature functioning 
and coalescing. Understanding it is crucial to developing an appreciation that for Derrida, 
signature is a process and not a thing. 
 
Derrida is reluctant to divest his method of its ‘sponginess’ in Signsponge, but he does 
distinguish three modalities of signature. The first is that of signature as authenticating a 
‘proper name’; the second, of signature as ‘the inimitable idiom of a writer, sculptor, 
painter or orator’; the third is that of signature in general, that which styles and names 
signature as ‘signature’.127 He contends that Ponge folds all three into one under the 
rubric of the ‘signsponge’. The signsponge is a proper name (exemplified in the name 
‘Francis Ponge’ in Signsponge and the name ‘Friedrich Nietzsche’ in ‘Otobiographies’); 
it is the name of a name, a name redoubled. Placed in quotation marks by Ponge, the 
name is ‘a supplementary mark in the abyss’ and ‘It is [therefore] in the abyss of the 
proper that we are going to recognize the impossible name of the abyss.’128 In Ponge’s 
poems, (prominent amongst those referenced in Signsponge are ‘Pour un Malherbe’, 
‘Mimosa’ and ‘Soap’), the relationships between signature, text, proper name and ‘thing’ 
are figured by Derrida as fungi and deadwood, spores and cinders, something he marks 
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elsewhere as ‘dehiscence’ (in SEC and ‘Limited Inc.’) and ‘remains’ (in Dissemination). 
As spores and cinders, mutually interdependent for necrotizing life, movements between 
signature-text-name-thing are exponential, inextricable and symbiotic. In both 
‘Otobiographies’ and Signsponge, such a temporal convenience as might be described by 
the movement between signature-text-name-thing, an unfixed entity with a dynamic 
border, is never deferred to anything but advancing countersignatures: the signature is not 
autonomous or contained.  In this, although Derrida might seem to approach Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic circle in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, and his distrust of the ideological 
translation of pharmakon in the ‘Phaedrus’ echoes Heidegger’s distrust of the translation 
of hypokenimenon, there is a marked difference. Derrida does not subscribe to 
Heidegger’s view of the hypokenimenon, but to ‘countersignature’ and the abyss.  
 
To clarify, the Heideggerean hermeneutic circle involves the artist, the art work and art in 
a search for the point of origin, ‘the thingliness of the thing’, which ‘is not merely an 
aggregate of traits, nor an accumulation of properties by which that aggregate arises.’129 
For Heidegger, the thing has a pre-existent core - hypokenimenon - or underlying 
substance; the core ‘being’ is essentially inarticulable, an awareness that might be 
described in Freudian terms as unheimlich. Heidegger believes that the (insensitive) 
translation of hypokenimenon points to a distant error in the Western construction of 
‘being’: 
The process begins with the appropriation of Greek words by Roman-Latin thought. 
Hupokenimenon [sic] becomes subiectum, hupostasis becomes substantia; symbebkos 
becomes accidens. However this translation of Greek names into Latin is by now way the 
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innocent process it is considered today. Beneath the seemingly literal and thus faithful 
translation there is concealed, rather, a translation of Greek experience into a different 
way of thinking. Roman thought takes over the Greek words without a corresponding, 
equally original experience of what they say, without the Greek thought. The rootlessness 
of Western thought begins with this translation. 130 
Hypokenimenon is a rather untranslatable state of Greek thought that has been 
rationalized by Roman thinking in terms of its ‘traits’, which, related to it, are 
nevertheless not ‘it’. That the thingness of the thing, the ‘-ness’ of anything, is figured as 
‘rooted’. This contrasts with the Derridean ‘dehiscence’ of the thing as an ‘aggregate of 
traits’.  
 
The significance of dehiscence as a somewhat marginal metaphor in the SEC cycle pays 
directly into Signsponge and to Derrida’s relationship with Heidegger. Dehiscence, 
mentioned in passing in SEC, is described in more detail by Derrida in ‘Limited Inc a b 
c…’: 
As in the realm of botany, from which it draws its metaphorical value, this word marks 
emphatically that the divided opening in the growth of a plant, is also what, in a positive 
sense, makes production, reproduction, development possible. Dehiscence (like 
iterability) limits what makes it possible, while rendering its rigor and purity possible. 
What is at work here is something like a law of undecidable contamination, which has 
interested me for some time. 131 
Dehiscence describes the dissemination of seeds and spores in a violent and multifarious 
burst or puff. It is connected with the action of iteration on utterance and signature where 
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iteration is a fractal trigger, and at some level ‘quasi-organic’. The fungal movement 
originates without absolute definition. 
 
The synecdochic, fungal quality Derrida perceives working in and through ‘Francis 
Ponge’ (signature-text-name-thing) denies ‘things’ healthy, practical, discrete lives as 
much as it denies them a submerged, ‘uncanny’ existence. Fungus, wholly unchanged 
from Latin, translates to Greek as sphongos, spongos, (a sponge), and has, in this history, 
a relationship with the action of yeast: ‘sponge’ is the pun, the textual device, that 
Derrida employs to demonstrate the mycological movements between signature-text-
name-thing through Ponge. Furthermore, the Latin fungibilius, derived from fungor 
(present infinitive fungi) means ‘to perform’ – this is hardly incidental as a reflection on 
the Derridean method. In combination these etymological excursions bring sense to 
Derrida’s assertion that ‘the relationship between the signature and the proper name is 
spongy’, and signature is fungal.132 Signsponge is an important elaboration of Derridean 
method. 
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3.1.2 AGAMBEN 
 
The notion of a synecdochic quality to signature might be seen to bring Signsponge close 
to the notion of signature explored by Giorgio Agamben.133 The Signature of All Things - 
a self-declared ‘reflection on method’ - opens with a consideration of Paracelsus’s 15th 
century alchemical treatise De natura rerum (‘On the Nature of Things’), a treatise 
codifying the medieval doctrine of signatures, (signatura). Agamben argues that the 
doctrine of signatures had a decisive influence on Renaissance and Baroque thought. 
When signature is understood to mean ‘characteristic’, what is generally considered to 
constitute a signature is shifted beyond the notaristic inheritances of the hand-written 
paraph to implicate moral and personal indigenous ‘truths’, (signature has a penumbra of 
shifting qualities rather than a singular, identifiable, static source). The Medieval doctrine 
of signatures holds that hidden, esoteric qualities and propensities are marked as signs 
which allude to these qualities in the physical form of organic things. Signatures are thus 
diagnosed through signs.  
 
Agamben, writing to demonstrate the limits of semiotic analyses of signature, points to 
the (provisional) resurrection of the Paracelsian signature in The Order of Things and 
says Foucault locates it in the 16th century episteme which is determined as having been 
constructed through a theory of resemblance. In The Order of Things, ‘adjacency’ is the 
organising principle in this episteme, with place and similitude (that which displays the 
                                                
133  Agamben, G. The Signature of All Things: On Method (New York: Zone Books, 
2009) 
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‘hidden’ property) in a symbiotic relationship.134 For Foucault, in this ordering of 
knowledge, movement is circular as opposed to linear, (it is linear in the ‘Classical’, 17th 
century episteme). Signatures visibly (physically) manifest hidden qualities in terms of 
the sympathies, analogies, emulations and conveniences that flow from hidden qualities, 
and thus structure the field of resemblances. In this order, signatures have a degree of 
latency - they exist even if they have not, and have never been, recognized. There are 
mute signatures waiting to be discovered. Signatures are not constituted through exterior 
perception, however, but ‘organically’ from within. 
 
Agamben claims to work in a Foucauldian Entwicklungsfähigkeit, tracing the movement 
of the Paraclesian signature - which makes manifest occult virtues - through the work of 
the 16th century German mystic, Jackob Böhme. Agamben indicates that the most 
significant development of the doctrine of signatures occurred not in ‘science’ (medical 
or magical), but in the theory of sacraments. This theory, in debt to Augstine’s fourth 
century theory of signs, culminates in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, a work 
which marks a material difference between sign and sacrament. Sacraments do not only 
refer symbolically to what is signified (as might the sign), but act to confer a grace. The 
sacrament of marriage is used by Austin (and others) to represent the speech act and that 
- in turn - opens out in Derrida’s consideration of ‘notaristic’ signatures and their lack of 
self-sufficiency.135 If the notion of sacrament seems to pervade the speech act as a 
                                                
134 Foucault, M. The Order of Things (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002) 
135 Agamben, G. Language and Death: The Place of Negativity (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota, 1991).  Language and Death deals with the specifically with the 
speech act, but is beyond the remit of this thesis. The Signature of All Things is 
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metaphysical remnant, that is nothing more than a description of the complicity that the 
speech act requires. Agamben states that the sacrament’s efficacy: 
does not act simply ex institutione like a sign; rather each time it needs an active principle 
in order to animate it. This is why it is necessary for the minister, who represents Christ 
as the principal agent, to have the intention, (if not presently, at least customarily) of 
carrying out the sacramental act…Even if such intention is not subjective, which depends 
on the good or evil dispositions of the minister (ex opere operantis), but is an objective 
reality that is produced ex opere operatum, the sign here is always the place of an 
operation that actualizes its efficacy. 
In other words, the sacrament functions not as a sign that, once instituted, always 
signifies its meaning but as a signature whose effect depends upon a signator, or in any 
case on a principle – occult virtue in Paraclesus, instrumental virtue in Thomas – which 
each time animates it and makes it effective.136 
 
In Medieval theology, the sacramental effect - the effect of receiving sacraments - marks 
the human soul with a character or nota. Agamben states that Augustine held that such a 
character might be marked without conferring sacramental grace it was supposed to. 
Augustine exemplifies this with reference, firstly, to gold or silver coins which, stamped 
with a signum regale in breach of the appropriate authority, would nonetheless remain 
valid tender; secondly, with reference to an absconding soldier, marked with the 
character militiae, (given to Roman soldiers entering the Legion), who, forgiven for 
                                                                                                                                            
considered in preference to Language and Death because it extends the etymology of 
signature. 
136  Agamben, The Signature of All Things, op. cit. pp46-47 
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absconding, is returned to service without being re-marked with the character militiae. 
Agamben says this demonstrates that: 
the idea of an indelible sacramental character arises, then, from the need to explain how 
the sacrament survives in conditions that should have made it void or inefficacious. If the 
communication of the Spirit is impossible, the character will express the excess of 
sacrament over its effect, something like a supplement of efficacy without any content 
other than the pure fact of being marked…To put it differently: character is a zero degree 
signature, which expresses the event of a sign without meaning and grounds – in this 
event - a pure identity without content.137 
 
Historically, the notaristic signature - the kind of signature Derrida considers in SEC -
follows the sacramental signature, and the sacramental character bears a relationship to 
the paraph of the autograph/notaristic signature: the paraph is something less than a 
signature which must, like ‘grace’,  promise itself again, (it is active). As a supplement of 
efficacy, the zero degree signature, the indelible sacramental character, is redundant:  
a sign produced by a sign, the character exceeds the relational nature that is proper to the 
sign……Character, then, is a sign that exceeds the sign, and a relation that exceeds and 
grounds every relation. In the efficacious sign of the sacrament, character is what marks 
the irreducible excess of over-signification.138 
Agamben locates a split in signature in relation to excess and in that, its ‘sign’ is the locus 
of redundancy. To some extent, Agamben’s work supports Derrida’s contention that 
signature is both a divided seal and a latent countersignature. The fact that Derrida 
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specifically refers to signature as parousia, as he does in ‘Restitutions’, testifies to the 
importance of theology in its structural inheritance. 
 
 
3.2 SIGNATURE AND THE BODY OF THE ARTIST 
 
3.2.1 RESTITUTIONS 
 
‘Restitutions’ is a title that could be seen to hint at the logic of the politically motivated 
attributions and corporeal recoveries examined in the text that follows it.139 Derrida wrote 
the essay in French in 1978, at approximately the same time as ‘Otobiographies’. Like 
‘Otobiographies’, it anticipates the character of issues that would surface with the 
discovery of de Man’s ‘collaborationist’ papers because it looks at the operation of 
ideologically motivated recoveries and the hygienic process of distancing. Derrida takes 
up with the claims to a painting of shoes by Van Gogh which were lodged by Heidegger 
in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ (1935) and by Meyer Schapiro in ‘The Still Life as a 
Personal Object: A Note on Heidegger and Van Gogh’ (1968).140 It could be said that 
what is at stake in Derrida’s essay it is the determinacy of titles: Schapiro and Derrida 
employ - or construe - different titles for the (same) painting, whereas Heidegger does 
employ one at all, merely referring to the artist. Despite this, Schapiro claims to recognise 
                                                
139  Derrida, ‘Restitutions’, op. cit. pp255-382 
140  Heidegger, M. Basic Writings, (London and New York: Routledge, Routledge 
Classics, 2011); Schapiro, M. ‘The Still Life as a Personal Object: A Note on Heidegger 
and Van Gogh’, Theory and Philosophy of Art: Style, Artist, and Society - Selected 
Papers (New York: George Braziller, 1994) pp135-142 
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a specific painting in Heidegger’s text, and he corresponded with Heidegger before 
publishing ‘The Still Life as a Personal Object’, as correspondence which led him to 
illustrate his text with an image of the painting to which he believes Heidegger was 
referring.  
 
This painting, which bears the name ‘Vincent’ and the date ‘1887’, is entitled Shoes 
(anomalously dated ‘1886’ in the reproduction by-line). It is acknowledged as belonging 
to the Vincent Van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam, where it is listed as A Pair of Shoes 
(1886). Derrida, who finds Schapiro in prosecutory mode, forcing Heidegger’s hand, 
employs the same illustration in ‘Restitutions’. He titles it Old Shoes with Laces 
(undated) and follows it with several other image reproductions, which are spaced 
throughout the text in an effort, it seems, to illustrate ‘titles’ as much as reproduce the 
images to which they are attached. None of the (titled) illustrations are referred to in the 
‘body’ of the text, unlike the names of artists to which they may be attributed. Removed 
from their proper place accrediting individual works of art, the names of artists dispersed 
within the body of the text constitute another methodological device, a performative 
element of textual ‘practice’. Magritte, Van Eyck, Van Gogh are stockholders in 
Derrida’s enterprise here - his S.A.R.L. - and by virtue of this in the enterprise of 
Heidegger and Schapiro. A degree of connoisseurship or detective work (policing the 
text) is required to stitch the names to the reproductions. 
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On the face of it, Schapiro and Heidegger seem to be divided over the issue of whether 
the shoes depicted belong to Van Gogh (Schapiro) or to an anonymous (female) peasant 
(Heidegger). Schapiro introduces his text, as follows: 
In his essay on ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, Martin Heidegger interprets a painting 
by Van Gogh to illustrate the nature of art as a disclosure of truth…he chooses ‘a well-
known painting by Van Gogh, who painted such shoes several times…141 
Derrida remarks that Schapiro, intent on identifying exactly which of ‘several’ paintings 
is this ‘well-known’ Van Gogh, skips over the central thesis at work in ‘The Origin of the 
Work of Art’ to concentrate on a triviality. It is through a process of academically 
informed elimination, coupled with personal recollections solicited from Heidegger some 
30 years after the fact, that allows Schapiro to settle on the painting that illustrates his 
text. Henceforth, the illustrative example employed by Schapiro is accepted as the 
veritable object.142  
 
Having identified the exact painting, Schapiro goes on to fault Heidegger’s personal 
theoretical projections into it and thus his conception of ‘the metaphysical power’ of art, 
which in Schapiro’s opinion, are advanced to the detriment of the originating artist. For 
Schapiro, the intimate and psychoanalytically important status of shoes on a symbolic 
level naturally means that Van Gogh painted his own shoes, (simultaneously painting 
himself), so he works empirically towards this conclusion. In the end, despite his 
prosecutions, it is not the specific painting that matters to Schapiro, but the specific artist, 
                                                
141  Schapiro, op. cit. p135 
142  The painting has, consequent to the attention of Heidegger-Schapiro-Derrida, 
become something of a cause célébre and was, in 2009/2010, the focus of an exhibition - 
Vincent Van Gogh: Shoes – A Painting as Our Guest at the Wallraf-Richartz Museum, 
Cologne http://www.wallraf.museum/index.php?id=43&L=1, (accessed 27th July 2013) 
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the specific self-consciousness. Here, Derrida reads a devious science which employs the 
aperture located in the signature - ‘Vincent’ - in an attempt to restitute the full presence of 
the artist ‘Vincent Van Gogh’; to pull, in tact, in versimilitude, that historical body 
through the aperture. Under the guise of an empirical prosecution, Derrida suggests, 
Schapiro slips to metaphysics: ‘the whole presence gathered, pulled tight, contracted into 
itself, with itself, in proximity with itself, a parousia.’143 It is as if Schapiro pulls the 
signature-aperture closed and the painting can be said to depict Van Gogh’s shoes in an 
aboslute sense: the spectral body of the artist is a not so much a djinn at Schapiro’s 
command, but the apparition of empirical truth beyond human agency.  
 
It appears to Derrida that Schapiro unwittingly betrays a more personal attribution than 
the supernatural restitution of the artist. According to Derrida, in wishing to restitute the 
full presence of ‘Vincent Van Gogh’, the impossible unity of an impossible presence, 
Schapiro, (who dedicated ‘The Still Life as a Personal Object’ to his mentor, Kurt 
Goldstein), wishes to restitute the object vicariously to him. It was Goldstein who 
introduced Schapiro to Heidegger’s text in the first place, hence the dedication. Derrida 
employs the abyssal, destabilizing operation of the signature to illustrate his contention 
that Schapiro’s acknowledgement of a debt to his mentor precedes (prefaces and frames) 
an ideological attempt to restitute the place of a persecuted émigré in the face of Teutonic 
nostalgia, (i.e. Schapiro is not resituting the shoes to Van Gogh). In attempting to restitute 
‘Vincent’ contra Heidegger, Schapiro brings Goldstein to haunt the painting. Derrida 
believes that Schapiro was too keen to abandon the central thesis of Heidegger’s work in 
                                                
143  Derrida, ‘Restitutions’, op. cit. p369 
  110 
order to prosecute him on Goldstein’s behalf, and through this prosecution, attempt to 
bring an political ideology and series of (traumatic) events into focus. 
 
Derrida notices that mention of Van Gogh in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ is nugatory. 
Methodologically, this is precisely what interests him. Heidegger’s reference to Van 
Gogh is a pinprick, a puncture through which his conception of the work of art is pulled 
in on itself and caught in a vortex: ‘…each time, I’ve seen the celebrated passage on ‘a 
famous picture by Van Gogh’ as a moment of pathetic collapse, derisory and 
symptomatic, significant.’144 Having imagined a narrative for the shoes that locates them 
as the shoes of a ‘peasant woman’, all the more present the less they are thought (of) by 
that imaginary peasant woman, Heidegger states that ‘truth’ of the shoes is the revelation 
in the painting, (by imaging and imagining them in paint), of what is ‘not-thought’ in 
them: 
What happens here? What is at work in the work? Van Gogh’s painting is the disclosure 
of what the equipment, the pair of peasant shoes is in truth. This being emerges into the 
unconcealment of its Being. The Greeks call this unconcealment of beings aletheia. We 
say ‘truth’ and think little enough in using this word.145 
Though Heidegger’s reference to Van Gogh is transitory and the painting is presented as 
an exemplar, (he would have us believe that any other painting would do), Derrida says 
that the fact that Heidegger choose to indicate ‘Van Gogh’ means that he fails in his 
attempt to model the work of art. Heidegger emphasizes the familiarity of the painting, (it 
is ‘famous’ and ‘well-known’), and the prosaic quality of the ‘equipment’ it depicts. His 
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unconscious imputations accept unspoken structures which construct what is ‘famous’ 
and they present subjective, ideological truths of being, (which are therefore conjectural). 
In a sense, Derrida’s view of Heidegger’s take on the work of art is in sympathy with his 
view of Searle’s take on claims to (Austin’s) intellectual legacy: Heidegger and Searle 
are compromised in similar ways. 
 
 
3.2.2 HEIDEGGER’S RECIPROCAL READYMADE? 
 
It is perhaps illuminating to consider Heidegger’s employment of the unspecified 
painting by Van Gogh as a (Reciprocal) Readymade. The notes which accompany 
Duchamp’s Green Box refer to the Reciprocal Readymade as follows: ‘Reciprocal 
Readymade = Use a Rembrandt as an ironing-board’.146 Substituting Heidegger’s 
reference to the painting in this formula gives us the following statement: ‘Reciprocal 
Readymade = Use a Van Gogh as aletheia.’ If a Van Gogh and a Rembrandt are 
interchangeable to the extent that they each represent a famous painting, (i.e. an instantly 
recognizable physical work of art), the tension between ‘ironing board’ and ‘alethia’ is, 
with reference to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, a tension between ‘equipment’ and 
‘the truth of equipment’. Duchamp’s reciprocity involves restyling what is ostensibly an 
artwork as a functional object for use in conducting a household task: the painting is 
bound to its physical substrate. Heidegger’s reciprocity involves restyling what is 
                                                
146  Sanouillet, M. & Peterson, E. (eds). The Writings of Marcel Duchamp (Oxford: 
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ostensibly an artwork as a functional object for use in modeling a universal or 
philosophical paradigm: the painting is unbound from its physical substrate. ‘Art’ – as a 
space created through disjunction (Duchamp) or revelation (Heidegger) – happens 
proportionately on different sides of the equation. For Duchamp, it happens largely on the 
side of the Readymade; for Heidegger, largely on the side of the painting. 
 
Both Duchamp and Heidegger require ‘instant recognition’ and it is this shared 
requirement that illustrates signature as a founding principle in their considerations of art. 
So, the implications of the Reciprocal Readymade for Heidegger’s notion of art vis-à-vis 
‘equipment’ cannot be divorced from the operation of the signature, which belies the 
schismatic character and complex temporality of the artwork even in its ‘thingly’ physical 
embodiment. Heidegger conceives of equipment as ‘half-thing’, as objects made without 
the autonomy of whole, self-sufficient things: artworks which reveal the essence of 
‘equipmentality’ are autonomous to the extent that they reveal the ‘truth of being’. The 
(impossibly) autonomous artwork - indicated by Duchamp as ‘a Rembrandt’ - is indicated 
by Heidegger as ‘a well-known Van Gogh’: the famous work of art for both, has the 
status of an ‘equipmental’ prop. Expunged of references to Van Gogh, Heidegger’s text 
could not carry the same degree of conviction that a painting - any painting - could 
embody the transcendental truth of ‘equipment’, the essence of being. 
 
Although Heidegger would like to think his example is indifferent, and he tries to display 
his indifference by abandoning ‘the one by Van Gogh that represents a pair of peasant 
shoes’ with a preceding qualification - ‘a painting, e.g.’ - it isn’t abandoned and it can’t 
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be generalized. For Derrida, there is no accident, no indifference, in the character of the 
painting Heidegger chooses to abandon. If Heidegger assumes that the painting he 
chooses as an example is dispensible, an indifferent model-form, he is sucked through the 
particularity of the signature-aperture ‘Vincent’. In choosing this painting to abandon, in 
describing what is left behind, he annexes Van Gogh’s shoes ‘on the pretext of 
repatriating them to their authentic, rural landscape, back to their native place’.147 
Heidegger chooses Van Gogh to share (represent) his artisanal ideology, his Germanic 
‘unthought’. In choosing to absent himself from peasant shoes, what remains for 
Heidegger (and constitutes ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’) is an earthy, manual 
artisan’s tradition, (Duchamp, of course, also professes ‘indifference’). 
 
Derrida reprimands Schapiro for not acknowledging the incongruity and superfluity of 
‘Van Gogh’ in the scheme of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. Paradoxically, he 
generates his own reading of Heidegger exactly through this superfluous ‘spyhole’. To 
bring ‘Countersignature’ into play here: 
…the system of contagion or radiation between the places of the text, the columns and 
the spyholes [judas]. I called ‘spyholes’, if you recall, the inset sequences of text that are 
precisely like spyholes, like openings made or pierced in columns to spy and to lie in 
wait, to see without being seen. Judas is also a traitor’s name, the figure of the disciple, 
the Jew who betrayed Jesus, his master, precisely by kissing him.148 
What is a spyhole, might be configured from the other side a ‘visor effect’, (as it is in 
Specters of Marx), a spectral device and operation: 
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…the spectre is a becoming-body, a certain phenomenal and carnal form of the spirit. It 
becomes, rather, some “thing” that remains difficult to name: neither soul nor body, and 
both one and the other. For it is flesh and phenomenality that give to the spirit its spectral 
apparition, but which disappear right away in the apparition, in the very coming of the 
revenant or spectre. There is something disappeared, departed in the apparition itself as 
the reapparition of the departed…One does not know if it is living or dead…this Thing 
that is not a thing, this thing that is invisible between its apparitions, when it reappears. 
This Thing meanwhile looks at us and sees us not see it even when it is there. A spectral 
asymmetry interrupts here all specularity. It de-synchronizes, it recalls us to anachrony. 
We will call this the visor effect: we do not see who looks at us…it will be presupposed 
by everything we advance on the spectre in general…149 
 
Derrida, whose debt to Heidegger in this passage is advanced in the capitalization of 
‘Thing’, describes the reference to Van Gogh in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ as 
‘ridiculous and lamentable’, ‘both overlooked and impoverished’, characterized by a 
‘consumer-like hurry’, ‘massive self-assurance’ and ‘crude framing’. He argues that 
despite its place on the periphery of his argument, Heidegger’s abandonment of Van 
Gogh is pivotal, (in this, ‘Restitutions’ shares methodological aspects with ‘Plato’s 
Pharmacy’). Heidegger deals in ‘ghosts’, as does Schapiro. Unconsciously, they both 
demonstrate the operation of the abyss. The moment that Schapiro seems to oppose 
Heidegger most radically is the moment he most resembles him. Heidegger’s 
abandonment and Schapiro’s prosecution are faux-pas, taken in haste: it is possible to see 
a slip to metaphysics in the pre-linguistics at work in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, as 
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well as in the quasi-empirical parousia of ‘The Still Life as a Personal Object’. The 
revelation of the unthought thing and the restitution of individual artist are equivalents in 
Derrida’s abyss. In their respective texts, both Schapiro and Heidegger approach the 
artwork as a ‘commodity’ in the sense that both conceive it to be spectrally endowed and 
activated for use in their critical enterprise. 
 
 
3.2.3 HEIDEGGER’S HAND: SIGNATURE AS STYLE 
 
One of the figurations Derrida uses in ‘Restitutions’, a figuration which haunts the shoes, 
is the notion of the ‘pair’. It is pertinent that the title attached to the Van Gogh painting at 
the centre of the discussion has been museologically fixed as A Pair of Shoes (1886), 
setting some sort of seal on the aesthetic assumptions that have configured them as a pair. 
Derrida questions both Schapiro and Heidegger over the implication that the shoes 
painted by Van Gogh are ‘paired’. As a pair - ‘belonging’ (to Goldstein and the German 
people as much as to Van Gogh, Heidegger, Schapiro or Derrida) - the shoes are made to 
walk, put to work in on behalf of the (restituted/ing) individual: ‘They are attributed to a 
subject, tied on to that subject by an operation the logico-grammatical equivalent of 
which is more or less relevant.’150 Imagined as a mismatched couple, Derrida suggests, 
the shoes are ‘perhaps slightly threatening and slightly diabolical’ - neither personal 
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objects nor useful impersonal equipment on the basis of which the imputations of 
Schapiro and Heidegger carry.151  
 
This concern with paired-ness opens out onto a discussion of techne in ‘Geslecht II: 
Heidegger’s Hand’.152 In the context of a discussion about the translation of geslecht, via 
Heidegger’s consideration of Friedrich Hölderlin’s poem, ‘Mnemosyne’, and a French 
language constellation of substitutions and obliques circulating around the words 
monstrer and montrer, Derrida draws attention to the relationship of the hand to 
‘monstrosity’.153 Hölderin alludes to the people - the geslecht - as ‘monster’, in the 
singular, and for Derrida, this iterates through Heidegger’s figurations of ‘the hand’, as 
singular (unpaired). Having studied all the published photographs of Heidegger he could 
find, Derrida discerns: 
deliberately craftsman-like staging of hand-play, of the monstration and demonstration 
that is exhibited there, whether it be a matter of the handling [maintenance] of the pen, of 
the maneuver of the cane that shows rather than supports, or of the water bucket near the 
fountain. The demonstration of hands is as gripping in the accompaniment of the 
discourse.154 
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A clue to the trajectory of the exposition that follows is suggested by the pointed use of 
maintenance to represent ‘handling’. In SEC, Derrida represents the type of ‘presentness’ 
assumed to carry in the enigmatic paraph, the (autographic) signature, as general 
maintenance. Breaking into the compound word - maintenance (now) - the noun-stem 
main (hand) is prefigured. Derrida views Heidegger as blinded to the ‘craftsman-like 
staging of the hand-play’ in his photographic poses, a staging which covertly affiliates 
him with Thaumus rather than Theuth. This, despite the valorization of the craftsman 
who might be understood to be operatively ‘working’, grounds a technologically 
resistant, inoperative ‘authenticity’, reliant on rural and manual traditions: 
The meditation on the authentic Hand-Werk also has the sens of an artisanalist protest 
against the hand’s effacement or debasement in the industrial automation of modern 
mechanization. This strategy has, one suspects, equivocal effects: it opens up to an 
archaistic reaction toward the rustic artisan class and denounces business or capital, 
notions whose associations then are well known. In addition, with the division of labour, 
what is called “intellectual work” is what implicitly finds itself thus discredited.155 
The contradictions contained within Heidegger’s conception of craft turn on the 
singularity the hand. The hand, with an ‘immense role…more or less directly plays in the 
whole Heideggerean conceptuality’, is a singular ‘hand’, the essence of which does not 
unfold in the active function of gripping or grasping.156  
 
According to Derrida, the only time that Heidegger remarks on plural hands is in the 
context of a pair joined together in prayer: united as a singular hand before God. The 
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behaviour of the (singular) hand - the hand that does not work in concert with a partner - 
is of the order of the ‘gift’, and ‘touch’, but not of ‘craft’ (where craft is techne).  
Derrida’s discernment and reading of this motif in Heidegger establishes the 
Heideggerean essence of being (and the truth revealed in painting) in manner (maniera). 
The order of ‘felt’ presence attaches to the singular hand, to geste, not to paired hands or 
techne. In visual art, maniera, gives on to questions of verifiability, attribution and 
signature: beyond the obvious appending of a name to an artwork, signature is taken to be 
embodied in the recognisable ‘hand’ of the artist. This opens onto an expanded sense of 
signature as style. It might be tempting to assume that as style, signature has some 
mysterious extra quality that takes it into a different realm; that there is an element which 
is unforced, inarticulable and therefore special.  From a Derridean perspective, the issues 
involved in this type of signature are not of a different order to those of the kind of 
notaristic signature considered in SEC. ‘Artistic’ style is recognized by the same process 
of comparison and possibility of re-signing (elsewhere, in other artworks or with recourse 
to officiating documents, not necessarily ‘in future’) as is the ‘divided seal’. 
 
 
3.2.4 GESTURE AND CHANCE 
 
In the interview conducted in 1990 with Brunette & Wills, Derrida was invited to revisit 
Van Gogh and the place of signature in the visual arts.157 Referring to Van Gogh’s 
impasto, (the technique of applying paint thickly, that is not flat to the surface of the 
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picture plane), Brunette says he feels the ‘presence of the artist’s body’ in a way that he 
doesn’t with writing, and proceeds to question Derrida as to whether this ‘presence’ is 
irrefutable. Derrida answered that such an experience of the ‘body’ is an experience of 
frames, of dehiscence. Unlike Schapiro, who wishes to diarise Van Gogh, restituting him 
as a ‘lived’ individual with a biography, (the biography precedes and explains the artist as 
an ‘author’), Brunette’s apprehension of presence might be seen to open out to a ‘dumb’ 
restitution of the general (generic) human body, which traces its particularity, (its non-
mechanical, unmediated authenticity), transcendentally in the reassuring irregularity of 
thickened blots and daubs. In raising the issue of the artist’s body in relation to the 
technique of impasto, Brunette insinuates that the relationship between gesture and 
viscosity, the way in which material is self-evidently marked and holds its markings 
bodily, might be idiomatic in painting (in art), to be ‘felt’ rather than ‘read’. As such, 
painting’s idiom incarnates itself as a medium, putting itself beyond translation 
(ultimately beyond techne): painting must be apprehended sensually, beyond language. 
The notion of ‘medium’ might include both ‘subject’ and/or ‘material’ as ‘channel’, 
where medium is the union of subject and material. What appears to be put beyond 
writing is the artist (bolstered by the rhetoric of talent) and the unrepeatable encounter 
between the artist and material. Here is a slip past history instigated, ironically, through 
the apprehension of a manipulation and a technique (impasto) that can be historically 
delimited. 
 
Related to gesture, the fetishization of autographs and their substrates is a recurrent theme 
in several of Derrida’s texts, including ‘The Paper Machine’, Copy Signature Archive, as 
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well as ‘Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand’. In ‘The Paper Machine’, Derrida considers 
the obsolescence of paper as a medium, the technologies of inscription, the material 
archive, the book form and the ‘quasi-sacrality’ of writing supports and printing methods 
in the face of democratization. In doing so, he produces a useful oblique to understanding 
visual art. He observes the tendency to overvalue the ‘book-form’ according to its 
imminent obsolescence, the ‘fortunately incorrigible fetishism’ which will protect it and 
he notes that, in keeping with his veneration of artisanal ideology, Heidegger deplores the 
fact that in the typewritten letter ‘the singular trace of the signatory is no longer 
recognizable through the shapes of the letters and the movements of the hand.’158 The 
autograph deliqueses in signature, which, after all, does not require ‘the hand’. 
 
Admitting a juvenile tendency to fetishize the act of writing - using a quill when he had 
the ‘slightly religious feeling of writing’ - Derrida questions the legitimacy of opposing 
handwriting to mechanical writing. Technological advance doesn’t bypass the hand, but 
as it becomes less immediate, evidence of its trace is displaced and the neurotic scope of 
the autograph in the history of production, which is a history of belonging and owning as 
much as a history of devising and realizing, expands in necrotizing fashion: 
Even the computer belonging to the “great writer” or “great thinker” will be fetishized, 
like Nietzsche’s typewriter. No history of technology has wiped out that photograph of 
Nietzsche’s typewriter. On the contrary, it is becoming ever more precious and sublime, 
protected by a new aura, this time the means of “mechanical reproduction”; and that 
would not necessarily contradict the theory of mechanical reproduction put forward by 
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Benjamin. Some computers will become museum pieces. The fetishizing drive has no 
limits, by definition; it will never let go.159 
In ‘Geslecht II’, Derrida comments that Heidegger sees mechanization destroying the 
unity of the word, of speech and the hand - the violence done to the proper integrity of 
the word/speech/hand is exemplified in the action of the typewriter, lamented if not 
vilified by Heidegger. 
The ‘typed’ word is only a copy (Abschrift), and Heidegger recalls that first moment of 
the typewriter when a typed letter offended the rules of etiquette. Today, the 
manuscripted letter obstructs what Heidegger considers a veritable degradation of the 
word by the machine. The machine ‘degrades (degradient)’ the word or speech it reduces 
to a simple means of transport (Verkehrsmittel), to the instrument of commerce and 
communication. Furthermore, the machine offers the advantage, for those who wish for 
this degradation, of dissimulating manuscripted writing and ‘character’. ‘In typewriting, 
all men resemble one another,’ concludes Heidegger.160 
This then is the worry: that techne results ultimately in the disposability of the individual.  
 
Gesture is implicated in the construction of genius and the ideological construction of 
artistic labour in Modernism as exemplary and unalienated. It seems to present the 
artwork and the artist with the opportunity to resist the ‘commodity’ and capitalism. The 
gestural quality that belies the physical ‘presence of the artist’s body’ in production 
seductively suggests, at a material level, an irreducible spontaneity that is not unrelated to 
Derrida’s conception of the ‘event’, something that can never be predicted or planned:  
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One of the characteristics of the event is that not only does it come about as something 
unforeseeable, not only does it disrupt the ordinary course of history, but it is also 
absolutely singular.161 
Furthermore:  
Giving should be an event. It has to come as a surprise, from the other to the other; it has 
to extend beyond the confines of the economic circle of exchange. For giving to be 
possible, for a giving event to be possible, it has to look impossible.162  
Both the ‘event’ and the ‘gift’ are impossible when they are recognized: they recede as 
signature makes its promise. An artwork, planned and received, is incommensurable with 
conceptions of event and gift. Neither the event nor the gift can be ‘said’ or written. An 
artwork is necessarily (for Derrida at least) ‘said’, even (especially) when it does not, or 
is not configured to be able to, speak.  
 
The absolutely singular, unforeseeable artwork is an impossible artwork, which is not to 
say that chance cannot be seen to have a role in production (a role which is historically 
variable). For example, chance assumes a role in the production of Duchamp’s 3 
Standard Stoppages (1913-14), in which a rope is photographed as it lies having been 
dropped. Reputedly, it also played a part in Protogenes’ painting of a rabid dog, when a 
sponge, thrown at the painting, accidentally creates the exact likeness of canine saliva. 
This legend of Protogenes, recorded by Pliny, is one of the examples used by Ernst Kris 
& Otto Kurz in Legend, Myth & Magic in the Image of the Artist: A Historical 
Experiment to illustrate one valence the motif of chance has taken recurrently in artists’s 
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biographies since Antiquity.163 In the biographies they examine, the notion of chance 
inherits characteristics from the Greek hero and they contend that leitmotifs in these 
biographies are reiterated, almost unchanged, through to the Renaissance biographies 
written by Vasari. In this vein, the element of chance carries heroic values from Classical 
precedents into the Renaissance as ‘talent’, (because, like talent, chance manifests divine 
favour). The particular expression of chance is shown to be historical and it is possible to 
see chance operate in the mediation of gesture in Modernism. Through chance, divine 
favour and heroic exception fold into genius and talent, which fold into gesture. In studio 
practice, gesture cannot carry corrections (though it can be practiced) and so it appears to 
be unrepeatable. 
 
With Duchamp as a precursor, during the 20th century chance has been elevated to the 
level of a self-reflexive process or methodology in art production, evidenced in, for 
example, John Cage’s silent orchestral compositions. This elevation has blurred genre 
boundaries and played a significant role in the dematerialisation of the art object. In 
appearing to isolate the gestural, it appears to detach it from human agency, existing 
beyond the values of production, reproduction and language (beyond ‘commodity’) 
except as far as the artist can orchestrate and oversee the circumstances in which it might 
operate. The artist occupies the role of overseer and appears to have the power to 
(counter)sign for chance: Cage’s composition, 4’33” (1952), is a composition that, 
despite the complicity of the audience (their complicity is ‘material’), accrues to ‘John 
Cage’ as an individual because the signature is attributed to him. Cage is a paradigm 
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figure for Nelson Goodman, who theorized the difference between ‘autograph’ and 
‘allograph’ in terms of completion in The Languages of Art.164 Bracketed by Cage, 
gesture is seen to be open to chance, a situation which partially detaches it from 
consciousness and the human body (which, nevertheless, might retain its historical role as 
a medium, a channel). 
 
The appearance of gesture in artworks is seen to manifest chance and the aleatory, but for 
Derrida, if it does so, it does so as ‘remains’, as ‘cinders’: ‘The originary process is 
combustion, immolation producing cinders – trace – not being.’165 In Cage’s work, 
signature’s relationship to gesture is as a paradoxical ratification of human agency, of 
mastery over, and sensitivity to, chance. When the site of production in art is shifted to 
that which presents itself beyond techne, beyond alienation, signature as a determination 
gathers it in. Exaggerating the enigma of the paraph, gesture attempts to put maximum 
distance between itself and the practiced, repetitious manual skill of the artist, (the 
originary significance of whom is concomitantly exaggerated). Gesture also puts distance 
between itself and the demands of guaranteed non-variance that capitalism is seen to 
demand of mass production. The intentional, singular hand demotes aspects of the 
manual in visual art (those that represent the action of ‘paired’ hands) and transfers the 
balance of the power in touch to the complexities and splits involved in ‘orchestration’. 
The demotion of manual skill occasioned by the valorization of the singular hand is an 
aporia in Heidegger’s artisanally grounded art and a displacement which relocates skill in 
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art outside manual production. Signature permits the gathering of relocated skill to itself 
as a point of relative stability, a substitute artefact. 
 
 
3.3 THEORIZING THE PARAPH 
 
Ironically, much of what has been said about impasto, gesture, material and physical trace 
attempts to ‘dematerialise’ (or denature) signature by obscuring its ‘proper’ legibility. In 
Rembrandt’s Enterprise: The Studio and the Market, Svetlana Alpers remarks on how 
‘touch’ carrys in Rembrandt’s impasto which obscures the ‘craft of representation’ by 
drawing attention to the materiality of paint.166 Rembrandt tries to construct solid objects 
in opaque paint rather than alluding to the form of solid objects in paint applied in 
transparent layers and glazes (Venetian style). Alpers relates (the mediation of) this 
aspect of Rembrandt’s work to Renaissance precedents: ‘rough’ (or unfinished) painting 
appealed to connoisseurs (as maniera). Connoisseurs had to learn to appreciate maniera 
in terms of qualities which were not obvious in paintings valued for their seamless, 
mimetic accuracy. Alpers also notices the prominence of hands in Rembrandt’s work - 
‘exaggerated, almost grotesque in size’ - and she chooses to feature a detail of a hand and 
sleeve from his painting Lucretia (1666) on the cover of her book.167 She believes that the 
representation and trace of touch in Rembrandt’s paintings gives access to immediate 
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understanding: ‘Touch is more immediate than the distanced eye…’168 By making the 
materiality of paint representational, Rembrandt implicates the materiality of paint in/as 
his signature. However, Rembrandt’s gesture cannot function as his signature or style 
autonomously, without reference to other instances of itself outside any individual 
painting. 
 
 
3.3.1 TEMPORALITY AND ERROR 
 
So, notions of maniera and gesture, unrepeatable and unforced, are well-established in art 
history. They have a sympathetic relationship to the conception of error, which, in The 
Necessity of Error, Roberts suggests characterized progressive aesthetic thinking at the 
end of the 19th century. The Necessity of Errors is an account of the productive role of 
error in constructing systems of thought, and in art, errors are not assimilated to art as an 
expansion of reason as they might be in politics or philosophy. They define artistic 
practice as ‘indeterminate and stochastic’.169 Roberts says that from the mid-19th century, 
painting opened up to the expressive demands of painterly inchoateness and to themes 
connected to modern urban life with the result that its subjects deviated from established 
academic practice and genres.170 According to Roberts, at this time, technical ‘mistakes’ 
in execution not only stood, but were pursued or encouraged; deviations and mistakes 
marked the ambitions of artists, as well as their unrepeatable personalities. What might be 
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figured as an academic transgression actually stakes a claim to be produced within an 
idiom immanent to art (at this time, ‘Kantian’ painting and sculpture).  For Roberts, these 
transgressions opened onto an ‘antisystematic regime (of the indeterminate and the 
aleatory)’ that formed the basis for a (renewed) ‘discrete realm of judgment’, a 
‘systematic antisystematicity’.171 The signatory process bears some relationship to what 
makes anti-systematicity systematic. 
 
In ‘Otobiographies’, Derrida discerns a grammatical (as opposed to speaking) subject at 
work in Nietzsche. The grammatical subject who defers ‘signature’ (the appearance of 
unity) to countersignatures, revisitations and revenants (and assumes to proliferate 
thereby) is necessarily an incomplete subject. It is the grammatical subject who steps 
outside the present to execute a ‘capital cut’ and breaks with unity. Such a subjectivity 
can only be elaborated and enacted polysemtically, plurivocally which the consequence 
that anything understood as ‘transcendent’ occurs through polysemetic, plurivocal 
structures. For Roberts, Nietzschean ‘criticisms of the contemporary do have the merit of 
drawing attention to how questions of the actual, past and future are played out in the 
early years of modernism.’172 If error had a generative role in Modernism, it was in 
appearing to secure mastery of the present (and of presence) for the artist who seeks to 
establish the idiom of art purely in relation to touch, making ‘the actual’ synoymous with 
the present. 
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3.3.2 SKILL AND THE READYMADE 
 
The issue of ‘touch’ is relevant to Roberts’ earlier publication, The Intangibilities of 
Form: Skill and Deskilling in Art after the Readymade, which seeks to redefine artistic 
skills in the context of a labour theory of culture.173 In the labour theory of culture, 
Duchamp is not the artist of consumption and consumer choice, but the artist of artistic 
labour. With the Readymade - Fountain in particular - Duchamp does not (merely) 
dissolve the residue of painterly or artisanal skills in the artwork, he actively and 
productively posits other skills. Roberts says that he insists ‘on a point of mimetic 
identification between artistic production and social production. Art and social 
production (mechanization, reproducibility) become conjoined.’174 Duchamp’s mimesis – 
which denies ‘touch’ an originating autonomy - brings artistic and social production into 
an almost simultaneous relationship. The keyword in the preceding sentence is ‘almost’. 
Signature permits, or maintains, a split. 
 
For Roberts, Duchamp alters the relationship between the artist’s eye and hand, freeing 
‘the hand’ from the task of representation in order to elaborate the artist’s conceptual 
schema, (singular, the artist’s hand is one which can attributed production in its entirety). 
This allows the artwork to open out to a variety of non-manual skills and potentially to 
bring into focus the skills of others. If Duchamp appears to demote the singular hand, 
which, in Modernism, is nostalgically valorized in the face of a threat to the integrity of 
the human body posed by industrial machines, (the realization of an immanent similarity 
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between hands and prostheses), it is only as the manual hand. This is the hand which 
aspires to petrify its paraph in gestural sweeps as signature; which hovers uneasily 
between generic humanism and particular genius. 
 
In Modernism, the nostalgic basis of the valorization of the singular hand is in dialectic 
association with clarion calls to ‘newness’ (in the unrepeatable actions of the expressive 
individual) and cannot be seen to tether to anything technical, practised and/or 
predictable. Touch defines the Modernist artist as a wholly integrated artistic subject in 
whom the division of labour is idealistically and ideologically contracted to a point of 
absolute integrity (like the Austinian signature): 
Modernist artists…have no material investment in allowing others to complete or share 
work already undertaken. What counts above all else under the new market conditions 
(specifically the rise of the small private gallery) is the uncertain and potentially novel 
execution of painting in all its imagined purity. If the authenticity of the act of painting is 
not to be forfeited, the making and execution of the work by the artist have to be seen to 
be indivisible; each mark has to be accounted for, so to speak.175 
The issue of why ‘new market conditions’ should rely on the notion of an authentic, 
autonomous subject is a complex and deeply rooted art historical question on which the 
form and function of signature has some bearing. The notion of ‘repetition without 
copying’ is crucial to Roberts’s understanding of the Readymade. When the Readymade 
opens the artwork out onto the general labour, it dilates and dilutes Modernist potency. 
Although Roberts styles the Readymade as ‘replete’ and ‘intact’ because, as an artwork, 
it is co-extensive with its formal object, and the notion of repleteness in any form is 
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antithetical to Derrida, the notion of ‘repetition without copying’ effects a similar action 
to that of Derrida’s ‘divided seal’. Roberts’s point that the Readymade opens out to other 
hands before it is constituted as a work of art goes some way to denying it an autonomous 
presence (and presentness), a general maintenance.  
 
In Derridean terms, the action of signature/countersignature that the Readymade 
foregrounds also delays its constitution as a work of art. In Derrida’s understanding of 
signature, technical separations are not effected between work and author (which would 
require monumentality and permanence; the fixing of intent on both sides) but between 
receiver and sender (who may exist within the same person). It is Duchamp’s awareness 
and rejection of the integrated, singular subject that characterizes him as an artist, 
consistently betraying truth (in what might be styled a signature move). Roberts’s 
emphatic statement that: 
…the importance of the readymade lies in the way it assimilates the technical and 
technological processes of capitalist production in order to reflect on the possibilities and 
limitations of those processes of production for art. Without repetition without copying 
art would still be fixated by the idea that the manipulation of materials of art were 
incontrovertibly bound to the expressive movement of the hand.176 
is not incompatible with a position informed by Derrida’s construction of signature vis-à-
vis the Readymade. In deconstruction, the technological processes of capitalism are like 
the technical operations of the grammatical subject, (though it should be noted that 
deconstruction is the political labor of hierarchical reversal rather than capitalist 
accumulation). 
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Roberts views ‘the hand’ in the context of social production as operative rather than 
constructive, and ‘the hand’ in artistic labour as (ideally) autonomous. If Derrida’s 
signature might be styled as lowest common denominator authorship, his paired hands 
are similarly minimal when it comes to autonomy and artistic production: zygotic, they 
are already divided. To accord them autonomy as an entity – ‘the hand’ - is to equate 
them to the voice, to refuse their ‘pairedness’ and accord them singularity. For Roberts, if 
the Readymade deskills art, it reskills it at the level of general social technique, outside 
the academy and its hierarchies. The Readymade deskills art in order to displace 
expressive artefactuality. The skills involved in the production of a urinal; in 
orchestrating Fountain’s rejection from the S.I.A. exhibition in 1917; in contextualizing 
Duchamp’s delayed revival within the (emerging body of) Conceptualism, exist on a 
continuum with ‘general social technique’. Indeed, the production skills to which 
Duchamp opens the artwork might be seen to have been presented and signed for in bad 
faith, parasitically, as someone else’s skills. In effect, Duchamp cites skills in the manner 
of making an ‘infelicitious’ Austinian speech act, and it this citation that his signature 
floats over (not that of ‘R. Mutt’, which is a pictorial element). For Derrida, whichever 
hands come to the Readymade, whichever ‘uses’ those hands put the Readymade to, 
arrive through signature. Derrida’s work can be used to demonstrate that 
‘mechanization’, ‘reproducibility’ and ‘artworks’ are activities of signature: an artwork’s 
authenticity never derives from completeness or self-sufficiency. 
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3.3.3 AUTOGRAPH AND ALLOGRAPH 
 
The notion of completeness can be pursued through Goodman’s Languages of Art, which 
provides a useful analysis of the differentials involved in locating authenticity and 
‘finish’ in art.177 Goodman distinguishes between artforms along lines of the ‘autograph’ 
and the ‘allograph’. A work of art is autographic if the distinction between the original 
and the forgery of it is important, and allographic if it lends itself to notation. So physical 
identification of the product with the artist’s hand assumes more importance in painting 
than it does in music or literature. Goodman understands the autograph as ‘a history of 
production’ into which gesture might be transubstantiated, however, in his understanding, 
the autograph can be ‘handless’, generated by a surrogate or prosthesis, at the artist’s 
behest: 
authenticity in an autographic art always depends upon the objects having the requisite, 
sometimes rather complicated, history of production, but that history does not always 
include ultimate execution by the original artist.178 
Music is allographic, and allographic art wins emancipation from the history of (its) 
production through notation (e.g. instructions for performance; for repertory). Aleatory 
processes play with clear-cut definitions between allograph and autograph, something 
Goodman acknowledges, remarking, for instance, on the ‘rebellious’, ‘alternative’ 
notation of Cage, whose ‘scores’ are ‘autographic diagrams’ marking the impossibility of 
notational fidelity.179 They neatly conceptualize the difference between the singular and 
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the similar in performance. The line between autographic and allographic work does not 
coincide with a division between what is manual or mechanical, nor between what is 
unique or multiple. For Goodman, it appears that the difference rests in a notion of 
‘completion’. Where art is read as allographic rather than autographic, it means that it is 
incomplete; conversely, if it is read as autographic, it may be seen to be complete. In 
marking completion, the autograph sets seal on form. 
 
Autographs are, in common language, synonymous with signatures, appearing to 
authenticate and seal the having-been present of a specific individual - a ‘requisite history 
of production’ - which might also, therefore, be understood to be unreproducible: the 
autographic element in an artwork is that which is unreproducible because it is complete; 
the allographic element is that which is reproducible, incomplete. Derrida maintains that 
signature is an aperture, a stent which prevents completion. The artwork is always open 
to countersignatures. In these terms, signature is an allographic element rather than an 
autographic one: the autograph is reduced to an inconsequential trait, an empirical 
accident, which, unless/until it opens onto the Derridean abyss (as signature) does not 
extend beyond itself. Configuring the signature as allograph rather than autograph is 
important in understanding the operation of spectral logic - to go back to the Ghost in 
Hamlet, what we see in the ‘autograph’ is the covering visor; the ‘armour’: 
The armour, this ‘costume’ which no stage production will ever be able to leave out, we 
see it cover from head to foot, in Hamlet’s eyes, the supposed body of the father. We do 
not know whether it is or is not part of the spectral apparition. This protection is 
rigorously problematic (problema is also a shield) for it prevents perception from 
deciding the identity that it wraps so solidly in its carapace. The armour may be but the 
  134 
body of a real artifact, a technical prosthesis, a body foreign to the spectral body it 
dresses, dissimulates and protects, masking even its identity. The armour lets one see 
nothing of the spectral body, but at the level of the head…The helmet, like the visor, did 
not merely offer protection: it topped off the coat of arms and indicated the chief’s 
authority, like the blazon of his nobility.180 
Derrida’s extensive figuring of what is capital, ‘head’, ‘authority’ is brought to bear on 
the spectre. The visor, the armour, is the stasis we perceive. 
 
 
3.3.4 UNREPRODUCIBILITY, SILENCE AND AUTHENTICITY 
 
Confusion between autograph and signature allows the artwork to be (mis)read as 
complete. Conceding to Brunette that a painting by Van Gogh is irrefutably haunted by 
Van Gogh’s body, Derrida contends that what he calls a ‘body’ isn’t a presence: 
The body is, how should I say, an experience in the most unstable sense of the term; it is 
an experience of frames, of dehiscence, of dislocations. So I see a dislocated Van Gogh, 
one who is dislocated in the process of performing something…I relate to Van Gogh in 
terms of his signature – I don’t mean signature in the sense of attaching his name, but in 
the sense that he signs while painting – and my relation to or experience of the signature 
of Van Gogh is all the more violent both for him and me because it also involves my own 
body.181 
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Setting aside what this paragraph means for experiencing/viewing an artwork, (there are 
hints that the viewer might be charged with finding a ‘valid’ countersignature), for 
Derrida, there is (Judeo-Christian) anxiety at play in the doomed attempt to restitute in 
plenitude the body of Van Gogh through his paintings. The act of signature is not a 
moment marking the completion of an artwork, nor is the act of signature strictly 
simultaneous with the making of an artwork. Neither is signature simultaneous with the 
involvement of the artist in its production. The act of signature is an appeal to 
countersignature, and it is the countersignature which establishes the first (not sole) 
signature as the signature of ‘an artist’ attached to an artwork. Somewhat unsatisfactorily, 
Derrida responds to Brunette as follows: 
...the signature is not to be confused either with the name of the author, with the 
patronym of the author, or with the type of work, for it is nothing other than the event 
work in itself, inasmuch as it attests in a certain way – here I come back to what I was 
saying about the body of the author – to the fact that someone did that, and that is what 
remains. The author is dead – we don’t even know who she or he is – but it remains. 
Nevertheless, and here the entire politico-institutional problem is involved, it cannot be 
countersigned, that is, attested to as a signature, unless there is an institutional space in 
which it can be received, legitimized, and so on...Without that political and social 
countersignature it would not be a work of art; there wouldn’t be a signature…there is no 
signed work before the countersignature.182 
Despite the act of painting as an act of signing which marks the artist’s absence, it seems 
that the painting must be signed as an artwork before it can be signed by an artist - the 
signature of the empirical individual attested is dormant until effectively countersigned. 
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In a sense, Van Gogh already marks the removal of his physical body (his self-
containment) when he paints because painting is an act of bodily extension. The notion of 
extension, (prosthetics, surrogates, supplements, mechanics, reproduction), is crucial to 
Derrida’s conception of the body.183 When the body attempts to represent the ‘subject’, it 
is as an experience of frames, of contexts, of dislocations; the ‘body’ is in constant flux; a 
particular ‘thing’ without ‘thingness’ - a thing describing motion and generated 
in/by/from motion. Touch as the pre-eminent sense because it is the sense which 
mobilizes other senses in accordance with its own motor activity.184 Construing touch 
through its association to motion is very different to the construction of touch through an 
association with presence, (which is a function of sight). 
 
A fully present artwork is a dumb enigma. In the interview with Brunette, Derrida 
distinguishes between the mute silence of something that can’t speak and the taciturn 
silence of something that won’t. In the first place, for the ‘spatial artwork’, 
…there is the idea of its absolute mutism, the idea that it is completely foreign or 
hetereogenous to words, and one can see in this a limit on the basis of which resistance is 
mounted against the authority  of discourse, against a discursive hegemony. There exists, 
on the side of such a mute work of art a place, a real place from the perspective of which, 
and in which, words find their limit. And thus, by going to this place, we can, in effect, 
observe at a time a weakness and a desire for authority or hegemony…185 
and in the second place, 
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…and this is the other side of the same experience, we can always refer to the experience 
that we as speaking beings - I don’t say ‘subjects’ - have of these silent works, for we can 
always receive them, read them, or interpret them as potential discourse. That is to say, 
these silent works are in fact already talkative, full of virtual discourses, and from that 
point of view the silent work becomes an even more authoritarian discourse – it becomes 
the very place of a word that is all the more powerful because it is silent, and that carries 
within it, as does an aphorism, a discursive virtuality that is infinitely authoritarian, in a 
sense theologically authoritarian. Thus it can be said that the greatest logocentric power 
resides in a work’s silence, and liberation from this authority resides on the side of 
discourse, a discourse that is going to relativise things, emancipate itself, refuse to kneel 
in front of the authority represented.186 
In the first place, the notion that ‘spatial artwork’ might be heterogeneous to words is 
presented here as an autonomy manifest as ‘silence’, and in the second place, that the 
idiomatic silence of the artwork occupies the topos of, variously,  ‘source’, ‘logos’, 
‘capital’ in Derrida’s theory. The artwork’s seeming refusal to speak is an attempt to use 
unreproducibility to resist capitalist systems of exchange. The artwork does not seem to 
make the (same) promises that the commodity might be seen to make. When art’s 
medium is treated as its idiom, it is not seen to promise anything beyond that idiom (i.e. it 
does not promise anything that it can’t deliver, it is there). The idiomatic artwork 
reiterates the contradictions of the Austinian speech act. Like the unique signature that 
can only present itself as an enigmatic paraph within the terms of its promise to present 
itself again, the unreproducible artefact can only present itself as art when it is 
                                                
186 Ibid. 
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reproduced as ‘art’, inscribed and mobilized as ‘art’, (in which case it’s behaviour is no 
different to that of the commodity, even if it is not physically traded). 
 
Addressing the issue of reproducibility and unreproducbility, Roberts finds Theodor 
Adorno’s commitment to the artwork as unreproducible artefact limited in its scope to 
provide a liberatory and critical foundation for addressing art’s relationship to productive 
labour.187 Roberts says that for Adorno, art allows all moments of its production to be 
determined by the artist’s subjectivity (which aspire to make it wholly unreproducible). 
The potential for reproducible art to operate as a critique of the value-form cannot be 
destroyed as long as it admits the transformative subjectivity of the artist ‘all the way 
down’ - through all the relations of production it exposes, through the complete, 
autographic history of production. Roberts does not consider the importance of signature 
as the mechanism by which an artist’s transformative subjectivity may be carried all the 
way down, but if expressive artefactuality is made obsolete by the Readymade, it is 
conceptually remaindered in signature. Signature, which by the 19th century had acquired 
its everyday ‘autographic’ form, appears to be at once singular and expressive, yet it is 
reproducible. If signature is taken to symbolize a discernable and necessary link between 
the artist and reproducible artwork, it is because it guarantees an (immaterial) history of 
production. Signature is a catalyst and trace of the subjective transformation of one 
commodity into another, an anticipation and archive of attribution. 
 
                                                
187 Roberts, The Intangibilities of Form, op. cit. 
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If unreproducibility (full presence, plenitude and completion) is equivalent to silence, that 
which manifests ‘absolute mutism’ positions itself contra the chatter of speaking 
subjects, against the commodity as an ‘original’.  
 
The original is, in Walter Benjamin’s view, a pre-requisite for authenticity.188 Wherever 
unreproducibility determines the relationship that artworks have with commodities and 
capitalism, the cult value and the aura of the singular (separate) thing are valorized, the 
ideology is Romantic and the object is ‘placed on a pedestal’. Positing the ‘pure’ artwork 
through unreproducible material forms attempts to seal its singular place in time and 
space (as an object or an experience) definitively. Aura is understood to be a property of 
the original thing; it is held to be diminished by copies, by reproduction and by 
counterfeit. For Benjamin, ‘aura’ - transhistorically produced by ritual - ‘withers’ in the 
age of mechanical reproduction because duplicates and copies ‘substitute a plurality of 
copies for a unique existence’. The artwork is permitted to range beyond the physical 
confines of a singular time and place and consequently opened out to political, rather than 
ritual, ends.189 Plurality introduces the empirical possibility of near-absolute simultaneity 
in the production of multiples, disrupting the integrity of the proper object at source 
(there is no proper object). Benjamin does not notice the structural sympathy between 
ritual and reproduction in establishing aura - potentially endless, distributive production 
does not divide and diminish aura, it creates and guarantees it. In the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction, (and in the Age of Print which preceded it), aura is constructed and 
                                                
188 Benjamin, W. ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ 
Illuminations (London: Fontana, 1992) pp211-244 
189  Ibid. p215 
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restituted through familiarity - an anticipation of attribution and the recognition of an 
unrepeatable and authentic place in the past. 
 
 
3.3.5 BENJAMIN & THE SPEECH ACT 
 
In ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, Benjamin remarks, that: 
the uniqueness of a work of art is inseparable from its being imbedded in the fabric of 
tradition. This tradition itself is thoroughly alive and extremely changeable. An ancient 
statue of Venus, for example, stood in a different context with the Greeks, who made it 
an object of veneration, than with the clerics of the Middle Ages, who made it an 
ominous idol. Both of them, however, were equally confronted with its uniqueness, that 
is, its aura.190 
Is it possible to substitute ‘signature’ for ‘aura’ in Benjamin’s statement? Benjamin does 
not explicitly state that the work of art incorporates tradition within itself, (the 
implication being that the work of art is historically contingent even if its aura is 
transcendental), but that is not far from his position to the concerns of Austin and Derrida 
(if ‘speech act’ may be substitued for ‘work of art’). In fact, Benjamin carries on to say: 
for the first time in world history, mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of art 
from its parasitical dependence on ritual…instead of being based on ritual it begins to be 
based on  another practice - politics.191 
                                                
190  Ibid. p217 
191 Ibid. p218 
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The word ‘parasitical’ is telling. Benjamin’s emancipation of the artwork does not seek to 
reserve or restitute its autonomy: he does not seek to emancipate the work of art from 
‘parasitical dependence’, rather to substitute ‘politics’ for ‘ritual’ in its heteronomy. His 
use of the word ‘parasitical’ here in relation to the issue of reproducibility opens out onto 
SEC and How to Do Things With Words. To recall, Austin uses the word ‘parasitic’ to 
describe those speech acts that operate as ‘infelicitous’ quotations in order to put them 
aside from genuine speech acts; Derrida defines the structure of the speech act as 
necessarily ‘parasitic’. Goodman is in accordance: ‘In representation, the artist must 
make use of old habits when he wants to elicit novel objects and connections’.192 If the 
auric work of art (one that has not been emancipated by mechanical reproduction) can be 
understood to be akin to an Austinian speech act, copies of that work of art are citations. 
Understood as a Derridean speech act, the work of art itself (‘emancipated’ or not) is a 
citation. Both the ‘fabric of tradition’ and the ‘signature to come’ (including the 
politically motivated countersignature) and copies of the artwork iterate that citation - 
repeating and altering it. 
 
Derrida remarks that ‘the act of signing’ in Van Gogh’s painting is more than the 
attachment of a name: the act of painting presents as ‘event’. In contact with the speech 
act - the performative enunciation - the unreproducible artwork aims to petrify the ‘event’ 
in such a way as to keep it happening. Here, there is no split apparent between document 
and signature, which fuse as an entity, an unrepeatable singularity, past and present. The 
artwork appears to embody a self-sufficient general mainentance, a ‘transcendental 
                                                
192 Goodman, op. cit. p33 
  142 
presentness’, and it is this ‘transcendental presentness’ that is required to manifest 
silence. As painting, signing constitutes the artwork schismatically. Derrida says: 
...it is as if there had been for me, two paintings in painting. One, taking the breath away, 
a stranger to all discourse doomed to the presumed mutism of “the-thing-itself”, restores, 
in authoritarian silence, an order of presence. It motivates or deploys, then, while totally 
denying it, a poem or philosopheme whose code seems to me to be exhausted.193 
The issue of ‘authoritarian silence, an order of presence’ takes us back to ‘Plato’s 
Pharmacy’, Socrates is relayed as saying: 
…that is the strange thing about writing that makes it truly analogous to painting. The 
painter’s products stand before us as though they were alive, but if you question them, 
they maintain a most majestic silence. It is the same with written words.194 
Silence is not beyond language, beyond writing as a ‘thing’ to be experienced rather than 
articulating (itself). Neither is it the place of a virtual discourse that is securely 
authoritarian because silence is boundlessly engaged in dialogue by speaking beings. The 
silent artwork is aphoristic. Lee Lozano’s artwork, General Strike Piece (1969), in which 
the artist determined to make herself gradually absent from ‘the artworld’ by not 
attending gallery previews and artworld events, exemplifies such an aphoristic operation - 
the work is only know through its place in an ‘artworld’ firmament. For De Duve, who 
refers to Lozano’s work in Kant After Duchamp, this illustrates that the minimum 
requirement for an artwork is that it is engaged in dialogue, that it is somehow recorded 
and communicated.195 Silence must be heard as invisibility must be seen. 
                                                
193 Derrida, ‘+R (Into the Bargain)’, The Truth in Painting, op. cit. p156 
194 Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, op. cit. p137 
195 De Duve, op. cit. p298 
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In Derrida’s view, the operation of signature allows historians and theorists a quasi-
theological licence to restitute the (named) artist as a presence. However, such a 
restitution serves the ideological or political interests of the agent who does the restituting 
and what is presented as presence is an experience of motion, the coalesence of frames. 
In this way, even where it appears in autographic artforms, signature is a stent which 
prevents completion, rather than the final act that seals it. Every artwork is an allograph. 
Signature is what makes gesture – which shares a field of operation with the event and 
the gift -  readable, and what divides the singular, gestural hand. Readability (iterability) 
is what prevents an artwork existing autonomously in the transcendental present. In 
effecting the Readymade, Duchamp drew attention to the play of hands – physical and 
metaphorical - in the production of artworks. Rapaport suggests that Derrida is limited by 
his ‘Kantian’ view of art –the ‘only’ art Derrida considers takes largely conventional 
forms as paintings or sculptures.196 In the light of their commonalities, it may seem 
bizarre that Derrida did not engage directly with Duchamp, (there was, for example, a 
significant retrospective of Duchamp’s work, accompanied by the publication of a four 
volume catalogue raisonné, when the Centres Georges Pompidou opened in 1977, a high 
profile cultural event in Paris – the city in which Derrida lived). This said, for Derrida, 
the relevance of the artistic substrate or form is empirical rather than essential. That is not 
to say that Duchampian scholarship cannot benefit from a Derridean perspective (or vice-
versa), but that at a functional level, specific art forms and materials are essentially 
inconsequential to him.  
                                                
196 Brunette & Wills, op. cit. pp151-167  
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PART 2 
 
 
4. SIGNATURE AS WITNESS: I WAS HERE 
 
 
4.1 THE COMMON SENSE MEANING OF SIGNATURE 
 
Signature exhibits a complex temporality, presuming (to be able) to say, variously, ‘This 
is mine’, ‘I was here’ or ‘I promise’: it presumes to assert presence and belonging. In 
SEC, Derrida refers to the effects of signature being the ‘most common thing in the 
world’. As a handwritten name appended to a document of some sort, the signature holds 
itself out to be unique and by that token, a guarantee of the specific ‘having-been present’ 
of the signatory, a verification of the truth as stated. In these terms, signature is 
understood to be simultaneous with the instance of a fully present individual who has 
either produced the document (text or artefact) which precedes the signature, or who 
understands and agrees with what has been produced in the document by someone else. 
The content of the document must precede the signature otherwise the signature cannot 
be taken to testify to its contents. Signature is then, apparently, a final act. It marks 
completion, sets seal on proceedings. Signature is generally understood to be 
commensurate with autograph and like a more convenient (readable) fingerprint, it is held 
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to pertain specifically to the individual to whom it can be attributed: it is held to pertain 
to the unrepeatable instance of that individual having manually put pen to paper.197 Thus 
John Wilmerding, introducing his study, Signs of the Artist: Signatures and Self 
Expression in American Paintings, can say: 
Our signatures are unique. Our written names, even more than our handwriting generally, 
carry something of our individual personality…the mystique and legality of a signed 
name go back as far as handwriting itself.198 
However, the particularities of graphic expression are historical as well as formal, and as 
an institution, the signature is not the immemorial, handwritten manifestation of pure 
personality that Wilmerding imagines. The size, form and pace of letters; the type of 
instrument used to execute the signature, (etymologically, the relationship of ‘signature’ 
to ‘style’ is carried through the stylus); the calligraphic flourishes which channel the hand 
of the individual; the incidental, additional, deliberate or absent dots and strokes which 
evidence the idiosyncrasy of the individual all combine in testament to the empirical 
event of signing, permitting, it would seem, a conclusive attribution in time and place. 
The invocations of criminal procedure in the notion of ‘witness’ that underscore 
signature’s common meaning are thus not incidental, and, in terms of signature’s 
relationship to cultural production, Foucault’s claim that the author-function came into 
being in concert with individual liability for transgression in literature looks to be a 
broadly pertinent circumstance for it. 
 
                                                
197  See for example: Cody, F. ‘Inscribing subjects to citizenship: Petitions, Literacy 
Activism, and the Performativity of Signature in Rural Tamil India’, Cultural 
Anthropology, Vol. 24, Issue 3, (August 2009) pp347–380  
198  Wilmerding, J. Signs of the Artist: Signatures and Self Expression in American 
Paintings, (Yale University Press, 2003) ix  
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While Wilmerding associates the signature ‘naturally’ with the history of handwriting, 
the etymology of the English word ‘signature’ can be traced it back to the past participle - 
signatus - of the Latin signare, which means to sign or seal, and it is in the artefactual 
legacy of the seal and signet that a more nuanced history emerges. Taken for granted as 
an autograph by Wilmerding in the 21st century, the apparent normativity of the written 
signature, indexed to the hand, is misleading. According to Patricia Rubin, prior to the 
16th century, signatures resulted from the impression or stamp of engraved seals, less 
‘enigmatic paraphs’ than heraldic ensigns, the impression of ‘tools’ held in the control of 
specific, representative authorities.199 In this manner, for hundreds of years, the Anello 
Piscatorio, which forms part of the Pope’s official regalia, officiated Papal bulls. In her 
history of writing, Albertine Gaur introduces the notion of signature through the objects 
used to mark property - branding irons for livestock, hallmarking stamps for metalwork – 
and dates the development of the signet and signet ring as far back as the third 
millennium BC in ancient Greece.200 
 
As noted by Rubin, in its range of Latin meanings, signare means to coin as well as to 
seal. Despite some important functional differences, coins and seals share a conceptual 
inheritance that oscillates between generality and specificity in the fields of 
‘convenience’ and ‘promise’. Coins are generally convertible promises minted in advance 
of their use; seals mark specific promises that presume to locate proper authority 
incontrovertibly at the instance of application. Both are mechanistic and allow the 
exchange of goods and information to happen at a distance from their originators, (they 
                                                
199  Rubin, op.cit. 
200 Gaur, A. Literacy and the Politics of Writing (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2000) 
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are thus proxies). Though Rubin dates the meaning of signature as ‘one’s own name 
written in one’s own hand’ to the 1570s, she traces the roots of the autograph back to the 
sixth century Christian world, when the word signum began to refer to the act of marking 
a document with the sign of the cross: 
It was present as the ‘sign of the hand’ of the person who dictated the document, but who 
could be illiterate, and as the professional mark of its writer, the notary. With the 
development of the notary’s art in the eleventh and twelfth centuries the signum became 
the symbol of the public hand of the notary, the validating sign of his authority. Notary’s 
signatures were registered and had legal weight.201 
Sedimented in the meaning of signature – autographic and otherwise - are issues bound 
up with the establishment of efficient and reliable legal, financial and professional 
structures. Derrida’s apprehension that signature is a parousia binds spiritual and 
administrative concerns together. Signatures also involve issues concerning the 
atomization of the individual through an internalizing movement that begins to institute 
the human subject - as opposed to the deity or the institution - as a source of authority. 
Conflated with the autograph, as signature, the seal loses its status as a necessary object, 
and - dematerialised in this sense - it is invested in the hand of an individual. The 
materiality of the seal is made synonymous with the corporeality of the subject. 
 
In her study, Rubin aims to set aside ‘the philosophical meanings of signum’ in order to 
examine it ‘in documentary contexts, in connection with the mark of the hand as 
                                                
201 Ibid. p564. In the 21st century, digital technology is changing the character and 
function of signature: see Neef, S. Imprint and Trace: Handwriting in the Age of 
Technology (London: Reaktion, 2011); Neef, S. Van Dijck, J. & Ketelaar, E. (eds), Sign 
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representing a residual, authorizing presence’.202 It is questionable whether the 
philosophical meanings of signum can be wholly set aside from those that are 
‘documentary’, as if a clean break could ever be made. It could be argued that the 
conceptual authority of signature - the punctuation it effects - is involved in any 
philosophy of the documentary. Signature dates, but it does not fix. It is always open-
ended, presenting like a visor in documentary contexts from both sides. When Derrida 
strategically styles the handwritten signature a seal, he reveals the immanent and 
necessary iterability of that singularity which is taken to be synonymous with empirically 
unrepeatable personal autographs. He demonstrates that the mark of the hand has no 
‘presence’ but that constructed for it by (the abyssal operation of) countersignatures. It is 
instructive that firma, the modern Italian word for ‘signature’, traces its history not 
through signare but through firmare, (to make firm), a root which pays into the English 
sense of the ‘firm’ as a group of people who have come together in commercial 
enterprise, (recalling Derrida’s ‘Sarl’). If the formal, (iconographic) development of 
signature has, since the 16th century, gradually privileged its autographic qualities over 
those of its instruments, in alluding to the functional, mechanistic legacy of the seal, 
Derrida’s work moves to show that the lure of signature as a direct, permanent expression 
of (and substitution for) the ‘intact’ individual is a fancy and a foible. 
 
One of the presumptions raised by the issue of signature in art concerns the implication 
that in signing objects, artists mark a point of completion, tightening and defining them as 
‘works’. Despite being the result of an everyday operation, the signature is seen to clearly 
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demarcate artworks from the circumstances of their genesis and reserve them from 
‘everyday life’, allowing them to be inserted into oeuvres and traditions. The signature 
appears to automatically re-sign art to the immediate past; to have a place to play in 
demarcating what exists as ‘work’; to exclude or prohibit future working, amendment or 
alteration and thus, to influence and inform the way in which artworks are treated and 
held in posterity. When Robert Rauschenberg produced his Erased de Kooning Drawing 
(1953), cancelling the work of a previous (and celebrated) artist, or when Jake and Dinos 
Chapman worked on a set of Goya’s etchings, modifying and overwriting them in their 
series Insult to Injury (2003), they deliberately challenge those notions of completion that 
accompany the signature and at some level appear to controvert the privilege of the 
autograph to signal the end. Demarcating an oeuvre amongst personal ephemera 
intensifies as a challenge in contemporary art not only because, (if we accept Boltanski 
and Chiapello’s view), society organises itself along the lines of the Projective City, but 
because contemporary art has no material or representational idiom. 
 
 
4.2 VAN EYCK’S SIGNATORY PRACTICE 
 
The first work Wilmerding considers in Signs of the Artist is the Arnolfini Portrait. He 
accepts it as the key marker of the transition of the artist from ‘anonymous artisan’ to 
‘singular creative professional’. One of the most celebrated signatures in the history of 
art, the calligraphic inscription, ‘Johannes de Eyck fuit hic 1434’, occupies a central place 
in the composition between two figures - one female, one male - which dominate the 
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painting, (Fig. 1). The inscription translates as ‘Johannes de Eyck was here 1434’. Erwin 
Panofsky, for whom the inscription has given rise to much ‘unnecessary discussion’, is 
reminded of the ‘undesirable epigraphs recording the visits of pilgrims or tourists to 
places of worship or interest’.203 Despite Panofsky's pejorative tone, it is not bogus to link 
the signature to graffiti.204 Extremely rare in art, the phrase fuit hic is actually better 
known from graffiti found in medieval churches, in the civic spaces of Imperial Rome, in 
the unearthed ruins of Pompeii; linguistic variants place it in inscriptions wrought by 11th 
century Norsemen at the Neolithic tomb of Maes Howe in Orkney and in those of the 
Archiac Greek inhabitants of Thera.205 
 
Van Eyck’s signatory practice, atypical for the time, is unusually rich and prominent. 
Including the Ghent Altarpiece, signed by both Jan and his older brother, Hubert, eleven 
of the 24 works currently attributed to him carry signatures, mostly painted on frames, 
and it may be speculated that his signature featured on at least some of the original 
frames missing for the remaining thirteen.206 For example, the Portrait of Cardinal 
Niccolo Albergati (1432), does not have its original frame - it was shaped to fit the 
Gemaldegalerie, Vienna in the late 18th century and there is speculation that the frame 
                                                
203 Panofsky, E. Early Netherlandisch painting: its origins and character. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953) p180  
204 For example, Seidel, L. ‘Jan Van Eyck’s Arnolfini Portrait: Business as Usual?’ 
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Taschen, 2008) 
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may have been discarded or mislaid during the process of installation. The Arnolfini 
Portrait is also missing its original frame, though it is highly unlikely that Van Eyck’s 
name would have been insinuated amongst the verses from Ovid that it is reputed to have 
carried.207 Individual points of difference between the relatively small group of paintings 
which constitute Van Eyck’s settled oeuvre are necessarily emphasized given the size of 
the group, however, the quality of the difference between the Arnolfini inscription and 
Van Eyck’s other signatory inscriptions makes it especially significant: the Arnolfini 
signature can be pitched directly against features common to most of the other signatures 
in the group. With one other exception, all Van Eyck’s signatory inscriptions form part of 
the frame, usually with the appearance of having been engraved into marble. In that 
exception, Portrait of a Man (Léal Souvenir) (1432), a painting which is also missing its 
original frame, the inscription - like that of the Arnolfini Portrait - participates in the 
pictorial scheme, and, again like the Arnolfini signature, it employs a calligraphic script. 
However, the signature appears as if engraved on a stone parapet that acts, in effect, as a 
pseudo-frame, so specificities of its form and placement provide points of contrast to the 
Arnolfini signature. Within Van Eyck’s oeuvre, then, the signature on the Arnolfini 
Portrait distinguishes itself in two respects, in terms of its vocabulary and its form. 
 
Firstly, although fuit hic is a singular occurrence, the signatory vocabulary Van Eyck 
used is not entirely consistent and fuit hic is not distinguished by its singularity. For 
example, Van Eyck inscribed his name alongside the Latin term complevit (meaning 
                                                
207  In De Viris Illustibus (1456), Bartolomeo Fazio describes the frame of the 
Arnolfini Portrait with reference to these verses without specifiying them. See: Hall, E. 
The Arnolfini Betrothal: Medieval Marriage and the Enigma of Van Eyck’s Double 
Portrait (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1997) p6 
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‘completed’) in the Portrait of Margaret Van Eyck (1439); alongside actum (meaning 
‘transacted’ or ‘done’) in the Portrait of a Man (Léal Souvenir), and alongside the Dutch 
term gheconterfeit, (which has been variously translated as ‘painted’ and ‘portrayed’), in 
the Portrait of Jan de Leeuw (1436). This means that fuit hic is just one of a few uniquely 
idiosyncratic terms Van Ecyk used. What is of interest in distinguishing the term from all 
these idiosyncratic others, as well as the more generally common term me fecit, (which 
Van Eyck used several times); what is indicative of a specific attitude is the conceptual 
association of fuit hic not with the process of production but with presence. Specifically, 
fuit hic cannot be read within the ambit of me fecit as can ididosyncratic terms like 
complevit and gheconterfeit. Fecit, the third person perfect of the Latin facere, means 
‘made’; fuit, as the third person perfect of the Latin sum/esse, means ‘was’.208 
 
Secondly, appearing on the painting, Van Ecyk’s calligraphic Arnolfini signature 
distinguishes itself against the typical form and placement of his signatures as trompe 
l’oeil engraved majescules on frames. Van Eyck’s frames themselves generally exhibit 
trompe l’oeil effects and there is a strong presumption in favour of his tendency to paint 
them in simulation of marble or porphyry. Only one of Van Eyck’s me fecit signatures 
does not occur in tandem with a marbled frame, his supposed ‘self-portrait’, Portrait of a 
Man in a Red Turban (1433), (the frame of which is gilded and pseudo-engraved). Thus, 
making a reproduction frame for the Lucca Madonna (1436), Dr Jochen Sander and the 
Karl Pfefferle Company were persuaded that the original would have been marbled and 
so they imitated the frame of the Virgin and Child with Saints Catherine and Michael and 
                                                
208  See Harbison, C. ‘Sexuality and Social Standing in Jan Van Eyck’s Arnolfini 
Double Portrait’, Renaissance Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Summer, 1990), p. 254, n.14.  
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Donor (1437) (the Dresden Triptych).209 On the balance of probabilities, it is likely that 
the original frame of the Arnolfini Portrait would have been similar (i.e. marbled). 
Together, these points of distinction combine in the Arnolfini Portrait to assert the 
primacy of the artist over the object. In this sense, the Arnolfini signature has 
consequences for the way that the hierarchies involving the artist, object and viewer are 
figured. 
 
 
4.2.1 PRIMACY OF THE ARTIST OVER THE OBJECT 
 
Signatures using verbs like facere which are associated with production have an 
interrupted history extending beyond their Latin form, ultimately deriving from Early 
Greek and Etruscan precedents. Signatory verbs on Early Greek pots, for example - 
egraphsen and epoisen - are words which refer to their having been ‘painted’ and ‘made’ 
respectively.210 The precise meaning of the epoisen signature (especially) has been 
debated frequently, with opinion wavering between whether the word refers to ‘actual’ 
potters or to workshop owners and overseers. Sir John Beazley, a prominent authority on 
the identification of Greek Pottery, wrote: 
Two explanations have been given for the epoise-signature. One, that it gives the name of 
the potter, the man who fashioned the vase; the other, that it gives no more than the 
                                                
209  Karl Pfefferle Workshop: 
http://rahmenwerkstattpfefferle.de/english/references.htm , (accessed 3rd August 2013) 
210  On this subject see the notes of the Classical Art Research Centre:  
http://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/tools/pottery/inscriptions/painter.htm , (accessed 3rd August 
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owner of the establishment from which the vase came. At one time I held it more prudent 
to adopt the second explanation: but now I believe that, in general, the first explanation is 
the right one.211 
Signatures on Greek pottery are known mostly from a single instance and epoiesen 
signatures are twice as common as egraphsen ones. A small number of vessels carry both 
epoisen and egraphsen inscriptions alongside the name of one individual, leading some to 
speculate that such signatures might mark the moment when a painter acquired his own 
workshop, or, alternatively that the entire object was fashioned by one individual.212  
Later Roman art and architecture carries inscriptions in both Latin and Greek, (sometimes 
together), which maintain a link to the processes of production.213 During the 
Renaissance, Roman epigraphy played a significant role in the revival of signatory 
inscriptions on paintings and sculptures. However, the form of Renaissance inscriptions, 
(which are largely Latin, rather than Greek or vernacular, and often utilise Roman-style 
typography), is attributed to the role played by literary, Humanist interests in Roman 
descriptions of Greek art, rather than the direct adoption of the signatory habits presented 
by physical models. The work of Pliny in particular filtered through to affect the working 
practice of Renaissance artists.  
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Oskar Batschman & Richard Grenier, discussing the work of Hans Holbein, comment on 
the marked attention that Pliny’s description of ‘foundational’ signatory habits received 
from artists in the early 16th century.214 They quote the long dedication in the Historiae 
Naturalis in which Pliny says: 
I should like to be accepted on the lines of those founders of painting and sculpture who, 
as you will find in these volumes, used to inscribe their finished works, even the 
masterpieces which we can never be tired of admiring, with a provisional title such as 
‘Worked on by Appelles’ or ‘Polyclitus’, as though art was always a thing in process and 
not completed, so that when faced by the vagaries of criticism the artist might have left 
him a line of retreat to indulgence, by implying that he intended, if not interrupted, to 
correct any defect noted. Hence it is exceedingly modest of them to have inscribed all 
their works in such a manner suggesting that they were latest, and as though they had 
been snatched away by fate. Not – ‘Made by’ so-and-so (these I will bring in at their 
proper places); this made the artist appear to have assumed a supreme confidence in his 
art, and consequently all these works were very unpopular.215 
If this passage is to be believed, Appelles and Polyclitus manipulated their signatory 
vocabulary to serve two purposes - to expound their modesty and to defend themselves 
against criticism. What is certain is that these precedents are seen to have had a marked 
influence on Renaissance artists, explaining the form of Michelangelo’s (sole) signature, 
for example. This signature uses facere in the third person imperfect as faciebat, and can 
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be found on the Pietà (1498-99) (Fig. 3) in St Peter’s Basilica.216 The imperfect tense 
implies that, like Appelles and Polyclitus, Michelangelo does not (merely) finish work. 
His self-consciously reflexive signature is hardly an expression of modesty, used as it is 
to declare his rank as equal to the best of the Classical ‘greats’, but - unlike Van Eyck’s 
Arnolfini signature - it maintains a necessary link with production. 
 
In Van Eyck’s signatory practice, whereas me fecit refers paintings internally to their own 
conditions as objects,  fuit hic refers the Arnolfini signature outside of the painting to the 
artist. In me fecit inscriptions the general pronoun ‘me’ specifies the primacy of the object 
over the artist, so signatures which use the phrase do not directly challenge the pre-
eminence of the object’s apparent subjectivity over that of the (remote) signatory even as 
they actively signal the ‘productive’ role and involvement of human agents in the 
realization of objects. Conceptually, in me fecit inscriptions, it is the object that is 
accorded the power of speech and presence, subordinating the artist to something like the 
role of mid-wife. Fuit hic does not declare the involvement of the artist in the 
manufacture of the object as does me fecit - tacitly, the artist does not serve the object.  
Wittingly or not, in the Arnolfini Portrait, Van Eyck directs attention to himself: his 
name is the primary proposition and seems to stake a claim on the Byzantine 
acheiropoieta tradition which me fecit inscriptions acknowledge even as they erode it, 
(acheiropoieta forms were believed to have supernatural origins - the Greek compound 
breaks into literal translation as ‘without-hands-production’ – so by asserting his presence 
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rather than his production, Van Eyck places himself in the role of supernatural 
originator). The claim to acheiropoieta in the Arnolfini Portrait is not straightforward - 
oblique knowledge of Van Eyck’s position as ‘painter’ is required in order to stitch him 
to its production despite his signature. Significantly, this is information that the painting 
does not deliver immediately. 
 
In representing his viewpoint as witness to the scene he has depicted and put before the 
viewer, Van Eyck subordinates the object to its ‘proper’ place as a vehicle for the 
particularity of his technical skill and vision: the vocabulary and manner in which he 
signs the work relate to this subordination. Like Michelangelo’s faciebat and despite its 
perfect tense, Van Eyck’s fuit hic is an active principle not the conclusion of service 
because, in combination with the naturalistic circumstances of the image, the signature 
directs viewers to look ‘as if’ through the eyes of ‘Jan Van Eyck’ and see ‘now’ what has 
been seen before, by him. The ambiguous pronoun ‘hic’ means ‘here’ and represents an 
ongoing statement of place.217 Viewers are directed to acknowledge the physical absence 
of ‘Jan Van Eyck’ as a nominal presence which meshes with their own physical 
experience - ‘Jan Van Eyck’ is absent in the space beside them, in front of the painting. 
In the anomaly of fuit hic, Van Eyck takes possession of the personal pronoun ‘me’, not 
only trumping the object but staking a claim to breach the temporality of the merely 
present and the merely past. He attempts to reconcile the separation of viewer from artist: 
as an artist, he identifies with the viewer (not the object). Van Eyck’s hic is 
simultaneously ‘here’ and ‘there’. 
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4.2.2 LEGERDEMAIN AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF MATERIALITY 
 
As mentioned, the operation of fuit hic relies on representational naturalism. In Early 
Netherlandish Painting, Panofsky writes: 
…a picture by Jan Van Eyck claims to be more than ‘just a painting’. It claims to be both 
a real object - and a precious object at that - and a reconstruction rather than a mere 
representation of the visible world.218 
For Panofsky, the object quality of Van Eyck’s paintings is stressed by the trompe l’oeil 
treatment of their frames. It is as if surrounded by simulated stone painted on wood, Van 
Eyck’s paintings are weighted, lent the appearance of a heavy object whose artifice is 
nonetheless declared in the signature apparently incised. Panofsky describes the 
simulation of marble as a legerdemain that emphasizes and glorifies ‘the materiality of 
the picture’, but makes no acknowledgement of the contradiction between legerdemain 
and ‘materiality’.219 As contradictory principles, legerdemain and materiality relate to the 
object in different ways - the former demotes ‘inherent’ physical qualities in favour of 
technical skill, a circumstance reversed in the latter. In a painted image, legerdemain 
constructs belief as the suspension of disbelief. 
 
Rudolf Preimesberger contends that Van Eyck’s painterly depiction of stone on frames 
and shutters marks the place of competition between sculpture and painting as a ‘silent 
paragone’, a competition painting is seen to win.220 As paragone, painting subsumes 
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sculptural materials, forms and techniques (e.g. engraving) to itself - it also plays with the 
expectations of scale, miniaturizing or reiterating ‘life-size’ according to the artist’s 
design, making a virtue of the ability to simulate or deceive in paint. In choosing to 
imitate marble for the mouldings of his frames, Van Eyck effectively demonstrates 
painting’s greater worth over sculpture. Painting is an art in which careful modelling 
(riliveo), mastery of perspective and acute observation could rationalize three dimensions 
in two.221 The painter’s pride in such mastery, which Preimsberger argues was provoked 
by a conceptual association with the climate of intellectual discovery and scientific 
theorizing, might be extended to cover the appearance of signatory inscriptions painted as 
if engraved on marble frames. If so, such inscriptions exist as declarations of technical 
achievement, setting seal on a declaration of the painter’s victory over three dimensions.  
 
Preimsberger remarks that in the Dresden Triptych - a small Annunciation scene painted 
on hinged panels which, when closed, reveal depictions of two small stone statues - Van 
Eyck deliberately breaches the aesthetic boundary set up by the frame because he extends 
the pedestals of the statues over it. Without this breach the frame is like a window onto 
the painting; with it ‘In theoretical terms, it is as if Van Eyck has transcended the purely 
pictorial character of painting’.222 The window analogy is somewhat misplaced, (the 
statues appear to be recessed or boxed), but Preimsberger uses it because he wants to 
inculcate the idea of looking past the painted surface in order to promote the idea that 
‘transcendence’ is something that can be effected through an excess of skill. It is excess 
skill that makes the painting more than an image, unbinds it from the declared limits of 
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painted representation and makes opaque pigments behave unnaturally in order to convey 
transparency and invisible space. Equally, the encroachment of the pedestals over the 
frame can be read as a device that belies artifice, restating the (never purely) pictorial 
character of the painting: as a small, portable object, the painting was designed for 
private, devotional use that necessitated manual actions (opening, closing) as well as 
visual appreciation.223 The owner and user of the Dresden Triptych knew (by handling) 
that the intrusion of the stone pedestal over the frame was a visual trick, and the painting 
reciprocates that knowledge. The painting acknowledges that it is in some sense 
complicit in denying itself as an object, (something that makes trompe l’oeil painting 
inherently camp). 
 
As a pun, the incursion of the pictorial scheme onto the frame retreats from ‘unsafe’ 
illusions as much as it attends the artist’s mimetic skill. The mimetic legerdemain 
reported to have been practised by the Greek artists, Zeuxius and Parrhasios, in which 
competing masteries of illusion are tested by the physical reactions they provoke, has 
frequently been viewed with suspicion for its ability to present the virtual as real.224 At 
some level, mimesis is magical. More pragmatically and sitting in the background of Van 
Eyck’s marbling, lie Andrew Martindale’s remarks that, at this time,  ‘it was the power of 
the painter to conceal basic faults in workmanship which was particularly feared.’225 Part 
of what Van Eyck accomplishes is making a virtue of the virtual against any such 
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suspicion, putting the ability to create illusion at the heart of ‘good’ workmanship. Where 
Van Eyck’s signatures are employed on marbled frames which, unlike the naturalistic 
images they bind, are painted simulacra (lifesize), they are a wry acknowledgment of the 
success of imitation. in a Foucaldian sense, Van Eyck holds himself responsible for his 
pictorial transgression. 
 
Van Eyck’s preference for ‘marbleing’ his frames can be taken to be reflective of a 
general shift in painting away from what might be termed ‘base materiality’ towards 
‘virtuosity’. Michael Baxandall demonstrates that, in the 15th century, contracts for 
paintings were less likely to include clauses insisting on the verifiable quality of pigments 
than their predecessors and concomitantly more likely to include clauses insisting on the 
personal touch of a named master.226 Despite the relative dearth of contracts relating to 
painters of the ‘Northern Renaissance’, (Baxandall’s focus is specifically on Italian 
painters), the general tendency he describes can be imputed to the work of a well-
travelled, well-connected painter like Van Eyck, who was attached to a Royal Court and 
venerated in Italy during his lifetime. According to Baxandall, in the contracts he 
analysed, ‘conspicuous consumption’ of materials became less important than 
‘conspicuous consumption’ of skill, and this is indicative of a broadly accelerating 
cultural trend, not one confined to the production of paintings.227  
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If Van Eyck’s marbled frames are read not just as paragone in the particular assertion of 
painting over sculpture, but also as paragone in the direct and general assertion of skill 
over material, their trompe l’oeil device is not only a straightforward display of skill but 
it occasions the displacement of materiality. Panofsky is right to remark on the 
importance of the marbling preferred by Van Eyck for his frames and to link it to 
materiality, but he because he doesn’t conceptualize or explain the significance of the 
distance from materiality that legerdemain introduces, he reads Van Eyck’s simulation as 
an apparent interest in asserting the physicality of the object. On the contrary, marbling 
steps towards ‘dematerialisation’ by asserting the superiority of illusion over ‘base’ 
reality. If there is ‘glorification’, it is through visual wit, technical skill and apparition. 
There is a very literal sense in which Van Eyck marginalizes ‘materiality’, pushing it to 
the frame where it is admitted as a simulacrum of itself, complicit with the viewer. 
 
 
4.2.3 SIGNATURE, SUBJECTIVITY AND MARGINALIA 
 
In a dialectical move, in the Arnolfini Portrait, Van Eyck’s undisguised signature might 
be seen to have shifted from the margins, the parergon, (to use a Kantian term), to take 
up a central position on the picture plane. The centrifugal forces that pushed materiality 
from the painting to its frame, literally and conceptually, can be seen to have attracted the 
signatory inscription into the centre of the pictorial scheme. These forces are dormant in 
what Camille marks as a gradual shift from ‘speaking words’ to ‘seeing words’, a shift 
that he argues was fundamental to the development of medieval imagery in Byzantine 
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and Anglo-Saxon (Gothic) Psalters from the tenth century onwards.228 Here, speech 
aligns with materiality and sight with legerdemain. The margins of the manuscripts 
considered by Camille are the locus of complex illustrations, known as ‘marginalia’, 
which exist alongside the main body of the text: ‘this extra-textual space only developed 
into a site of artistic elaboration as the idea of a text as a written document superseded the 
idea of the text as a cue for speech.’229 Prior to this supersession, in monasteries, the 
‘Word’ was always performed meditatio, from memory: 
in the later 12th century, the page layout or ordinatio of the text supplanted monastic 
meditatio. Now it was the physical materiality of writing as a system of visual signs that 
was stressed, this shift from speaking to seeing words is fundamental to the development 
of medieval imagery.230 
Camille links the shift from speaking to seeing to a gradual decrease in the decorative 
ornamentation of calligraphic elements in manuscripts.  
 
As ornamentation decreased, the physical materiality of writing began to correspond with 
its legibility. Thus, legibility can be seen to demote the physical materiality (visual 
density) - the singular ‘presence’ - of the word. The more that words had to operate 
immediately, unpracticed, on sight, the less scope there was to obfuscate their functional 
form with decoration. Seeing words for reading necessitates a denudation and 
decluttering of the centre in order that the script become legible. Naked, words and texts 
are (potentially) available to a greater readership; they are beginning to be able to be 
democratized. Camille argues that as ornamentation was pushed out to the margins of the 
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page and it was less integrated with letterforms: extraneous, it took on a different 
character, formally and functionally. Set aside, less central, its decorative impulse 
mutated. Marginalia finds its origins in ornamentation but interacting with the main body 
of text narratively, as comment from the wings, it began to signal the subjectivity of the 
scribe, that is the person(s) engaged in the physical production of the manuscript. No 
longer solely servicing the letter-form, ornamentation acquired a degree of unregulated 
autonomy because what is ‘outside’ - decentred - interrupts integrity, dogma and 
orthodoxy. So, in certain aspects, manuscript marginalia shares traits with Classical 
graffiti. Writing about Roman epigraphy, Alison Cooley remarks on the pitfalls of the 
tendency to assume that the vernacular, casual aspects of grafitti make it irrelevant as a 
source for history because it is not orthodox: 
...it is true that many graffiti, such as the caraciture labelled rufus est (‘it’s Rufus) in the 
‘Villa of the Mysteries’ at Pompeii are self-indulgent scrawls to which their authors may 
not have paid any attention, but this is far from the whole story. 231 
 
One of Camille’s purposes in writing Image on the Edge was to challenge the notion that 
the pious and the grotesque exist as separate parallels. In the margins, the pious and the 
grotesque are mixed and ‘in-between’. The sympathies here with Derrida’s philosophical 
enterprise are marked, though Derrida does not feature in his bibliography. Camille’s 
examples show margins as places for ribald play, depictions of self are ‘monstrous’, 
ambiguous and liminal, ‘areas of confrontation, places where individuals often crossed 
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social boundaries’.232 For Camille, the cultural implications of this mean that 
ornamentation can be lawless: the visual clamour of the margins giving voice to those 
who have had no voice. Marginalia undermines the universality of the written word, 
affronting rather than assuring, disturbing and destabilizing rather than creating accord. 
As decoration, marginalia interrupt beautifully illegible texts.   
 
Camille attributes the flourishing of marginalia to growing self-consciousness amongst 
artisans at this time, citing the inclusion of corrigenda, (additions or corrections to the 
text), which are playfully pointed out by ‘textual construction workers’, as an instance of 
such self-consciousness: 
Self-representations by medieval artists in all media are more common than one might 
suppose…. there are a large number of images, especially from the 12th century, showing 
artists at work, which should make us question the cliché of medieval anonymity. It was 
not that the artist was a nobody, it was more a matter of his situation relative to the body, 
the Word of God that was his subject. Even if his art was not religious and he worked for 
a secular lord designing tapestries and armorial pageants, his position was still 
subservient and secondary to the ‘Lord’.233 
A particularly apposite example, though not one considered by Camille, is to be found in 
in a 12th century codex in the Bibliotheca Bodmeriana in Cologny, Switzerland.234 
Insinuated in a letter ‘R’, an illumination carries a pictorial depiction of a monastic 
scribe, surrounded by his tools, engaged in painting the tail of the letter alongside the 
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signatory inscription ‘FR. RUFILLUS’, an inscription is taken to be indicative of his 
name. Whilst the conclusion that the text has therefore been produced by Fr. Rufillus 
could be taken to follow, there is no natural link between the name, the pictorial 
illumination and the scribe of the text: what looks like it might unify these three elements 
is the notion of ‘self-depiction’. There is no way of ascertaining whether the illuminator 
who produced the depiction is drawing himself,  (indicating that he is Fr. Rufillus), or 
depicting someone else engaged in the activity of painting, (a Fr. Rufillus who is not 
him). Nonetheless, whoever reads the manuscript is forced, by this signature, to recognise 
the grounds for affinity between the unseen illuminator of the manuscript and ‘Fr. 
Rufillus’, even if, (to recall a trope from the Derrida/Searle debate), the ‘Fr. Rufillus’ is, 
as illuminator, ‘merely’ absent to himself. The operation of affinity in this way is a 
feature of marginalia as Camille reads it. It is not a consequence of an individual 
integrated ‘creative’ self that manifests itself in personal expression.  
 
Having noted that the most active trading places, (Paris, Ghent, Bruges and London), 
were those producing the most manuscripts, rather than examining them for depictions of 
mercantilism or the value of materials, (conventional departure points for those looking 
to analyse the historical workings of the market in art), Camille finds representations of 
‘urban marginals’ in mariginalia.  He details instances of painters (illuminators) 
representing themselves alongside beggars, prostitutes and the like: 
In the list of ‘illicit trades’ reviled in the Medieval West as studied by Le Goff, we read 
not only of butchers, innkeepers, jongleurs and, of course, prostitutes, but also of 
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painters. Most of them had small family businesses which were nothing like our ideal 
notion of the workshop.235 
There is sympathetic recognition between the painter and other illicit traders. Camille 
considers the socially marginal position of many of these Medieval artists - not all 
monastic - at a time of nascent capitalism, associating ‘class’ self-consciousness with a 
division of labour introduced into the production of illuminated manuscripts during the 
13th century: 
whereas in the previous century the text-writer and artist of a book were often one and the 
same, increasingly the two activities were practiced by different individuals and groups. 
The illuminator often followed the scribe, a procedure that framed his labour as 
secondary to, but also gave him a chance of undermining, the always already written 
Word.236 
Self-consciousness, an autonomy which undermines authority and expression (so often 
read as the preserve of ‘pure’ art), flourishes in the margins where it marks social 
affinities, causing problems for genius theories of individuated authorial self-inscription 
which rely on the same foundations (self-consciousness, autonomy and expression). In 
Camille’s study, self-inscription - the allusive base of artistic freedom - is not geared 
towards establishing a sovereign individual, but towards representing lived experience 
outwith the higher echelons of society. As such, subjectivity is not asserted tightly bound 
to the self, (or the self-sufficient object), rather it is perceived in others, as witness to 
shared experience. The division of labour ruptures the centralised, mystic power of the 
Word, which is ideally entire; in this it is liberatory. 
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Though Van Ecyk was working some two hundred years later than the period Camille is 
interested in, he is believed to have started his ‘career’ as a book illuminator and is 
credited with the work of ‘Hand G’ in the Turin-Milan Hours of the Duc de Berry. It is 
true to say that neither Van Eyck’s illuminations nor his panel paintings reflect the ribald 
play of the Gothic marginalia considered by Camille. Nonetheless there appears to be a 
generative cohesion of conceptual circumstances between Van Eyck’s work and that of 
Gothic illuminators: if Van Eyck’s marbled frames represent a materiality pushed out to 
the margins by technical skill, and the emergence of marginalia is involved in a move 
from ‘speaking words’ to ‘seeing words’. The critical displacement involved in both is a 
decentering that invokes Derrida’s deconstruction of the myth of Thaumus and Theuth in 
Plato’s Pharmacy. When artitsic skill successfully challenges the omnipotence of an 
object’s material presence, the universal power vested in ‘presence’ can accrue partially, 
to human agents, because, demoted in its materiality, the painted object no longer serves 
as a prop or channel for deity. What is challenged in both marbled frames and manuscript 
marginalia is the form and possibility of ‘presence’. When it is readmitted to art, 
materiality is associated with human touch and genius. Paradoxically, signature, which 
has had a part to play in moving materiality out, is the device by which readmission is 
made. 
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4.2.4 MATERIALITY, COMMON CULTURE & COPYING 
 
As mentioned, when Panofsky reads Van Eyck’s marble frames as an emphasis of ‘object 
quality’, it is tempting to suggest the opposite and claim that the frames dematerialize 
material and materialize skill. It might be provocative, given the virtuosity and technical 
advances of Renaissance paintings, to suggest that, against the foil of their Byzantine 
predecessors, the ‘object quality’ of the former is less important than that of the latter, but 
in terms of the production processes that vest aura (wholly) in objects, this is the case. 
Conceptually, Byzantine icons bind aura to the material singularity of the object, not to 
the originality of an image. Self-similar, icons derive their value from expensive 
materials like gold and ultramarine as well as from the constancy of images. Repetition 
binds the incidence of materiality more tightly, necessarily and internally to the instance 
of an image derived from copybooks. Manifest in singular, specific objects, Byzantine 
icons provide a recognizable habitat for the manifestations and experience of deity. 
Ultimately, Renaissance paintings and sculptures begin to devolve aura to the singularity 
of the subjective vision - that of the artist - and there is, progressively, a relative deflation 
in the intrinsic value of materials, of the binding of the image to its substrate, and a 
location of specificity outside the object.  
 
Complex inheritances subjugate the artist to the object in Byzantine culture. Art of the 
Modern era, (rooted in the Renaissance), might be broadly characterized as art in which 
the painter or sculptor has become more important than the object. Characterizing art in 
this way provides an opportunity to change the conventional emphasis in historical 
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narratives which see the artist separate from the artisan, because if legerdemain is seen to 
displace materiality and, concomitantly, the margins are seen to give play to decentred, 
critical voices interrupting ‘presence’, the artist can be seen to emerge principally against 
and through the object. 
 
In pursuit of this idea, what Camille writes about the condition of making before the 12th  
century is pertinent: ‘you can do nothing of yourself’.237 The pre-Renaissance production 
of Christian icons is thought to have closely followed written descriptions such as those 
contained in the manuscript of Ulpius the Roman’s Eccelesiastical History, something 
read from the perspective of the twentieth century as creatively restrictive ‘copying’.238 
While established formulas for depicting images in icons were routinely copied, new 
formulas or images could also be revealed ex nihilo, mediumistically.239 Even so, in this 
visionary capacity, the icon painter served the vision transmitted to him, and was obliged 
to embody it in a sacred object without personal interference or individual gratification. 
The Rule of St Benedict, a codified set of religious precepts which dates from the sixth 
century AD, states: 
If there be skilled workmen in the monastery, let them work at their art in all humility, if 
the Abbot giveth his permission. But if anyone of them should grow proud by reason of 
his art, in that he seemeth to confer a benefit on the monastery, let him be removed from 
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that work and not return to it, unless after he hath humbled himself, the Abbot again 
ordereth him to do so.240 
Far more than merely setting down prohibitions concerning the signing of individual 
works, The Rule of St Benedict prohibits ‘secret’ pride in what is produced. Icons are 
understood to have to be wholly autonomous from the artisans that serve them by 
bringing them into being. Iconic images may descend to the artist but they originate with 
God. ‘Unpainted’, archeiropoietic images were ‘therefore especially authentic’.241 They 
include the ‘Image of Edessa’, the ‘Veil of Veronica’, the ‘Shroud of Turin’ - images 
purportedly created by the impression of Christ’s face and body, ‘a relic of physical 
contact’.242 Similarly, the fixed form of the Virgin Mary and Christ Child in (a) 
Hodegetria Madonna reiterates a (lost) original considered to have originated with St 
Luke, the patron saint of artists.243 Necessarily, icons do not carry signatures, but the issue 
of provenance, (in terms of their connection to relics, the appropriateness of the artist’s 
attitude and their adherence to proper form), which segues so fully with what signature is 
supposed to assure, is of absolute importance.  
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4.2.5 NATURALISM AND THE ARNOLFINI CONTRACT 
 
In analysing the relationship of painting to materiality and forms of secular self-
representation, conceptually, both Preimseberger and Camille clear space. Van Eyck’s 
signature in the Arnolfini Portrait can be seen to occupy this cleared space. The success 
of the occupation in terms of insinuating ‘his’ presence, relies, for its impact, on the 
quality of painted naturalism with which it is coupled. Naturalism is what allows Van 
Eyck to demote the physicality of the object and assert his primacy over material then to 
claim that ‘he was here’. In assessing the critical terms used to judge paintings in 
Renaissance Italy during the 15th century, Baxandall remarks on the importance of the 
phrases imitatore della natura and imitatore del vero in setting up ‘an unspecified 
realism’.244 Imitation of nature segued with the representation of truth in naturalism, and 
to a degree, the signatory inscription on the Arnolfini Portrait sits as a critical punctum of 
that joining. Whereas the temporality of Byzantine icons is a universal ‘now’ that is 
transcendentally static and elsewhere, Van Eyck’s fuit hic marks the trace of ‘real’ time 
(‘then and now’) in synthesis with the domesticity of the interior depicted. It indicates the 
room, the couple and their possessions without direct reference to the artist’s role in the 
realization of a production process or ‘making’.  
 
Van Eyck’s naturalism, the life-like, ‘believable’ quality that imbues his work, is 
constructed with reference to secular, contingent environments which are seen and 
reported – not channeled or designed to adhere to religious edicts. This is necessary to the 
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ambiguous operation of fuit hic. Had fuit hic been signed on a Byzantine-style image, a 
flat image lacking a sophisticated understanding of perspective and produced without 
recourse to the then innovative technique of using oil as a medium for pigment, (a 
technique that, critically, allows the painter to control the modulations of light and 
shade), the signature could not unable draw the artist ‘Jan Van Eyck’ into the pictorial 
scheme as a witness (it is instructive that, for centuries, Van Eyck was credited with 
inventing oil painting).245  
 
The split between a representational ‘here’ and a physical ‘here’ is narrower in a flat icon 
than it is in a naturalistic panel painting. In presenting a believably life-like scene, Van 
Eyck encourages those looking at the painting to believe that what is represented has 
actually been seen and recorded by the artist - the skeins of fixed iconography unravel in 
naturalism. The effect of fuit hic in the Arnolfini Portrait is to shift the locus of ‘looking 
through’ further back than the compositional frame of a window: looking at the Arnolfini 
Portrait, Van Eyck’s eyes are prosthetically, verifiably before us. He relays a scene that 
has been witnessed and testified to in the real, ‘earthly’ world. He signs in the gap 
between image and reality in which naturalism appears to broaden, forcing the 
representational ‘here’ to recede from the (present) physical ‘here’, also forcing the 
viewer to take account of the fact that the image is elsewhere and the artist is testifying to 
that. 
 
                                                
245 Vasari records ‘Giovanni da Bruggia’ (Jan Van Eyck) as the inventor of oil 
painting in the ‘Life of Antonello da Messina’, although this story has been discredited 
since the 19th century. See Vasari, G. The Lives of the Artists, (Oxford Classics, 2008), 
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In The Body of the Artisan: Art and Experience in the Scientific Revolution, Pamela 
Smith refers to Van Eyck’s use of fuit hic rather than me fecit when she sets out to 
establish a shift from making to seeing in the Early Renaissance - the importance of 
vision observed by Camille contra speech is specifically reiterated by Smith contra the 
point of production.246 She contends that in the Arnolfini Portrait, Van Eyck was, as a 
painter, acting as a witness. Smith calls this ‘autopic authority’, relating the authority of 
artistic eyewitness to the autopsia of Renaissance anatomists and European explorers 
traveling in the New World. She comments that the notion of autopic authority gained 
momentum in the 16th century because it established the importance and validity of 
personal praxis in developing epistemology. Practical knowledge (derived from the 
application of artisanal skills and experience) and, more importantly, the observation of 
results, has a formative place in developing ‘science’. The incipient division between 
‘fine art’ and ‘craft (artist and artisan) is constructed according to the locus of the ‘eye’. 
Sight is disconnected from tactility, divorced from a necessary relationship with object. 
 
The displacement of materiality is evident in the move Smith notices from hand to eye, 
and she sees the ‘artistic’ self-consciousness emerge as a consequence of observing and 
recording. The autopic artist is, in effect, a Modern artist, who emerges against the 
material object and against those who are tied to the materiality of objects: those artisan 
trades which were not involved in leading the ‘autopic’ revolution are remaindered. The 
signature Smith styles as ‘autopic’ stakes a claim on truth and document as witness, not 
as maker - although it is technical skill as maker, the ability to produce a convincingly 
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naturalistic image, that qualifies the witness. In art as in science, observational skills can 
be seen to institute the long trajectory that runs from (intrinsic) value in material, to 
(imputed) value in trace. In the displacement of deity and materiality, the seeing eye 
triumphs over the speaking mouth and making hand to register the artist, who has 
achieved agency against the object, as witness. 
 
So, the signature of the artist is of crucial importance in supporting Smith’s theory of 
autopic authority: the signature denotes that what is represented has been seen. The status 
of the artist as ‘truthful’ (authentic) witness is founded on the ability to render lifelike 
images, and, in the case of the Arnolfini Portrait, the ‘truthful’ image is verified by a 
legible, apparently notaristic signature. Following Panofsky, Smith is inclined to accept 
the signature on the Arnolfini Portrait as having a role in ‘legally authenticating’ the 
image. For Smith, it is Van Eyck’s mastery of naturalism that gives credence to the claim 
that his representations were ‘legally’ accurate - she compares his practice to that of the 
16th century aristocratic botanist and illustrator, Gherdardo Cibo, who, alongside his 
accurate depictions of botanical specimens, depicted himself in the act of discovering the 
plants, recording written descriptions of the day, time, place and circumstances of the 
discovery.247 Smith interprets Van Eyck’s Portrait of a Man (Léal Souvenir) (1432) as a 
legal document, registering the translation of Léal Souvenir as ‘Legal remembrance’  
(Panosfsky translates it as ‘loyal remembrance’) and the accompanying inscription as 
‘Transacted on the 10th day of October in the year of our Lord 1432 by Jan Van Eyck’. 
Smith’s translation of actum as ‘transacted’ has a legalistic character and serves her 
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purpose of progressing the idea that Van Eyck was not a general witness, but a self-
aware, civically empowered witness guaranteeing the veracity of his images with force, 
legally.248  
 
When the metaphor became available, Van Ecyk’s ‘autopic authority’ was compared to 
the apparently objective, evidential action of cameras. Ernst Gombrich says of the 
Arnolfini Portrait that: 
The picture probably represents a solemn moment in their lives – their 
betrothal…Probably the painter was asked to record this important moment as a witness, 
just as a notary…This would explain why the master has put his name in a prominent 
position on the picture….We do not know whether it was the Italian merchant or the 
northern artist who conceived of making this use of the new kind of painting (oil), which 
may be compared to the legal use of a photograph, properly endorsed by a witness…For 
the first time in history the artist became the perfect eye-witness in the truest sense of the 
word.249 
Like Smith, Gombrich explicitly links the notion of ‘eye’ witness to signature as the 
proper endorsement of acute naturalism and attention to minute detail. In this Gombrich 
builds on the idea, introduced by Panofsky, that Van Eyck’s naturalism is objective, 
technological and machine-like. For Panofsky, Van Eyck’s mimetic ability was ‘a 
microscope and a telescope at the same time’.250 Underlying each of these circumstances - 
legal force and photographic quality - is the idea that the painting (a representation) is not 
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‘merely’ subjective, that it has a supra-subjective, institutional place that is ‘objective’ 
and independently verifiable. 
 
 
4.2.6  HETEROGENITY AND DEHISTORICIZATION 
 
The notion of ‘independent verification’ is perhaps one that carries over into the form of 
the Arnolfini inscription. If the naturalistic, hyper-focus of Van Eyck’s depiction of the 
interior, figures and objects is taken to verify what has been seen, what was there before 
the artist and faithfully reported as such, the signature strikes the viewer as a moment of 
absolute realism which supports the appearance of the painting as a document. There is 
no apparent pretence or deference to pictorial representation in the signature of the 
Arnolfini Portrait: the signature is ‘real handwriting’ which does not participate in 
illusionistic space, integrated into the pictorial scheme. Edwin Hall, somewhat 
unconvincingly and without much historical substantiation, advances the idea that the 
Arnolfini signature could actually have been painted on the wall of the room depicted by 
Van Eyck: ‘Manuscript miniatures suggest that mottoes and pious inscriptions were 
actually sometimes painted on the interior walls of Flemish Houses.’251 Hall’s theory is 
improbable - the signature is neither motto, nor pious inscription - but on these terms, the 
signature would form part of the ‘naturalistic’ representation of the interior, and such 
naturalism would negate the moment of absolute realism that the ‘applied’ signature 
encapsulates. In the Arnolfini Portrait, the ‘naturalism’ evidenced in the acutely observed 
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painting abuts the signature’s ‘realism’ - the calligraphic signature requests immediate 
appreciation of it as a non-artistic form announcing itself apart from the rest of the 
painting, even as it takes centre-stage. This realism effectively short-circuits and closes 
off representational naturalism.  
 
On the frame, Van Eyck’s signatory inscriptions take up their proper place on the 
periphery of the painting, they simultaneously contain the painting and serve it as an 
object. In the Arnolfini Portrait, the obvious heterogeneity of the signature to the image 
in which it is situated appears to catalyse and present a separation of text from image. 
The signature stands apart from the object, dominating it and anticipating the autographic 
form artists’s signatures took in the 18th and 19th centuries. It is the form and vocabulary 
of the Arnolfini signature, the collusion between the unmediated realism of its Gothic 
lettering contra the sophisticated naturalism of the image, that have led readings of it as 
an act of witness - to a marriage or some kind of betrothal ceremony - and characterized 
the painting as a document, a quasi-certificate.252 The schism that this heterogeneity 
presents is essential to ‘witness’, to ‘autopic authority’. The change in pace between 
illusionistic image and real handwriting (which guarantee ‘presentness’ in different ways) 
- the friction between their registers of expression - is what generates the painting’s 
enigma and on-going scholarly appeal. 
 
In the Arnolfini Portrait, Van Eyck’s signature exhibits an obvious and immediate 
heterogeneity to the pictorial scheme. The notion that it is a quasi-notaristic signature 
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effecting the painting as a quasi-legal certificate, relies on this heterogenity. Though he 
found Van Eyck’s signature bothersome, Panofsky’s treatment of the painting as a 
clandestine marriage was aided by its hetereogenity. Setting aside Hall’s unique 
contention, which, were it accurate, would compress the signature and image together in 
one seamless scene, it is the signature’s heterogeneity to the pictorial representation that 
lends it the ability to appeal to an extrinsic authority, an authenticity unmediated by ‘art’. 
To reiterate, the signature appears as unmitigated moment of realism that coincides with, 
and splits from, the naturalism of the image. It appears to be a ‘real’, secular signature 
with a cursive form akin to that of signatures on letters and certificates, rather than a 
pictorial inscription in carefully incised capitals apparently carved on statues and 
buildings, (and represented as if carved on frames). It is not mimetic or representational. 
 
Bothered by the rub of realism against naturalism, Hall’s general argument in The 
Arnolfini Portrait is that the ‘truth’ of the painting has been obscured by the layers of 
postmodern revision and that this has led to the ‘progressive dehistoricization of the 
portrait’ in the name of ‘iconography’. He locates Van Eyck’s ‘cryptic’ signature at the 
heart of this dehistoricization, which is why he attempts to resolve its ambiguity by 
painting it into the Arnolfini chamber. For Hall, the signature was responsible for Charles 
Eastlake’s serious misreading of the painting as a self-portrait and it behaves like a key 
unlocking misadventure for iconographers and ‘postmodernists’ alike.253 In this respect, 
he is particularly concerned to locate the significance of the signature in driving 
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‘postmodern’ history, (which he disparages). What escapes him, as it does many others, 
is the particular ruse signatures play with historical significance, because if significance 
cannot be conclusively recovered through the signature, it is down to the enigma of a 
paraph that does not tether definitively to source but is not without historicity. Hall’s 
work on refuting the idea that the painting represents a clandestine marriage makes 
extensive, detailed and convincing reference to what is (now) known about Medieval 
marriage customs, but his own historical contextualization of the actuality of written 
inscriptions on the walls of Flemish interiors is almost purely conjectural and that is 
permitted by the signature. 
 
For Craig Harbison, a former student of Panofsky’s and one of the ‘postmodernists’ 
whom Hall styles as playing fast and loose with the meaning of the Arnolfini Portrait, the 
artist is not present principally as a ‘witness’ indicated by the unusual circumstances of 
the signature, rather, the artist is a: 
story-teller, realizing the multi-valence of any incident, any object, any detail in a 
nouvelle such as this…In the Arnolfini double portrait Jan van Eyck was certainly there. 
Craftsman, magician, and social commentator… 254 
If the signature is seen by Hall to permit the fancies of scholars like Harbison, it is seen 
by Harbison himself to frustrate them, to divert ‘proper’ attention. Harbison is not 
persuaded to the notion that the painting could have had legal force at anytime, 
commenting that ‘a work of art would not stand up as fact in a court of law then anymore 
than it would today’.255 For Harbison, legalistic interpretations of the painting privilege 
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unsustainable empirical assumptions over a sensuous and ambiguous symbolism in 
keeping with the cultural mores of the time. He favours the notion that the painting might 
commemorate a secular annunciation, hinting that if Giovanni Arnolfini is not pregnant, 
(she died childless), her distended form indicates a hope – perhaps a plea - for a fruitful 
union.256 In this, he shares Linda Seidel’s opinion that the painting represents a desired 
reality, and like Seidel, he is persuaded that the detail and realism of the interior faithfully 
report the appearance of the merchant’s prized chattels in order to represent his courtly 
ambitions and aristocratic self-image.257 Seidel says that Van Eyck presents an ideal 
which melds together what is real with what is desired in a vision that ‘seek(s) to 
persuade the viewer that present and future realities can coexist in the same time and 
space’.258 The tense that naturalism appears to assume to itself is the ‘present’, but a 
‘present’ that is documentary, memorial - a halt to the passage of time. In a devotional 
context, the present anticipates an unfolding in the afterlife, styled by Seidel as a ‘future 
reality’ - the way Seidel understands temporality thus, recalls Derrida’s work on 
countersignatures. 
 
Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that unlike Harbison, Seidel expressly integrates the 
appearance of the signature into her reasoning. She develops her argument through, and 
in honour of, Panofsky, styling the Arnolfini Portrait as a kind of ricordanze, a work that 
commemorates the cumulative ceremonies that were involved in the marital process 
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rather than depicting the ‘one-off’ event of a ‘clandestine’ marriage.259 In her view, the 
contractual status of the Arnolfini Portrait reflects the hope of the marriage, but more 
pragmatically is in someway a guarantee against the marital dowry advanced by the 
bride’s family. In attempting to discern for whom the painting was produced, Seidel 
underscores the importance of complex financial transactions in Medieval marriage. 
Central to her commentary, she relates that grooms required notarized proof in order to 
release dowry payments, and she says that the Arnolfini Portrait exists as that kind of 
proof: the painting may have functioned as a kind of ‘receipt’. 
 
Seidel notes that Van Eyck began to hold property in Bruges in 1432, (2 years before the 
date on the Arnolfini Portrait), and as a consequence was eligible to act as a witness to 
ceremonies as a ‘community representative’. On these terms, his signature is that of a 
notary and as such incidental to his role as the artist who ‘made’ the painting. So, Van 
Eyck did not sign the painting as an artist, but as a dignatory who happens to have 
painted what he signs. According to Seidel, on this basis, the signature is an essential 
element in the painting, not an extraneous or idiosyncratic one. The merchant class in 
Bruges would have recognized Van Eyck as an artist, but also as a civically important 
man: signature splits his status. For Seidel, the signature is indicative of civic authority 
rather than the artist’s assertion of personal virtuosity or a Modern authorial self. It works 
very much in a common sense manner, and her interpretation of the painting proceeds 
outwards from it. 
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In The Truth in Painting, Derrida briefly considers the Arnolfini Portrait in his discussion 
of the claims Heidegger and Schapiro make to Van Gogh’s ‘shoes’. Accepting 
Panofsky’s treatment of the painting, he understands Van Eyck’s signature to have 
transformed the representation of a wedding per fidem into an ‘attestation of marriage’. 
The fact that the detail of the wedding theories that circulate around the Arnolfini Portrait 
has led to them being discredited on one ground or another is irrelevant: the fact that the 
painting has (had) this persistent appeal is not. Van Eyck’s signature invites readings that 
interpret the painting as the commemoration of a ceremony, a classic speech act for 
which a witness is required. If naturalism hides the artist, at the same time it purports to 
give spectators his eyes and the undisguised signature seems to announce and verify his 
presence as something not entirely simultaneous with mechanical skill. The signature 
asks us to fill in and trust what it is a proxy of (what is beyond it), and that is a secular 
‘being-there’, ‘être-la’, ‘da-sein’, the unseen ‘having-been’ of an instituted individual. 
 
At the beginning of this Chapter, the conceptual difference between fecit and fuit was 
discussed. In artists’s inscriptions, fecit and fuit are associated with me and hic 
respectively, and these pronouns also have a relationship to presence. In Language and 
Death, Giorgio Agamben looks at the etymological connections between da and diese in 
Greek; hic, the adverb of place, and hic, the demonstrative pronoun in Latin; there and 
this in English.260 According to Agamben, based on Aristotle’s classification of nouns and 
verbs into discrete categories, (all other words were sundesmoi, ‘connectives’), pronouns 
arrive late in language as an autonomous category and when they do, they establish the 
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character of ‘indication’ (deixis in Greek, demonstratio in Latin): indication might be 
understood as a prosthetic operation. Pronouns have a special relationship with the action 
(as opposed to appearance) of the ‘sign’ and a privileged place in thought. In passing, it 
is worth remarking that if fuit hic opens the Arnolifini Portrait grammatically onto 
considerations of the être-la of SEC, it also opens it onto Heidegger’s da-sein, (with the 
idea that fuit hic could register as ‘not-here’ as well as ‘being-there’). 
 
Agamben contends that the movement between signifying and indicating (demonstrating) 
preoccupied Medieval grammarians, who intuited ‘two types of presence’ - ‘one certain 
and immediate and one in which a temporal difference had already insinuated itself’.261 
Thus, pronouns - primarily indicative - function by way of instituting temporal difference 
and delay, by splitting presence, by substitution. Pronouns, and in particular the pronoun 
‘I’, are structurally implicated in the speech act, always already sited and operating 
reflexively within discourse: ‘Indication is the category within which language refers to 
its own taking place’.262 In the hic of the Arnolfini signature, indication is abyssal. The 
viewer is directed simultaneously to a past ‘here’ represented in the image, and a present 
‘here’ - to the occupation of an impossible position, a present ‘here’ which is doubly 
occupied by the artist and the viewer. In the Arnolfini Portrait, the movement and 
reflexivity of temporal difference is encapsulated and emphasized in the signatory 
inscription of a ‘proper name’ appearing in conjugation with a declaration of ‘having 
been’ in front of a scene (as seen) depicted at some point in the past. The pronoun hic 
operates as a vortex, deliberately drawing the viewer to a ‘prior’ event, a ‘prior’ place 
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that nevertheless appears before them in versimilitude. The Arnolfini signature declares 
that this has been seen as much as it has been made and is being seen, a double vision that 
constitutes an authentic testament delivered through the particularity of the artist. 
 
The artist is an individual occupying a role which is linked to the operation of temporality 
in signature. The particular signature indicates the artwork in the ‘past’ but the 
intersection of materiality and spectator look to locate it in a general maintenance. When 
Panofsky introduces the artist as a witness to a sacrament more legal than religious, and 
the painting is evidenced as a document, the signature appears to constitute the artist’s 
final involvement with the painting, the testament. The implication that the signature 
marks an act of witness requires that it simultaneously marks an act of completion, but if 
the signature is not a mark of completion, if it does not attempt to set seal, can it have any 
persuasion as an act of witness? As previously noted, a witness may be understood to be 
someone who has been present enough in the totality of an event to verify and report its 
having taken place; is familiar enough with an individual to make an identification; has 
experience and reputation enough to be considered an expert, and as an expert is treated 
as the objective representative of a current body of knowledge at that point in time where 
witness is given. In all circumstances, the witness is understood to be testifying on the 
basis of prior experience that is marked as sealed at the time of testimony. Any additions 
or changes made to a witness’s statement must be signed as such otherwise they 
adulterate and invalidate it. All this gives onto Derrida’s word and form play in ‘Ltd. Inc 
a b c…’, the ‘borrowed names’ that appeal to him so much. 
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The heterogeneous form of the calligraphic signature on the Arnolfini Portrait effectively 
raises the presumption that it was applied separately to the surface of the painting after it 
was finished. The quality of this presumption institutes a difference between the Arnolfini 
signature and every other signature attributed to Van Eyck. It declares a shift from the 
involvement of the artist principally in the processes of object production to involvement 
in generating documentary testimony. Ironically, read through Derrida, rather than 
marking completion, the Arnolfini inscription, with its special emphasis on presence over 
production, reflects the impossibility of signature’s ability to do this. Van Eyck’s marbled 
frames illustrate a literal displacement of material which can be read as a step towards 
dematerialisation and the Arnolfini signature can be read as a significant statement 
alluding to the emergence and dominance of the artist over the object.  
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5. SIGNATURE AS PROPERTY: THIS IS MINE 
 
 
5.1 DONOR INSCRIPTIONS: THE ARTIST AS A FUSED FIGURE 
 
In the preceding Chapter, the idea that Van Eyck’s signatory practice might be taken to 
represent a shift in which the artist emerges against the object is contingent on the pre-
existence of circumstances in which the object was venerated over the artist. When the 
production of images and statues was circumscribed by religious edicts, as it was in 
Byzantine culture, the integrity of the object was dependent upon a secure typology of 
form that distanced it from any individual originator. In the nexus of relationships that 
convenes in a Byzantine icon, the intimate, physical connection between the person 
responsible for direct manufacture of the object is not figured as the most important one. 
This is not to say that the direct and variable influence of individuals on the realization of 
icons is not relevant. Despite the tradition of acheiropoieta, Byzantine icons occasionally 
identify by name individuals that can be said to have facilitated their existence, even if 
those individuals – as donors who endowed their production  - were not engaged in 
physically manufacturing them. For example, the 7th century Icon of St Irene, at the Holy 
Monastery of St Catherine in Sinai, identifies by name, a donor, ‘Nicholas (Sab)atianos’, 
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who is depicted as a tiny figure prostrate before the giant, unresponsive saint 'Irene' (an 
historical figure, also named in the inscription).263 
 
Where the donor is identified, an icon might testify to a penitent relationship between the 
donor and the saint, which is an indirect relationship between the donor and God geared 
towards securing salvation for the donor. The relationship between the donor and the 
saint is hierarchical: the canon of saints is a litany that includes those historical 
individuals who, having lived ‘ethically’ and served the interests of the church and court, 
were officially recognized and monumentalized in death.264 The icon might not identify 
an individual artisan’s involvement in manufacture, but it cannot be said to be ‘unsigned’. 
It carries the name of someone responsible for bringing about its existence, albeit at a 
degree of remove from physical manufacture. Hans Belting refers to the image of 
Nicholas (Sab)atianos in the icon of St Irene as ‘a visual signature’: the icon is only 
unsigned in the sense that the attribution of credit for manual production is missing.265 
 
So, despite there being no necessary physical contact between the icon and the donor, 
who is named (credited) and portrayed by an uncredited third party, can it be said that the 
indication of the donor by name ‘signs’ the icon? Where the signature is supposed to be a 
guarantee of presence, a guarantee of ‘having-been’, what is the nature of that presence or 
‘having-been’?  Can ‘presence’ travel esoterically through the representation of the 
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donor’s name in order to secure spiritual benefits for himself and his family, or does the 
notion of presence in an object necessarily rely on (volitional) manual contact in the 
process of production? Derrida does not theorize a necessary difference. The idea that a 
presence can flow through (and be guaranteed by) contingent circumstances that are 
external to the body of the donor - a determined representation, a name who is thus 
‘signed’ - rather than purely through gestures generated by the hand of a maker, is a 
construction of signature that is implied in both the etymology of signature and in the 
mechanistic way Derrida envisages signature operating. All that changes between an 
autograph and a seal, for example, is the emphasis on one empirical method or another: 
the hand of the individual or the control of an instrument at a degree of remove from the 
hand. The method of signing might have an impact on the legibility and authority of the 
signature in various contexts at various times, but there is no essential difference between 
gesture, autograph or stamp because, for Derrida, signature only becomes effective 
through countersignature. The depiction of Nicholas Sabatianos is not autographic, nor 
does it result from the impression of a singular tool, but it is not without an authority that 
assumes it can channel Divine favour to the right individual i.e. to ‘Nicholas Sabatianos’. 
Furthermore, the icon represents and identifies Nicholas Sabatianos in what aspires to be 
an ongoing act of piety and devotion: in Derridean terms, it could be said to aspire to an 
(impossible) general maintenance designed to assure salvation, and of course Derrida’s 
choice of parousia to describe the operation of signature in ‘Restitutions’ hints at 
signature’s quasi-theological mode. 
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In the Icon of St Irene, the figure of Nicholas Sabatianos is indicated proximate to his 
name, and the main reason for citing the Icon of St Irene at the start of this Chapter is to 
bring it into proximity to those structures through which artists came to apply their own 
names as signatures on their works. It is an example that is intended to advance the 
notion that one of the relevant precedents for what are commonly recognized as artists’s 
signatures are those inscriptions recognizing donors. Donors, like artists, can be 
recognised as having been involved in the production of paintings and sculptures as 
‘orchestrators’. The place of the donor in Byzantine and Early Renaissance art indicates 
the variability of the roles connected with operating as an ‘artist’. When Ambrose 
Lorenzetti decorated the Sala della Pace in the Palazzo Pubblico, Siena with Allegories of 
Good and Bad Government (c.1338-39) in the 14th century – including his signature in 
the process - to what extent is he behaving as an orchestrator and to what extent as an 
artist?266 Not only did Lorenzetti run a workshop - so it is highly unlikely that he would 
have been responsible for every physical effect in realizing the work - he is documented 
as being very actively involved in the civic affairs of the city. Is his signature that of an 
artist, that of a workshop owner, of a civic figure (and donor); any, all, some or one? 
Likewise, to what extent does Seidel read Van Eyck’s Arnolfini signature as that of an 
artist, and to what extent as that of a burgess? If we accept that signature allows 
(necessitates) the co-mingling of roles (and individuals), what does that mean for where 
we find the artist in history and how we might read signatory inscriptions on a continuum 
rather starting with individual ‘creativity’ during the Renaissance? 
 
                                                
266  Barker, Webb & Woods, op. cit. pp32-55 
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5.1.1 LOCATING THE ARTIST AFTER DUCHAMP 
 
While Nicholas Sabatianos may have directed production of the icon, requiring that he 
and his name was recorded on it, despite the paradigmatic shifts in critical thinking about 
art practice since Duchamp, art history has had a general tendency to view the 
‘anonymous’ manual worker who painted the icon as the ‘proto-artist’ and not the 
orchestrating donor who faciliated its production. This is largely because the idea of 
visual art has been driven by a view of it as something that is expressed in a manually 
produced, autonomous entity - ‘the work of art’. Post-Duchamp, (and informed by the 
theorising of Relational Art), is it not possible to read ‘orchestration’ as a function of 
artistic practice and look for evidence of that in historical examples? This changes where 
the artist or proto-artist can be located in history. Recent art histories dissimulate 
tendencies to read the artist in the shadow of Romantic ideals as a self-contained genius 
directly (manually) involved in all ‘moments of production’. Even so, there is a lack of 
work seeking to specifically synthesize the legacy of the donor with that of the artisan. Is 
there not a case for seeing the artist as a ‘fused figure’ who can occupy the place of 
either/both the donor and artisan in history, (meaning that donor signatures are significant 
in the genealogy of the artist)?  
 
It is my contention that the donor is as necessary in the figuration of the ‘proto-artist’ as 
the artisan and this is permitted when the artist - as a function - is viewed with a post-
Duchampian model of what that might be in mind, rather than a Romantic or Modernist 
one.  Duchamp was implicitly involved in taking apart the structural legacies that have 
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contributed to making up ‘the artist’, and these legacies are not just found in the 
Readymade’s immediate 19th century predecessors. Despite its 19th century form, the 
signature ‘R. Mutt’ on Fountain necessarily engages a long, complicated history of art 
production that extends beyond the Renaissance through the Byzantine era to Antiquity. 
 
 
5.1.2 SIGNATURE AS AN INTERTEXTUAL ELEMENT IN ANTIQUITY 
 
There is perhaps support for this in the work of Robin Osbourne who, having surveyed 
the signatory habits of potters and vessel-painters in Ancient Greece, concludes that 
signatures point to a notion of ‘authored’ ‘fine arts’ existing in antiquity:  ‘Artists are 
continually born in the collaboration of artist and patron’.267 Osbourne makes a 
distinction between signatures, (on pots, gemstones and sculptures), and stamps, (on tiles 
and bricks), on the basis of their function, and he cautions against imputing a hierarchical 
reading of signature that suppresses the notion of ‘the craftsman in our terms’. In relation 
to the Derridean conception of signature, the distinction between stamp and signature is 
empirical because they perform in the same way, however, Osbourne’s paper disrupts a 
foundational notion in art history, namely that there was no such thing as ‘art’, ‘artists’ or 
‘originality’ in Antiquity, indeed at anytime before these concepts were born in the 
Renaissance.268 Through the close quantitative and qualitative analysis of signatures - ‘the 
                                                
267 Osbourne, R. ‘The Art of Signing in Ancient Greece’, (Spring 2010), Arethusa, 
Vol. 43, No. 2, Spring 2010, p249 
268  Ibid. p236: ‘I focus on signatures because not only have signatures come to be 
associated with claims to originality, but there is good reason to think that signatures 
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ways in which painters and sculptors identify themselves’ - he argues that objects bearing 
signatures are acts of communication whose intertextuality points to their (collaborative) 
authoring.  
 
The signature of the potter or painter is part of that act of communication which 
constitutes a work of art. Signatures are not ‘adjunct’ to decoration but integral 
components of pictorial schema that consciously and essentially allow the object to 
‘perform’. For drinking vessels (e.g. kylikes) which, within the set of pots that are signed, 
are frequently indicated, the role of signatory inscriptions is well-defined: 
You could not come to perform at the symposium without the equipment that the potter 
and painter provided. Sympotic performance was an act in which the potter and painter 
were complicit…269 
Osbourne notes that the signatures of sculptors in dedicatory inscriptions are generally 
separated from the body of the statue and appear on the base or plinth, this: 
…makes the sculptor more than just adjunct to the patron…it also turns the inscribed 
base from merely a utilitarian text to being itself a work of art: the reader is made to think 
about the place and size of the words, not just about their content. The ‘balance’ of 
sculptor and dedicator raises the question of their relative part in communication that is 
signaled, and ensures that in these presentations to the gods, representation - of dedicator, 
of man, god, or hero portrayed, and sculptor - is always at issue.270 
He concludes that using signature to search for the ‘rise’ of the artist (out of a class of 
artisans) is futile because those behaving as artists, those who are engaged in directing 
                                                                                                                                            
already conveyed such claims in antiquity. Since the claim to originality has regularly 
been denied to ancient artists, the signature is a good foundation on which to build.’  
269  Ibid. p245 
270  Ibid. p247 
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performance and using their signature as an intertextual element in this activity, have, 
quite simply, always signed their work. This is not to say that the function of the artist or 
artisan had not undergone changes; rather, it is to say that the function has never been 
defined purely by material manipulations. Signature is indicative of role-variablity. 
 
There are many intervening centuries between the art considered by Osbourne and the 
icon of St Irene, and the icon does not anywhere indicate a named painter. However, if 
dedicatory and signatory inscriptions can be considered to point to an ‘artistic’ authorship 
in Antiquity, might the same be said for dedicatory and signatory inscriptions on 
Byzantine icons where a painter is not indicated by name but a donor is? If we consider 
donors to have played a part in structuring icons, are those that bear their names ‘signed’? 
If authorship is intertextual, is anything compromised in emphasizing the separation of 
donor from painter, a separation that is effected by styling the icons as ‘anonymous’ 
productions? If we accept Osbourne’s evidence that the role of the artist in Antiquity 
involves directing ‘performance’ through the production and use of objects, and such a 
direction is indicated by the way in which signatures and signatory inscriptions are used, 
what does the use of signatory inscriptions per se (i.e. including those that do not name 
the manufacturing individuals) mean for what is considered to be an artwork and 
who/what is considered an artist? Might signature and signatory inscriptions be aids to 
understanding the roles and functions that artists have, as ‘fused figures’, performed 
throughout history, (i.e. not just since the Renaissance)? There is a strong case for 
understanding all signatory inscriptions as the point of intermixing along the lines of 
Derrida’s ‘Sarl’ formulation – a société plus ou moins anonyme ‘3 + n’. Tracing the 
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personalities and roles which, for any given work at any given time, filter through ‘Sarl’ 
result in what and who the artist has been, is and will be. As a fused figure, can the role 
of the artist ever be said to have proceeded solely on the basis of individual artisanship, 
or mastery of material and technique? 
 
 
5.1.3 THE ARISTONOTHOS KRATER 
 
An instructive example can be found on the Aristonothos Krater (Fig. 4), a kylike which 
dates from approx 650 BC.271 The signature – ‘Aristonothos epoisen’ - is implicated in 
the representation of a scene from Homeric epic which is depicted on the Krater, (this 
scene is also reputedly the ‘first’ of its kind). The scene shows Odysseus blinding the 
Cyclops, Polyphemus, having procured his drunkenness. Vedia Izzet observes that the 
artist’s name ‘Aristonothos’ is inscribed at the very centre of the Cyclops narrative - 
almost as an extension of the burning ember used to injure Polyphemus: 
the point at which the onomastic inscription is inserted is that at which Odysseus’s 
namelessness is crucial for the outcome of the story. The scene of myth into which 
Aristonothos writes his name is one in which names deceive and cannot be taken at face 
value. When Odysseus gives his name to the barbarian Cyclops, the latter, not being 
                                                
271 A Krater from Pithekoussai with a partial signature is thought to be earlier: 
Bennett, Michael J., Aaron J. Paul, Mario Iozzo, and Bruce White Magna Graecia: 
Greek art from south Italy and Sicily. (Cleveland, OH: Cleveland Museum of Art, 2002) 
p27 
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Greek, thinks it is a real name. When precisely at the same point, the painter gives us, or 
his Etruscan client, his name, we too believe him.272 
She casts doubt on the veracity of the name ‘Aristonothos’, breaking it into its component 
parts aristo and nothos, translating them respectively as ‘noble’ and ‘bastard’ and 
suggests that the supposed signature has a satricial edge. Similarly, for Seth D Pevnick, 
who styles ‘Aristonothos’ a ‘loaded name’: 
…given the uniqueness of the name “Aristonothos”, not only as an artist signature, but 
also in the entire body of Greek inscriptions and personal names, one wonders whether it 
may not have been invented by the artist as a sort of visual pun – just as Odysseus 
deceives the Cyclops with his invented name, so too may the artist here be deceiving 
us….In seeking an answer to the question “Who is Aristonothos?” the user(s) of the pot 
must also have been forced to ask important questions about the mythical meaning and 
cultural identity within the complex mix of Greek and Etruscan populations found in 7th 
century Etruria. In many ways, the meaning would be greatly diminished if the user of 
the pot actually knew the artist, and if the artist’s actual name was Aristonothos.273 
So, not only is the signature of Aristonothos the earliest signature yet recorded, it is, 
typically for an artefact of its type, a singular instance of that signature. More 
significantly, it is apparently a singular instance of the name, ‘Aristonothos’. In Ancient 
Greece, kraters were vessels in which water and wine were mixed for symposia - this 
function, coupled with the narrative of the illustration and the compound idiosyncracy of 
the name produces speculation that the signature is a visual pun.  
                                                
272 Izzet, V. ‘Purloined Letters: The Aristonothos Inscription and Krater’ in Shefton, 
B.B., and Lomas, K. Greek identity in the western Mediterranean papers in honour of 
Brian Shefton. (Leiden: Brill, 2004) p195  
273 Pevnick, S. ‘Loaded Names, Artistic Identity, and Reading an Athenian Vase’, 
Classical Antiquity, Vol.29 (2010) Issue 2, p227 
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Scholarly work on the Aristonothos Krater reinforces Osbourne’s contention that 
signatures point to performative, artistic self-consciousness. Signatures don’t appear to 
have had a straight-edged function on Greek pots, and it is perhaps possible to see the 
‘dehiscence’ that Derrida describes operating clearly through them. There are, for 
instance, rare cases in which pottery carries two epoiesen signatures (band cups by 
Nikosthenes and Anakles; by Archikles and Glaukytes) - such signatures are thought to 
refer to partners in workshop ownership; to express a transfer of ownership at some level, 
or, as Matthew Robertson speculates: 
They might even be jokes: a bored painter putting names of any two of his companions to 
confuse the poor Etruscan who would be buying the cup. Indeed, jokes apart, are we 
perhaps trying to discern in the signatures on Greek vases a rationale which is not there? 
One starts with the expectation that there will have been some purpose in signing a vase; 
but a definable purpose would surely leave a detectable pattern and the signing practice 
on Greek pottery seems entirely haphazard….there might have been some commercial 
motive for the signature; but had it been so one would expect the usage to have been 
much more general and consistent.274 
Here, in brief, the signature - taken to be so consistent, coherent and expressive; direct 
and permanent - is found to be slippery, problematic, confusing and interruptive of 
expected logic. Scholars like Beazley dismissed signatures on Greek pots as the ‘least 
important’ aspect of them because they provide unreliable witness and were thought to 
evidence subjective whim.  
                                                
274 Robertson, M. ‘Epoiesen on Greek Vases: Other Considerations’, The Journal of 
Hellenic Studies, Vol.92 (1972) p182 
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5.1.4 CONFUSION & ROLE-VARIABILITY 
 
Signature indicates role variability in a different way. Not infrequently in art historical 
analyses of objects and images, confusions that arise when the purpose and character of 
names appearing in inscriptions is unclear. For example, the ‘pre-Byzantine’ mummy 
portraits associated with the Faiyum basin in Egypt are ‘unsigned’. Exceptionally, one of 
the Faiyum portraits in the collection of the Metropolitan Museum in New York, Portrait 
of the Boy Eutyches, carries an anomalous inscription painted into the yoke of the 
subject’s garment: 
the boy’s name (‘Eutyches, freedman of Kasanios’) seems indisputable: then follows 
either ‘son of Herakleides Evandros’ or ‘Herakleides, son of Evandros’. It is also unclear 
whether the ‘I signed’ at the end of the inscription refers to the painter or the portrait or to 
the manumission (act of freeing a slave) that would have been witnessed by Herakleides 
or Evandros. An artist’s signature would be unique in mummy portraits.275 
The fact that it should be unclear as to whether Herakleides/Evandros was the witness to 
an event, (which itself stands in close relation to the notion of a ‘speech act’), or was the 
artist who painted the portrait of Eutyches neatly illustrates the dilemma. Depending on 
the locus of the power assigned to Herakleides/Evadnros, ‘I signed’ might refer to 
making, (if the ‘artist’ is empowered and delimited by making); to witnessing, or to both 
simultaneously. Similarly, in the celebrated case of ‘Gislebertus’ at the Cathedral of 
Autun, there have been a series of confusions over who Gislebertus was, why his name 
appears and what he did - was he donor, sculptor or architect? If it can’t be decided 
                                                
275  The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York (2000 – 2013) Portrait of the Boy 
Euytches http://www.metmuseum.org/Collections/search-the-collections/100004780 
(accessed 26th March 2013). 
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whether the name ‘signed’ is that of an artist or a donor, it suggests that there is a degree 
of shared involvement in the process of signing, (so signature cannot, as Austin suggests, 
tether to source - there is no source that is entire or intact). When the artist is read 
critically and primarily as the descendent of individuated artisans who ‘make’, it is easy 
to overlook or forget the interplay of social inheritances that have contributed to the 
development of the role and rgar the formation of the ‘artist’ includes the non-physical 
acts of witnesses and donors as well as artisans. Examining the functional history of 
signatures provides a way to understand this. 
 
 
 
5.2 COLLECTING UNDER A SINGULAR SIGNATURE 
 
5.2.1 GISLEBERTUS 
 
If the signature on the Portrait of the Boy Eutyches alludes to an immanent confusion or 
symbiosis between artists and witnesses, the celebrated signature of Gislebertus on the 
tympanum of the 12th century Cathedral of St Lazare at Autun (Fig. 5) concerns a 
historically determined confusion about whether the presence of a signature testfies to the 
involvement of an artist or a donor. These contestations illustrate the possibility that the 
name attested to on  the Cathedral’s stone sculptures could be that of a donor which 
history has overwritten as that of an artist. Such an overwriting is contingent: when the 
figure of the artist is seen to be more important than the figure of the donor, in ‘hard’ 
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cases where the nature of the signature is ambiguous - as it is at Autun - the art historical 
tendency has been to construct the signature as that of an individual maker. The 
conventional lineage for the artist is then styled as a primarily anonymous artisanal 
heritage which is ‘reborn’ as the basis for the individuated, ‘creative’ artist. In 
conventional art histories, locating and naming the individual artist has been the guiding 
condition of the enquiry. Creativity is actively sought and located in an artist when 
readings of the physical evidence construe work as both exceptional and consistent, and 
this is what happened with the signature of Gislebertus, (‘exception’ and ‘consistency’ 
echo the masking assumption and operative function that Derrida figures in signature). 
This historically determined presumption in favour of the artist is true even for studies of 
signature that purport to be ‘scientific’ and proceed ahistorically. In his semiotic study of 
signatures, Gandelman, who styles the signature of Gislebertus as ‘non-indexical’ name, 
accepts without question the status of Gislebertus as ‘the artist who carved the marvellous 
sculptures of the portal’.276  In this, he follows a tradition of art historical scholarship that 
has, since the 19th century, recovered Gislebertus as an ‘artist’. 
 
The signatory inscription at Autun reads ‘Gislebertus hoc fecit’. It appears sandwiched 
between statements that refer to, and reinforce, the visual subjects of the tympanum 
which is concerned with themes of judgment and resurrection. Having been hidden for 
many years, it was uncovered in the mid-19th century after the removal of some 18th 
century plaster.277 The inscriptions were translated at this time by Abbé Devoucoux, a 
priest attached to the Cathedral, and the name ‘Gislebertus’ was accepted as that of a 
                                                
276 Gandelman, op. cit. p75 
277 See Ross, L. Artists of the Middle Ages, Greenwood Press, (2003), pp18-19 
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sculptor.278 The specificity of the time here is significant – the tendency to search for 
stylistic consistency in the carvings as the work of an individual ‘talent’, and to read the 
name as that of an artist, was in line with the priorities and conceptual assumptions of 
contemporaneous art historical connoisseurship. In the 1960s, Denis Grivot and George 
Zarnecki, a choirmaster at the cathedral and an art historian respectively, published an 
influential study – Gislebertus, sculpteur d’Autun – in which they restated the case for 
considering a group of carvings, which apparently bore strong stylistic similarities, as the 
work of one master: ‘Gislebertus’. Subsequently, André Malraux, the French Minister for 
Cultural Affairs at the time, labeled Gislebertus a ‘Romanesque Cezanne’.279  Elizabeth 
M.Polley, writing in Artforum in 1963, following an exhibition associated with Grivot 
and Zarnecki’s work, described the signature of Gislebertus as ‘self-glorifying’: 
Gislebertus is marked as a self-aware creator.280 
 
Considering the case of Gislebertus at Autun, Leslie Ross comments: 
many scholars have interpreted the inscription which names [Gislebertus] at Autun to be 
an indication of his so-called authorship of the work, whereas other scholars have argued 
that [Gislebertus] may not be the name of the artist but rather the name of an important 
patron of the church…the debates about this issue continue to the present day and 
primarily evolve from the fact that in general, very little biographical or documentary 
evidence exists about the majority of named or anonymous medieval artists. In other 
                                                
278 See Seidel, L. Legends in Limestone: Lazarus, Gislebertus and the Cathedral of 
Autun, University of Chicago, (1999), p7 
279 Anon., ‘Art: Romanesque Cezanne’ Time, Vol. LXXVII No. 10 (3rd March 1961) 
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,897696,00.html, (accessed 13th 
March 2013)  
280 Polley, E. M. ‘The sculptor of Autun’ Artforum (February 1963), pp23-6 
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words, we have no information at all about Gislebertus (as an artist) apart from his name 
on the tympanum at Autun.281 
In Legends in Limestone, Seidel considers those claims that work to establish Gislebertus 
as an artist alongside historic claims and indications designed to establish the presence of 
relics belonging to St Lazarus on site at Autun. That the ‘fixity’ of the guarantee 
promised by signatory inscriptions should reveal ambiguity in the context of Cathedral 
sculptures dedicated to honoring a biblical figure whose resurrection not only prefigures 
that of Christ, but leaves an empty tomb - an empty monument, an enigmatic paraph - is 
aptly ‘Derridean’. Lazarus is ‘undead’, brought back to life, in-between, neither one thing 
nor the other, just like signature itself. 
 
Seidel contends that the peculiarity of the ‘Gislebertus’ signature has concentrated studies 
of the building on the recovery of one great, artistic individual personality rather than on 
the nature of the ‘architectural ensemble’: no comparable cathedral has such a signature 
‘signatory’ inscription, so it is seen to represent some kind of beacon illuminating the 
Dark Ages. In noting this, she repeats the criticism Panofsky makes of the Arnolfini 
signature - that it attracts undue attention, and overshadows everything else. The fact that 
the signature should exert such a gravitational pull is itself significant. The signature, 
appears under the feet of the figure of Christ, who is enclosed in a ‘medallion-like motif’: 
(It) calls to mind the shallow modeling and discrete imagery of contemporary seals, wax 
impressions of which were attached to medieval charters as signs of an individual’s 
authority. Such miniature reliefs provided guarantees of the authenticity of documents by 
attesting to the presence of key witnesses at a given act. As legal instruments, seals 
                                                
281 Ross, op. cit. p19 
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straddle the boundaries between civil functions and clerical activities. The seal-like 
allusion of the Autun Christ would have reminded contemporaries that judgment was part 
of both spiritual and worldy realms.282 
Seidel’s reference to ‘seals’ is augmented with pictorial illustrations that emphasize the 
commonality of form she perceives between them and the Autun tympanum as a 
signature for the building. Her interest in linking ‘artistic’ signatures to legal instruments, 
which also informs her work on the Arnolfini Portrait, is in evidence. Rubin calls to 
attention the common ground connecting seals to coins in the context of establishing a 
history for artists’s signatures as ‘signposts of invention’.283 The intimate and intricate 
connections between signatures, seals and coins which involve authority, religion, 
finance as well as issues of faith and trust, are embedded in Medieval culture and 
constitute a field of enquiry in themselves. 
 
Seidel’s reading of the Autun tympanum depicts ‘Gislebertus’ not as the simple signature 
of an individual sculptor, but as a complex, polymanual, plurivocal point of collection for 
the whole building: she demonstrates signature working in a Derridean manner. In the 
Cathedral’s architectural and symbolic scheme, the name ‘Gislebertus’ is one element. 
She suggests, for example, that its appearance in a ‘stone charter’ at Autun could be part 
of ‘the eponymic strategy of medieval ancestor remembrance’ which was designed to 
give credence to the building and the relics it purported to hold.284 Seidel says that those 
academic treatments of the signature at Autun that treat it as an artist’s signature do not 
take sufficient account of the breadth of conventions associated with Medieval naming 
                                                
282 Seidel, op. cit. p11-12 
283  Rubin, op. cit. 
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practices which included affiliating dynasties and donations with ‘future’ descendents by 
way of inscription, (again, the Derridean aspects of this are difficult to ignore). She also 
says that records of events, (specifically mentioning the consecration of buildings),  often 
occurred ‘in conjunction with the arrival of the important individuals whose names would 
figure prominently in the written record of the event’ and that in these circumstances, 
artisans and laborers are much less prominent where they are not undocumented 
altogether.285Reading Gislebertus as a ‘sculptor’ is nothing more than a ‘romantic 
conjecture’ that relies on modern conventions of what a signature is and does. In Seidel’s 
opinion, Gislebertus was a donor whose relevance cannot be extricated from the 
production of the building by an ensemble, not an artisan whose physical trace is 
evidenced in a coherent, stylistic hand. The inscription which names him is located in a 
sculptural tympanum that acts as a signature for the whole building. As a signature, the 
tympanum specifies the particularity of the building including the benefits and donations 
which brought it into existence as well as providing a general indication of its ‘holy’ 
character. The appearance of the legend Gislebertus hoc fecit within the Cathedral’s 
tympana can be figured as a signature within a signature, a mise en abyme. 
 
 
5.2.2 ACADEMIC INVENTION 
 
The imputations of Grivot and Zarnecki which collect around the signatory inscription at 
Autun flow from the mainstream of art historical practice at a time when the prevalent 
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ideology sought to recover, classify and construct individual artists. The art historical 
method of Beazley is also interesting to consider in relation to the instrumental, academic 
construction of signature. As already mentioned, Beazley dismissed signatures as the 
least important things on the Greek pots he studied. A few Greek potters are known by 
name via the signatures they applied to artefacts, but the majority of pots are unsigned 
and attributed to stylistically derived, but otherwise ‘unknown’, artists: for example, the 
so-called ‘Berlin Painter’.286 Beazley, who established the Berlin Painter, studied 
unsigned vases by tracing drawings directly from pottery and overlaying the tracings on 
each other in order to compare figures and lines.287 Essentially, he constructed unified 
‘signatures’ from his tracings and his method is typical of the type of scientific or 
analytical attribution that characterised the late 19th century art history.288 The influence 
of Darwinian taxonomical ‘typologies’, (of natural history, in fact), is clear in his 
approach and their role is related to that which Smith sees naturalism playing in the 
Renaissance generation of scientific epistemology. For Beazley, art studies and 
archaeology should follow scientific lines of enquiry and practice rather than establish 
them. Beazley’s labels have crystallized into ‘official’ names denoting single artistic 
entities whose stylistic particularities determine them and his method, with its reliance on 
tracing, necessarily privileges iconography as the measurable trace of hand (thus, the 
                                                
286  At least 33 vases are attributed to this painter, see: 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/artifactBrowser?redirect=true&object=Vase&field=
Painter&value=Berlin+Painter, (accessed 11th September, 2013)  
287 Beazley Archive, http://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/archive/history.htm (accessed 19th 
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work of the painter is preferred over that of the potter). Signature is sought as stylistic 
consistency over a series of artefacts and fragments. 
 
Pevnick states that Beazley’s professed dismissal of ‘names’ as the ‘least important thing 
about an artist’ was methodologically important for him because ‘by grouping vases on 
the basis of internal stylistic consistency, he ensured the coherence of his attributions.’289 
Beazley wanted to assert his name, his signature, pre-eminently and names were 
problematic because they could potentially evidence a particularity that did not conform 
to his research. The irregularity and apparent unpredictability of signatures troubled 
Beazley and he accounted for inconsistency in signatory practice in terms of the unstable 
personal preference of the artist, whose mood, temperament and compliance to ‘fashion’ 
underlay the decision as to whether or not the artefact was signed. Inconsistency and 
‘unreliability’ accompany written signatures on Greek Pottery, as does the incidence of 
name-squatting (the term is used in  preference to ‘forgery’ or ‘counterfeiting’): 
Neer gives the example of the Triptolemos Painter, ‘the ancient forger’, who twice signed 
as Douris despite not painting in a true ‘Dourian’ style. To this we might add the 
complicated case of the name ‘Polygnotos’, famously borne by the celebrated wall-
painter of Thasos, this name is also signed on pots attributed to 3 different hands – 
Polygnotos, the Lewis Painter (Polygnotos II) and the Nausicaa Painter. 290 
Here the unstable signature is problematic for objective categorisation, although, 
according to Pevnick, a growing field of scholarship in the area operates to bring a 
modicum of consistency to that which Beazley found so irregular. Signatures are 
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bothersome and irregular when they are taken to indicate a stable, creative individual. 
When that imperative is dropped, they have much more significance. So not only have 
signatures been understood to occupy strategic placements that enhance the interpretation 
of the iconography, they can be understood to establish a ‘marketplace persona’ and they 
can be understood to contain clues to the ethnicity of the signatory.  
 
Like Beazley - and about the same time - the Renaissance specialist Bernard Berenson 
‘recovered’ the Reniassance artists ‘Alunno di Domenico’ and ‘Amico di Sandro’. 
Writing about Berenson in a biography of the art dealer and Tate benefactor, Sir Joseph 
Duveen, with whom Berenson had a strategic relationship as adviser, S. N. Behrman 
says: 
In Amico di Sandro, [Berenson] created an artist who was more consistent, more nearly 
perfect, more distinctive and more readily recognisable than any actual artist. This human 
artefact of Berenson’s was in itself a work of art; it grew in beauty as, over the years, he 
increased the man’s production. Amico got better and better; he never had a lapse; he 
seemed immune to the declensions that afflict other artists. His market value in America 
went up steadily.291 
As an historian and marketable expert, Berenson valued consistency and distinction. In 
other words, he valued the core qualities that give signature its paradoxical enigma as a 
divided seal, (it is simultaneously the same and unique). Behrman recounts that whilst 
later documentary evidence proved that the work of ‘Alunno di Domenico’ could be 
reattributed to one artist, the ‘single hand’ of Bartolommeo di Giovanni, the work of 
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‘Amico di Sandro’, was reattributed to three: Sandro Botticelli, Domenico Ghirlandio and 
Filippino Lippi. This reattribution was executed by Berenson himself, who, according to 
Behrman, felt the artist he had created was too perfect.292 
 
 
5.2.3 ANONYMITY AND THE ST BARTHOLOMEW ALTARPIECE 
 
Using a single name or label aids the cartographic process of colonising history and 
culture. On this point, Neil McGregor’s Walter Neurath lecture A Victim of Anonymity in 
1993, is instructive.293 In it, McGregor recalled the discussions about which great artists 
should be commemorated in inscriptions on the stairwell of the newly instituted 
Sainsbury Wing. During those discussions, the ‘Master of the St Bartholomew 
Altarpiece’, a 15th century German artist whose only known work is in the National 
Gallery’s collection, was (initially) neglected. McGregor puts this neglect down to the 
Master’s ‘anonymity’- which he interpets as the lack of a personal name. He notes that 
for art produced during the Renaissance, for Northern - specifically German - work, there 
is a relative dearth of contracts relating to commissions, as well as a lack of signatures on 
the paintings themselves: ‘Most of the paintings are called - in desperation - quite simply 
after themselves, by what the Germans call a Notname, an emergency name.’294 As a 
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result, McGregor suggests that without a ‘real name’, for the Master of the St 
Bartholomew Altarpiece: 
…all kinds of celebrity are precluded. An anonymous artist, however distinguished, 
cannot enter the pantheons so eagerly constructed in the 19th century….an anonymous 
artist cannot become a household name. He or she cannot become part of that communal 
notion of culture so widely shared…295 
McGregor is of the opinion that because the name of the Master of the St Bartholomew 
Altarpiece is impersonal, it prevents the artist being established as a personality and this 
leads to (his) significance being overlooked. There is, though, no intrinsic reason that an 
‘impersonal’ name or label cannot be established as the signifier of a famous artist - 
nicknames and names locating the artist instrumentally in superscripted (and in this sense 
impersonal) geographies, traditions and studios are not infrequent. The names of many 
Renaissance artists include toponymic references - examples include Andrea da 
Pontedera, better known as Andrea Pisano, (‘Pisano’ indicates his assocation with Pisa); 
Jan Van Eyck, known to Vasari as Giovanni da Bruggia (‘da Bruggia’ refers to Brussels); 
Marc’ Antonio Bolognese (Bologna), also known as Raimondi and by the surname De’ 
Franci, which was acquired from Francesco Francia as his most ‘gifted’ pupil. Indeed, as 
dynamis and prosthetic extension, signature parlays personality into ‘impersonality’ and 
is observed (in art history) as having a ‘trademark’ function. 
 
More significant in the constructive anonymity of this Master is the fact that the 
altarpiece exists without supporting ephemera and is (his) only known work: there are no 
other works or documents with which to generate an ‘internal’ countersignature, 
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(comparison to works believed to have been made by the same person or workshop). The 
‘artist’ appears to be coextensive with one unique object. The signatory split indicated by 
the attachment of the word ‘Master’ to the altarpiece brings with it the possiblity of 
figuring its substrate as an ‘enigmatic paraph’ which the artist-function indicated by 
‘Master’ countersigns. Construing the altarpiece as the work of an artist, rather than as a 
singular object has certain implications: what ‘Master’ adds to ‘St Bartholomew 
Altarpiece’ is not so much a reflection on the quality of craftsmanship or personality of 
the artist, nor on the processes of the workshop that produced it, but the potential for 
future discoveries and attributions that can accumulate under the name, however 
‘impersonal’. Credited to an artistic entity - faceless though it may be - the painting 
assumes a penumbra of shadowy others, whether or not they are (still or ever were) 
extant. Adding ‘Master’, a human inflection, to ‘St Bartholomew Altarpiece’ opens a 
stent to the recovery – physical or otherwise - of what is also assumed to have existed. It 
adds a degree of Derridean spectrality. As a label complicit in the process of signature - 
seeming to fix position through a search for others - ‘Master of the St Bartholomew 
Altarpiece’ does not just designate an object but a germinal cultural territory. 
 
One of the important things McGregor brings into focus is the extent to which anonymity 
is, and has been, both a processual consequence of material practice, (he notes that 
signatures and paper labels could have been attached to (lost) frames), and a cultural 
determination.  In the course of his text, he partially and incidentally reverses the normal 
distinction between artist and artisan: 
Because of the unparalleled amplitude of the Sèvres archives, the most minor flower 
painter at the Sèvres porcelain factory is listed and studied, his biography published and 
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his propensity to bad language recorded, while virtually nothing has appeared in English 
on the artists of Cologne at the end of the 15th C, who are among the greatest painters of 
their generation in Europe.296 
Though he reiterates a classic opposition that pits the ‘greatest painters of their 
generation’ against the ‘most minor flower painter’, who seems to be - in McGregor’s 
view - almost unjustly documented, it is interesting to note the importance placed on 
individual traceability within the context of the Sèvres pottery. If artisans are thought of, 
and presented as, anonymous, it is not just because there is a lack of documentation to use 
in recovering artisan individuals, but partly because academic art historical treatments 
remainder them. Their signatures are styled as less authorial ‘maker’s marks’ – they are 
seen to lack the expressive capacity that a ‘modern’ signature indicates and is seen to 
require. During the Renaissance, specialization in certain forms of craft, (principally 
panel painting and sculpture), involved the establishment and assignation of  ‘creativity’ 
and ‘originality’ to painters and sculptors over artisans engaged in the production of other 
artefacts (porcelain painters and goldsmiths, for example). If artisans were ‘left behind’ 
by artists it was because they were bound to, or dominated by, the materials and 
techniques demanded by their crafts. 
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5.2.4 LANDO Di PIETRO 
 
To return to the signature of Giselbertus at Autun. Seidel understands that studies 
promoting Gilsebertus as a self-aware, self-indicating - if not self-glorifying - artist 
retrospectively promote an ideological agenda designed to venerate individual ‘creativity’ 
in the face of what can be recovered about systems of Medieval thought. One of the 
reasons that the name at Autun has attracted attention turns on the fact that, dating from 
the 12th century, it looks like it could be an ‘early’ signature that anticipates the assertion 
of pride in personal talent by the ‘great artists’ of the Renaissance and is thus indicative 
of a singular ‘creative’ identity in embryo. The academic methods and desires of Beazley, 
Berenson and McGregor demonstrate an inclination towards establishing convenient, 
singular points of collection (‘artists’ or ‘personalities’) using epithets they have devised 
and have a degree of control over: Beazley, especially, re-authors objects in this way. It 
suits an academic agenda invested in ‘the creative individual’ to establish signatures as 
axioms of artistic self-assertion against anonymous craft, because they can be made to 
look like prima facie declarations of pride in creative achievement. 
 
Rubin prefaces her essay, Signposts of Invention, with a description of Early Renaissance 
signatory practice: 
Artists’s names were regularly inscribed on the religious works which made up a major 
part of their production and which could be used as offerings to God… These are like 
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subscriptions put on manuscripts by their scribes, they are not to be read as claims to 
authorship. They are supplications for prayer.297 
It is only when they are allied to naturalism and invention later in the Renaissance that, 
according to Rubin, signatures mark authorship as creative, secular and public 
communication. In Rubin’s opinion, when signatures are of a sacramental nature 
designed to channel Divine favour towards the beseeching individual, (who happens to 
have made the work), authorship is not involved. However, bearing in mind that personal 
expression is commonly held to be vital to the narrative of the creative author or artist, 
the parallel possibility that ‘votive’ inscriptions have personal and expressive aspects 
(which might not be ‘creative’ as is generally understood) is interesting.  
 
For example, the case of Lando di Pietro, cited by Smith in The Body of the Artisan, 
illustrates a collusion between ‘votive’ practice and technical ambition.298 A sculpture in 
wood, Lando’s Crucifixion (1338) (Fig. 6) was damaged by the bombing of Siena in 1944 
and split to reveal two inscriptions inserted by the artist into the head of Christ (Fig. 7): 
One states ‘The Lord God made it possible for Landro di Pietro of Siena to carve this 
crucifix in wood in the similitude of the real Jesus to remind people of the passion of 
Jesus Christ Son of God, and of the Virgin Mary, therefore you true and holy cross render 
the said Lando to God’. The prayer asks the Virgin, St John the Evangelist, St John the 
Baptist, Mary Magdalene and all the saints, ‘men and women’, to recommend Lando to 
God. He completes his prayer with the statement ‘The year of our Lord 1337 [n.s. 1338] 
this figure was completed in the similitude of Jesus Christ crucified Son of God the living 
and true. And it is he one must adore and not this wood’…The second inscription, which 
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Lando rolled up and placed in Christ’s nostril, repeats the date and reads. ‘Jesus Christ 
through your mercy let the soul of Landro di Pietro, who made this crucifix, be 
recommended.’299 
Referring to a 16th century text, De Arte Crucifixi, Smith says that Lando used naturalism 
to improve the efficacy of his devotions, in this it is a creative act.300 However, the 
apologetic Lando steps back from any creative pride he felt in achieving a ‘similitude of 
Jesus Christ’ in wood: the naturalism of the Crucifixion is so successful and potentially 
efficacious, it seems he must declare it in his prayer. The taboos on transgressing the 
boundary between representation and ‘supernatural’ artifice, with its long entanglement 
with deceitful and sacrilegious mimesis, were still in play for Lando. His hidden 
signature checks these taboos in a move that is at once an admission of artifice and a 
prayer, an appeal for special recognition as well as a humbling apology. When Lando 
wrote the letters he stuffed into Christ’s head, he engaged in a private act of devotion and 
confession (personal expression) that was never meant for public display. The 
circumstances of the signature are markedly different to that of Van Eyck’s Arnolfini 
Portrait with which it might be seen to share a signatory realism. It is also different from 
publically available votive inscriptions.301 What better example of the Phaedrean scroll, a 
deferred, hidden, heart-felt interruption of presence, than Lando’s Cruxifixion? Is 
Lando’s votive inscription not a claim on authorship and a supplication? It is worth 
recalling Derrida’s insistence that signing is effected through différance, the signatory is 
absent to himself no matter what intent motivates the signature.  
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The example Rubin uses to propogate the difference between creative, authorial 
signatures and ‘subscriptions’ is the signatory inscription found on Pacino di Bonaguida’s 
Crucifixion Polyptych (1315-1320) which details the name of a donor alongside the only 
known signature of the artist. Rubin cautions against marking the appearance of Pacino’s 
name as an indication of authorship, stating: 
…such a combination is not uncommon. The votive nature of these work offerings made 
dates a very important part of recollection and testimonial. These ‘signatures’ are 
probably best understood as ‘undersigning’, and can be related to the collective 
‘subscription’ made by parties putting their name to a document.302 
Does this mean that the Polyptych was not ‘authored’ (in joint enterprise)? Is an such an 
intercession necessarily removed from the sphere of authorship? What removes it? The 
public nature of the declaration? If the signature of Pacino is not to be understood as that 
of an ‘author’ marking an individual creative involvement in the realisation of the image, 
neither can it be differentiated from the signature of the donor by anything other than the 
empirical attribution of his contribution to generating the physical form of the altarpiece, 
(Pacino is thought to have run a small workshop, so it is unlikely that he was personally 
responsible for every element of the manufacture of the work – his signature, therefore, 
cannot be taken to pertain to his hand). Can the collection of ‘undersignings’ not also be 
read against the formula ‘3 + n’ which Derrida expounds in Ltd Inc…, making Pacino’s 
signature as effective as ‘Sarl’/Searle’s? Supplication precedes, or at least humbly 
modifies, ‘invention’, and again, the inscription of an artist’s name can perhaps be read as 
having a degree of equivalence with that of a (non-manufacturing) donor. 
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5.3 INVENTION 
 
Invention is a power usually credited to artists in generative opposition to the ‘copybook’ 
production of ‘anonymous’ artisans and icon-painters, thus Rubin uses invention to read 
Renaissance signatures as essentially different to supplications and subscriptions.  If, 
under historical analysis, the inscription on Pacino’s Crucifixion suggests that the donor, 
(indicated as ‘Simon Presbytr’), directed the artist to paint the altarpiece in a form that 
(more or less) adhered to ecclesiastical conventions (i.e. if Pacino is not seen to have 
‘invented’ the painting), despite such a direction and such conventions, the fact remains 
that the artist’s signature is approximately equivalent in form, placement and effect to 
that of the donor. In this sense Pacino, who was contemporary with Lando, has a similar 
status before God and before the congregation as does the donor: if, as an artist, he is an 
artisan (not an ‘author’), he is a literate artisan of rank, not ‘merely’ a hired, directed and 
anonymous hand. However this equivalence is not an equivalence seen to have been won 
through ‘invention’. 
 
Rubin uses Pacino’s Crucifixion as a control against which an ‘inventive approach’ is 
seen to be demonstrated by Michelangelo, Lippi, Donatello and Titian.  For these later 
artists, ‘inventiveness’ is characterised by personal boldness, (Michelangelo reputedly 
caused ‘affront’ with his signature on the Pietà); by reflexive reinscription, (this same 
signature of Michelangelo paid ‘homage’ to the signature on Judith Slaying Holfernes 
(c.1450) by Donatello); or by technical mastery and compostional novelty, (on the 
sculpture of Judith Slaying Holfernes, Donatello’s signature draws attention to his ability 
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to make stone embody malleability). Lippi’s signature on The Virgin Mary Adoring the 
Child (Adoration in the Forest) (c.1459) is inscribed trompe l’oeil on an axe, acting, in 
Rubin’s words as a ‘patent’ for the unusual and much copied composition. Thus, if 
Pacino’s signature is not triumphantly won through ‘invention’, what enables it to realise 
a place on the Crucifixion? Is it an equivalence that proceeds on the basis of social status, 
and if so, how does that affect the view of him as unauthorial? Does his signature indicate 
a ‘bald’ ennoblization acquired independently of any emergent virtuosity? In that case, 
can artists be seen to have been ennobilized (purely or mainly) on the basis of ‘talent’ or 
genius, as they are in narratives that descend from the Renaissance? 
 
 
5.3.1 ARTISANAL SELF-AWARENESS 
 
As epistemological endeavour, invention plays a role in Smith’s assessment of the 
importance of Renaissance naturalism to the emergence of science. When she cites the 
case of Lando in The Body of The Artisan, she does so in the course of setting up a 
parallel between representational naturalism and artisanal treatises. In comparing the 
naturalism of Lando’s Crucifix to ‘magical’ instructions in De arte crucifix, she 
establishes an intimacy between naturalism and efficacy on which foundation, she argues, 
experimental science developed.303 Divinely ordained, Byzantine icons (which historically 
and culturally precede Lando’s Crucifix) were considered to be efficacious in terms of the 
constancy to type they demonstrated. Efficacy is not a quality that is necessarily 
                                                
303  Smith, op. cit. p11 
  218 
described by ‘naturalism’, however, for Smith, it is the naturalism of Lando’s Crucifix 
that provides the ‘first angle of access’ to use in exploring what ‘art making meant to an 
artisan’. Inventive in terms of its opposition to stylistic formulae, it is naturalism that is 
the conduit for such meaning. Smith’s theory of ‘autopic authority’ binds naturalism to 
the precise technical and honest observation of the artist. With the principle of ‘autopic 
authority’ in hand, a principle which relies on the notion of a ‘documentary signature’, 
Smith assesses the relationship that manually recorded observations and experiments 
have to the progression of science. She makes the case for considering the growth in 
individual, artisanal ‘self-consciousness’ to have been driven by the desire to discover 
and report, and calls for a revision of the notion that science has been theoretically led 
from ‘above’, (that is separate from the practical knowledge derived through experience 
and the artisanal application of skills).304 
 
Smith concentrates on three moments characterized by ‘most intense artisanal self-
assertion’ in collusion with naturalism: 15th century Flanders; the southern German 
imperial cities in the 16th century; and the 17th century Dutch Republic.305 Within this set 
of historical and geographical co-ordinates, she puts the case for considering the 
emergence of ‘a new type of person who began to call himself a new philosopher’.306 
Importantly, she allies this ‘new type of person’ to the emergence of a new type of artist, 
and in doing so, she accepts and promotes the idea that the function of the artist is 
heterogenous. Smith considers the 13th century a time of notable significance in the 
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development of the artist on account of a growing ‘self-assertion’, which she interprets as 
a general awareness of (personal) value, determined economically, epistemologically, 
culturally and socially, rather than as an assertion of artistic pride and achievement. To 
some extent, in this respect, she reiterates what Camille says, and she identifies the 13th 
century as a time when there was an increasing emphasis placed on the worth of an 
artwork for the artistic skill it displayed rather than on the cost of its materials. So, for 
Smith, the acquisition and practice of skill is intimately connected to the development of 
proto-virtuosic difference and individuation, a connection generated in and reflected by 
naturalistic representation. Naturalism began to characterize the work of panel painters 
like Van Eyck because representational activity was directed by the desire to imitate 
(‘invent’) nature and not by the necessity of reproducing circumscribed iconographic 
styles. The locus of the ‘model’ in naturalism is ‘real life’ (to be determined volitionally 
by the ‘intact’ individual) not ‘pattern’ (fixed according to social institutions, rules and 
customs). 
 
 
5.3.2 THE ANXIETY OF ORIGINALS 
 
Somewhat differently, Christopher S. Wood looks at the production of Medieval art in 
terms of substitutionality. The thrust of his argument is that in Medieval culture, the class 
of artefacts that transmogrified into modern artworks were mutually substitutional. In 
other words, within a broadly defined ‘chain of referential artefacts’, one similar thing 
could very much stand in for another similar thing without any loss of referential 
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capacity, thus the act of ‘copying’ was looser in Medieval culture than it was 
subsequently.  More importantly, copying was not predicated on the anxiety of originals, 
an anxiety which is related to historicity: history renders the object ‘non-fungible’. Wood 
believes that the technology of print reproduction tightened the scope of copying by 
notionally permitting ‘perfect exchangeability’ on a symmetrical like-for-like basis. This 
had the consequence of acknowledging the non-fungibile exception of an original as the 
print’s other: ‘The concept of the original only comes into focus through the lens of its 
opposite, the perfect replica.’307 According to Wood, it was the transitional 
substitutionality of the print edition that allowed the notion of the non-substitutional, 
authored original to emerge. The paradox for signature is that a device which functioned 
to guarantee a ‘forgery’ - a second-hand image - became a device to signify what was 
‘authentic’ (notionally ‘first’). It is perhaps possible to argue that in relation to prints, the 
habits that lead to authorship ‘emerge’ prosaically, from the pragmatic demands of 
material culture. Goldsmiths, whose skill in working metal led their involvement with 
engraving plates for prints, marked their work in order to verify the integrity of the 
material, so the possibility that engraved plates carried monograms largely because 
goldsmiths routinely marked their work cannot be ignored, and the reason goldsmiths’ 
work carries monograms is to guarantee material quality. 
 
The Derridean signature - as lowest common denominator authorship, (an aide-memoire) 
- seems to allow for the emergence of ‘authorship’ from print culture at a low level, as an 
unthought transfer of habit. With this in mind, it is possible to see artisanal ‘self-
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assertion’ as a deviation from singularity which results in dispensible or replaceable 
artefacts. Thus signature (if it marks self-assertion) is predicated on an anxiety of 
originals. As such, it links with Battersby’s conception of genius as the principle of a 
neurotic ‘regal’ male, who, urbanized, must attempt to embody and guarantee the 
hereditary genius which has been dislocated and moved from place. Signature is used in 
attempts to address the anxiety which accompanies originals because it appears to permit 
the assertion that the (dislocated) signatory can be bound and conform to a deviant 
orignating source (which is not evident in the typology of the object/image).  
 
 
5.3.3 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
There is a further caveat to bear in mind reading Smith’s account of artisanship, and it 
relates to a confusion between ‘self-assertion’ and ‘self-consciousness’. The quality of 
being ‘self-conscious’ does not necessarily emerge with naturalism or individuation, 
although that assumption is often taken for granted. It is difficult to sustain the notion that 
the iconographic artisan is any less self-conscious or aware (of what the representational 
activity is designed to achieve) because naturalism is not the organizing idiom and the 
individual is not ‘signed’. Indeed, when issues of religious faith are involved, perhaps the 
reverse is true.  Smith says that artisans were ‘forced’ to become self-conscious, ‘to make 
explicit claims for their skill and power’ by the changing nature of commerce.308 She says 
that panel painters asserted confidence in, and awareness of, their personal ‘unique’ skill 
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with a signature, using the signature in conjunction with naturalism to make a link 
between ‘artistic’ self-consciousness, epistemological endeavour and self-motivated 
individuation.309 
 
This link ought not to be naturalized. Signature, individuation and artisanal self-
consciousness do not necessarily have to be yoked together: Camille’s work shows that 
self-consciousness can be indicated as a social or ‘class’ phenomenon. Like Camille, 
Smith believes that the opportunities for free trade beyond guilds (tacitly, beyond 
monasteries and churches also) were a necessary circumstance for developing artisanal 
self-consciousness. Unlike Camille, who traces an emergent self-consciousness in the 
work of medieval illuminators through work in which they identify themselves with 
(other) socially marginalized people (beggars, prostitutes), Smith thoroughly integrates 
self-consciousness with competition for patronage. Camille does not figure self-
consciousness as the result of (pre-Capitalist) ‘aspiration’ as does Smith.  Camille’s work 
demonstrates that self-consciousness does not necessarily equate to individuation, 
complicating the picture for theorists who look to signature for the tracks of the artist 
emerging as an autonomous creative individual. 
 
Both Camille and Smith remark on the importance of the written word in catalysing 
change round about the 13th century in a culture that had been, to that time, 
predominantly oral. Again referring to ‘intense artisanal self-awareness’, Smith says that, 
with reference to the Early Renaissance, ‘the number of artisans who combined craft with 
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authorship at this time is striking’.310 She strikes up a sympathy between these two types 
of artisanal behaviour - naturalistic representation and the production of written treatises - 
and it is interesting to note that the treatises are described as the result of ‘authorship’, (a 
term debarred by Rubin even for later paintings). Smith discusses Cennino Cennini’s Il 
Libero Dell’Arte, a manual for painters written in the 14th century, in association with the 
interest in nature of the Carrara family in Padua who were Cennini’s patrons.311 She says: 
Cennini’s treatise signals both a self-aware artist concerned with justifying the 
mechanical arts and a potent interest in nature at the Carrara court: which was 
undoubtedly related to their own precarious and ‘unnatural’ hold on power. The Carrara 
family had risen through the communal government of the city, from which they had 
subsequently seized power, with the result that they possessed political legitimacy neither 
from pope nor emperor. Instead, they based their authority on the language of the jurists 
at the university in Padua who claimed that government must imitate nature.312 
The implication is that self-awareness and an expanded notion of naturalism (including 
an interest in what was to become ‘natural history’) were linked in the Early Renaissance 
to the wresting of political power from established lines of inheritance. In this respect, if 
we do accept Smith’s contention that the (effective) signature is a mark denoting both 
artisanal self-consciousness and naturalistic representation, it is simultaneously a mark of 
political interruption and ambition, rather than (‘autonomous') ‘creativity’. ‘Science’ 
relegates metaphysical authority, which passes ecclesiastically or regally - thus avoiding 
‘nature’ - in the face of an apparent objectivity. If it is politically contrived, Cennini’s 
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artisanal ‘self-awareness’ (bolstering, if not serving, the Carrara family’s position) is not 
generated purely by an internal or personal satisfaction with the mastering of naturalistic 
representation. 
 
 
5.3.4 RING-FENCED KNOWLEDGE 
 
Cennini’s book is a technical manual and the etymological relevance of  ‘manual’ is 
obvious. In the preface to her translation of Il Libero dell’Arte, Christina J Herringham, 
locates it within a technical history that stretches back to Theophratus in the fourth 
century BC, and includes, as precedents and parallels Russian podlinniki, (manuals of 
painting relating to the production of icons); the Roman Leyden Papyrus found at Thebes 
(which is a recipe book for pigments dating to the fourth century AD); a Byzantine 
manuscript from Lucca dating from the eighth century AD and the 12th century Mappae 
Clavicula.313 According to Herringham, the ‘alchemical’ industrial practices expounded 
in all of these treatises, demonstrate an uninterrupted lineage in the conceptualization of 
trade practices ‘from the Roman Empire through the Carolingian period and onwards’.314  
With this in mind, it appears that if the function of the artist changes, in Classical, 
Byzantine, Medieval and Renaissance eras, to a great extent, certain (craft) techniques 
and materials did not. It is the fact of committing this knowledge to the written word that 
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is pertinent. The technical nature of Cennini’s book is worth bearing in mind when 
considering how ‘authorship’ works in terms of iconography. What Cennini does in his 
manual is set down common practices, formulae and methods - is his work a more 
‘authored’ work of individual ‘imagination’ than the iconography it was designed to 
assist in the production of? In the light of this comparison, can the ‘copybook’ work of 
medieval artists be regarded as less authored than the work of later artists? Is Cennini’s 
authorship best understood as a claim to ring-fence knowledge, rather than to originate it? 
Can it be implicated in the narrative of individuation through ‘invention’? 
 
Kostylo argues that the general expansion in the amount of technical literature concerned 
with the mechanical arts which was produced in the 15th and 16th centuries had a 
significant role to play in separating craft knowledge from the hand: 
Traditionally, technical and craft knowledge was transmitted orally through 
apprenticeship systems or handed down through families, from one generation to the 
next. With the advancement of craft technologies and the expansion of trade investment, 
however, such modes of transmission no longer seemed sufficient and artisans, 
entrepreneurs and investors began to rely on printed industrial manuals in order to learn a 
trade. Changing technologies pressured craftsmen to acquire new skills, many of which 
they could gain or improve by reading books, while their wealthy and literate but 
inexperienced patrons wanted to learn how to maximize the profitability of their 
investments.315 
Her understanding links the narrative of invention and originality (‘new skills’ and 
‘changing technologies’) to entrepreneurship, profitability and ‘investment’. In this order, 
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a manual like Cennini’s is authored not only because its physical form in writing allows it 
to be separated from the fabric of the commonplace and the covert continuum of oral 
transmission, but because it advances and disseminates knowledge of new skills and 
technologies, resulting in profit. Within her rhetoric of market-driven expediency, 
Kostylo acknowledges the role that this kind of technical literature has in narrowing ‘the 
gap between cultures of learning and artisanal craft production’.316 In setting technical 
knowledge in writing, Cennini effects a split, which allows him to sign common 
knowledge as an author, (ultimately instituting it as the intellectual property of an 
individual). Broadly, read as a separation of technical knowledge from the hand and 
cultures of oral transmission, the production of artisan manuals run parallel to the 
denudation of the script, the displacement of materiality and the emergence of the artist 
against the object: it involves the acquistion of privilege by individuals. 
 
 
5.3.5 COURTIERS & TERMINOLOGY 
 
Seidel’s alliance of Van Eyck’s Arnolfini signature to his civic status has been 
considered, as has the notion that Pacino’s signature constructs an equivalence between 
the artist and the donor. Likewise, Smith allies the production of technical manuals in the 
context of Renaissance naturalism to the diversion of political power and the 
reformulation of social status for artisans. Cennini himself points out that ‘…painting on 
panels is the proper employment of a gentleman, and that, with velvet on his back, he 
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may do what he pleases.’317 Such a view styles the painter as a gentleman, and the 
acquisition of an elevated social status exerts a pull on painting away from other artisanal 
practices.318 If Pacino signs his name parallel to that of the donor, implying that they are 
both equivalent before God (and the congregation), and yet, as Rubin believes, his 
signature is not an indication of authorship, the aquistion or declaration of social status  
cannot be held to be delivered by artistic accomplishments or ‘invention’. Cennini, in the 
same period, indicates the painter parallel to the ‘gentleman’, i.e. a high status individual, 
with literary interests and abilities. The talents of the gentleman are profiled by his social 
status and they are read as immanent in such a superior individual. Pursuant to that, 
Cennini prefaces Il Libero dell’Arte by saying that (the best) painters are those who work 
without (primarily) desiring financial reward, and he mentions the habits (enthusiasm, 
reverence, obedience, constancy) that artists ought to cultivate. As with the religious 
edicts that governed the production of art in the Byzantine period, the personal habits and 
behaviour of the artist in developing the practice of painting are important - the proper 
approach to production is an internalized, ‘invisible’ attitude (or self-consciousness). The 
view that styles the painter as a gentleman, incipient in Cennini is, according to Jean 
Gimpel, one that is reiterated and established by Ghiberti in his Commentarii and Alberti 
in his treatise On Painting as part of the drive to establish painting and sculpture in the 
Liberal (rather than Mechanical Arts) by means of theorizing.319 
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Gimpel remarks that the title of Ghiberti’s Commentarii is a nod to humanist writings and 
that it provides the first autobiography of a sculptor: 
Born in 1378, Ghiberti was fifteen when the great bourgeois families of Florence 
regained their full power [following a period of financial turmoil]. They no longer feared 
either the nobility or the lower classes, but they were also no longer animated by the 
creative energies of a rising class. They produced sons who were indifferent or hostile to 
business and whose preoccupations were henceforth literary. These scholars or men of 
letters were in fact the first humanists of the Renaissance, men with a passionate interest 
in antiquity. Supported by their family wealth, they devoted themselves to study…320 
Precedents for the elevation of art above commerical practice exist in the legends and 
myths that have filtered through from Antiquity - apparently Zeuxis refused payment for 
work. It was as commercially unsullied Liberal Arts that the practices of painting and 
sculpture were gradually embourgeoised during the Renaissance. So when the publication 
of artisans treatises is taken to represent ‘a convergence between scholarship, 
craftsmanship and business acumen’, implicated in that representation is the aristocratic 
denial of (morally and aesthetically corrupting) ‘price’.321 Some 150 years later, in 
Baldassare Castiglione’s Book of the Courtier (1528), painters - the situation was slightly 
different for sculptors - were very definitely read as participants in a long, high status 
tradition: 
…I recall having read that in the ancient world, and in Greece especially, children of 
gentle birth were required to learn painting at school, as a worthy and necessary 
accomplishment, and it was ranked among the foremost of the liberal arts; subsequently, 
a public law was passed forbidding it to be taught to slaves. It was also held in great 
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honour among the Romans, and from it the very noble family of the Fabii took its name, 
for the first Fabius was called Pictor. He was, indeed, an outstanding painter, and so 
devoted to the art that when he painted the walls of the Temple of Salus he signed his 
name: this was because (despite his having been born into an illustrious family, honoured 
by so many consular titles, triumphs and other dignities, and despite the fact that he 
himself was a man of letters, learned in law and numbered among the orators) Fabius 
believed that he could enhance his name and reputation by leaving a memorial pointing 
out that he had also been a painter. And there was no lack of other celebrated painters 
belonging to other illustrious families.322 
Castiglione, who links the efficacy of painting and drawing to military interests, observes 
that ‘the first Fabius’ signed his name to enhance his reputation and to commemorate his 
activity beyond the titles he had inherited. Castiglione views the signature as a mark of 
pride in singular activity within the idiom of painting. Signature is an aristocratic 
practice. 
 
For Gimpel, the type of embourgeoisment advanced by Ghiberti and Castiglione led to 
the development of the modern definition of the word ‘artist’ for whom the ‘artisan’ is 
‘other’.323 He traces its etymology in French, claiming that if the idea of the artist was 
formed in the 15th century, it was not until the middle of the 18th century that the term 
began to be used in contrast to ‘worker’ or ‘craftsman’. 324  He says that the French word 
artiste derives ultimately from ars, which he defines as ‘University Faculty’, and which 
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in 16th century France could be used to describe chemists. At this time, he says, artiste 
and artisan are equivalent and the word ouvrier still had some currency for describing 
painters and sculptors. It was not until the middle of the 17th century in France that the 
term artisan was rejected for painters and sculptors; even at this time, the term artiste 
included chemists: the first ‘modern’ definition of artiste occurs in the 1762 edition of the 
Dictionary of the French Academy.325  So for Gimpel, the ideological change in painting 
and sculpture led the terminological change. There is nothing inherent in the skills or 
‘practitioners’ involved that separates artist from artisan. In terms of what this means for 
signature, a device used to signify the ‘artist’ not the ‘artisan’, it might be said that the 
appearance of signatures on artworks does not mark the schism between artists and 
artisans ‘organically’. When the artist’s signature is prioritised, there is a strategic 
suppression of the artisan’s signature, (which may well be present, as at Sèvres). If 
artists’s signatures can be differentiated from the signatures and monograms of artisans 
only on the basis of their empirical form, (the autograph vs the stamp), or by the nature of 
the substrate on which they appear, then in terms of a Derridean conception of signature, 
there is no effective difference at all. 
 
Concentrating on the vocabulary used in inscriptions, Louise Matthew traces 
ennoblization as it is evidenced through changing terminology in 15th century Venetian 
signatures. Prior to the mid-15th century, she says signatures typically employed a 
participle of the verb pingere (meaning ‘to paint’) and hoc opus (after the artist’s name). 
As the 15th century progressed, Matthew observes that the range of vocabulary used by 
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artists in inscriptions increased - she gives the example of  Vittore Carpaccio, who, 
around 1500, began to use both pingere and fingere in his inscriptions: fingere has the 
connotation of conceiving, imagining or inventing.326 As a verb of invention, fingere is 
still connected to ars and material culture (albeit more loosely), so it doesn’t quite have 
the same conceptual repercussions as does Van Eyck’s use of sum/esse, which distances 
the artist from the painting. Nonetheless, fingere can still be considered a decisive step 
towards the elevation of painting into the Liberal Arts. Matthew also comments on the 
fact that some historians regard the adoption of the Latin term pictor in the 16th century to 
refer to artists in preference to the Italian vernacular depentore to be a mark of 
ennobilization, though she points out that pictor was used principally in documents 
ancillary to artworks rather than on the artworks themselves. 
 
Critically, use of Latinized (or Greek) vocabulary and name-spellings (rather than the 
vernacular) during the Renaissance, accompanied monumentalized signatures, i.e. 
signatures which entered the representative schema as engravings on columns, stones and 
the like: Andrea Mantegna was particularly associated with the form. Debts to the great 
artists of Antiquity were signified by the inclusion of archaeological subject matter, 
Latinisation and by choice of font - Roman rather than Gothic.327 As signatory practice 
flourished during the Renaissance, artists gradually dropped qualifying signatory verbs 
and nouns from their inscriptions - Matthew gives the example of Jacopo Bellini’s heir, 
Giovanni Bellini, who abbreviated pinxit (3rd person perfect of pingere), to ‘P.’; and 
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example of Lorenzo Lotto, who is known to have signed paintings with his name alone, 
(i.e. without any qualifying verb). In order for these abbreviations and ommissions to 
occur, there must have been general acceptance that the name appearing in isolation 
referred to the artist responsible for overseeing its production, (however much manual 
involvement that entailed).  
 
At the end of the 15th century, signatures had not only fallen out of favour, Matthew says 
they were ‘associated with an artisan ‘workshop’ image that some of these younger 
Venetian artists now wished to disavow.’328 This move away from signature institutes a 
novel, specific association between art production and the individual artistic hand, 
closing down the validity of polyvalent methods of production: it also privileges Court 
commissions (more likely unsigned) over speculative or public work. Crucially, it is the 
abandonment of (alphabetic) signature that marks autonomous creativity and defines the 
artist in Modern terms. The abandonment of written signatures is linked to the developing 
art of connoisseurship: by the time Castiglione was writing in the 16th century, courtiers 
and gentlemen collectors of art were beginning to want paintings in novel genres, and to 
recognize artists’s virtuosity, skill and inventiveness without the presence of an obvious 
label. Connoisseurs wanted to discriminate and derive satisfaction from the utilisation of 
secret, aesthetic knowledge. When applied to art, a term linked to Castiglione - 
sprezzatura - describes the increasingly immediate, ‘expressive’, maniera (individual, 
painterly style or manner) and gives onto the artist’s ‘affective’ skills. Raphael, who 
painted a portrait of Castiglione in 1514-1515, is an artist particularly associated with 
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sprezzatura with Gombrich noting he had a ‘sweetness of temper which would commend 
him to influential patrons’: Raphael’s temperament and deportment made him the ideal 
courtier so the implication is that Raphael’s sociability (not merely his talent) helped him 
secure commissions.329 
 
Whilst maniera and sprezzatura are not necessarily incompatible with the appearance of 
written signatures - Raphael had a significant and idiosyncratic, if infrequent, signatory 
practice - they demonstrate the painterly inclination to diffuse signature into the 
expressive hand.330 When Raphael did sign his work, he characteristically ‘hid’ his 
signature on the representation of garments, engaging his patrons in a game of wit. Rona 
Goffen observes that Titian’s use of signature also engaged patrons in games of wit: 
[Titian’s signature adds] ...but one more detail for close inspection, sudden discovery and 
amused delight. The transfer to the court portraits not only carries a note of refined 
appreciation, but created a pictorial equivalent for being a court intimate. With these 
devices, Titian made his name a form of conceit, a pleasantry, a seemingly casual 
reminder that Titanius made each picture, stated with the witty and graceful sprezzatura 
so recently described by Badessare Castiglione as attributes of the perfect Courtier.331 
Titian is an exemplar of how strong the purchase of secular themes and attitudes was in 
art by the 16th century and an exemplar for the way in which signature was changing 
towards the end of the Renaissance in response to the changing character of the 
(advanced) ‘market’. Rather than an act of votive subscription or the advancement of a 
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public name, Titian’s signatures describe an elite circle of sympathetic, aesethetic 
recognition between artist and initiate patrons; they make claims to courtly status on his 
behalf. 
 
 
5.3.6 DÜRER, SIGNATURE AND COPYRIGHT 
 
If Cennini’s treatise can be seen to assert an authorial claim by enclosing common 
knowledge,  in terms of the nature of similar proprietorial claims made through visual art 
- at least in terms of print culture - the case of the 15th century German artist, Albrecht 
Dürer, is instructive. Dürer made extensive use of a personal monogram, a form 
stylistically indebted to goldsmiths’s hallmarks. In this, he followed not only the habit of 
his familial trade, but also the monogrammatic behaviour of his predecessor, Martin 
Schöngauer.332 Wood states that Schöngauer was the ‘first famous German artist’, largely 
because he initialled his prints and those initials functioned as a ‘return address’ in his 
work.333 Wood suggests that when monograms became associated with drawings (as 
opposed to prints), they began to take on a meaning which involves the establishing the 
primacy of originals. Applying a monogram to a drawing in the kind of circumstances 
Wood describes, as reference material in an artist’s studio, for example, is a private 
action, not unlike the hidden prayer of Lando. Wood says the monogram became: 
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…a tether that connected the artifact [sic] to the moment of creation. [This] signature was 
the interface between two identities of the artist, as creator moving and acting inside the 
domain of art, reacting to other artworks, and as a person acting in the world alongside 
everyone else. The signature split the artist in two, and helped everyone get accustomed 
to the artist as a kind of poet. The signature also signaled that the drawing was now 
collectible, that is that nonartists might value it, and in particular value it on account of its 
origins. A date only reinforced all of this. German artists began to leave paper trails 
marking their own careers. They produced art that already predicated its own narration, 
art that presented itself as the legible record of a flow of creativity punctuated by 
unrepeatable acts. When art can be pieced together on chronologically ordered, 
reproducible sheets of paper, there will finally be a public culture of art, as opposed to the 
traditional culture of art dispersed between towns and monasteries and stitched together 
by the imperfect memories of travelers…334 
The original did not, then, develop speculatively in direct response to the demands of the 
market in early capitalism, but almost as a consequence of autodidacticism. Wood notes 
that Dürer recorded the authorship of artists who had not signed themselves on several 
drawings - for example, he annotated and dated a drawing of a horse and rider with name 
of the artist, Wolfgang Beurer.335 He suggests that in performing this countersignature, 
Dürer ‘acknowledged the authority of other artists’ and it was his own sense of authority 
that prompted him to do this. Signing and dating drawings has the consequence of 
attenuating them in a linear sequence in which ‘first’ is a principle which overwrites 
circularity and substitionality. The passage quoted above also suggests that the act of 
applying monograms to drawings might have catalysed a market where there had been 
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none. In Dürer’s practice, the role of documentation - the ‘paper trail’ - in establishing the 
value of art makes an early appearance. 
 
Smith, with her interest in scientific epistemology, uses Dürer as the exemplar par 
excellence of ‘the effects of the exchange between artisans and humanists’ and to support 
her theory that naturalism was allied to artisanal self-assertion. For Smith, Dürer’s 
treatises Lesson in Measurement and Four Books on Human Proportion may demonstrate 
an ‘intense excitement about the notion of ideal proportions’ but never dispense with the 
need to relay personal, particular experience and knowledge through art. In this they 
demonstrate a Germanic (Gothic) ‘particularism’ (in relation to matter) which contrasts 
with the Italian (Renaissance) ‘perfectionism’ (and the ideal). Smith alleges Dürer’s 
treatises might have been provoked by the domination of his trade by guilds.336 Guilds 
control people through circumscribing materials, keeping trade practices secret, and 
limiting access to markets; as envisioned by Dürer, naturalism shifts the balance of power 
towards an ‘autonomous’ artist, who is gifted autonomous skill by natural (and 
unrepeatable) endowment. There is a synthesis between what an artist like Dürer is able 
to represent autopically, how talent devolves to the individual and the notion of 
originality. Nature is ‘unlearned’; naturalism is objective and authoritative, an 
interruption to institutionally sedimented power in favour of the originating individual 
who is ‘natural’ himself, and, by extension, to the unique outputs of that individual. 
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In this context, then, it is surprsing that someone who sees himself prima facie as 
divinely gifted, should be implicated in one of the first copyright cases. Like Van Eyck, 
Dürer was a Northern (non-Italian) artist favoured by Vasari, who makes extensive 
mention of him in the Life of Marcantonio Bolognese & Other Engravers of Print, as 
well as referring to him in the Life of Pontormo.337 Vasari reports that Marc’Antonio 
copied Dürer’s woodcut cycle, ‘Life of the Virgin’ in facsimile: 
…he added to these the signature that Albrecht used for all his works, which was “A.D.”, 
and they proved to be so similar in manner, that, no one knowing that they had been 
executed by Marc’ Antonio, they were ascribed to Albrecht, and were bought and sold as 
works by his hand. News of this was sent in writing to Albrecht, who was in Flanders, 
together with one of the counterfeit Passions executed by Marc’ Antonio; at which he 
flew into such a rage that he left Flanders and went to Venice, where he appeared before 
the Signoria and laid a complaint against Marc’ Antonio. But he could obtain no other 
satisfaction but this, that Marc’ Antonio should no longer use the name or the above-
mentioned signature of Albrecht on his works.338 
This account is frequently thought to refer to a very early ‘copyright’ case.339 The issue at 
stake turns on the replication of Dürer’s monogram by Marc’ Antonio (known as 
Raimondi) rather than on the copying of the image per se, with the Venetian Senate 
deciding that whereas the images belonged to Christendom (and could be copied freely), 
Dürer’s monogram could not be copied. At this point, it is impossible not to recall that 
Derrida’s mischievious games with ‘Sarl’ circle around the notion that it is not only 
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irrelevant to (try and) copyright ‘truth’, but impossible. As a trademark, Dürer’s name - 
and monogram - belonged to him alone. Wood points out that ‘the monogram retained 
the memory of its original, economically rational form’ even when it was adopted by 
painters and printmakers who did not have Dürer’s connection to goldsmithing.340 An 
accelerated link between the monogram, trade practice and humanism is implied by 
Smith in her account of Dürer’s use of it: 
Conscious of its intellectual and economic worth, he employed the A.D. monogram on 
almost all his works, including drawings, self-consciously creating a signed and dated 
retrospective record of his artistic development. Dürer’s monogram, like that of 
Schöngauer before him, referred to the authenticating mark of goldsmiths…(Dürer) 
bought his own printing press and brought out a book of his woodcuts, The Apocalypse 
(1496-1498), the first book designed and published by an artisan completely on his own 
undertaking.341 
Dürer’s use of a monogram departs from the trade practices of goldsmiths as far as it 
involves itself with ‘recording’ and ‘artistic development’, but, expressly, it was already a 
conduit for economic value and retained that role. The inheritances that monogrammatic 
forms derive from goldsmiths make the naturalistic representation they seal equivalent to 
precious material, thus what is ‘immaterial’ is connected in (economic and ideological) 
value via the signature to what (was) material. Kostylo says of the case that: 
It could be argued that while the Venetian legal system did not consider the copying of 
Dürer’s prints to be illegal, at the same time, it offered protection for something much 
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more subtle and immaterial – not the image but its expression and the artist’s individual 
style (maniera) – an acknowledgement of Dürer’s generative powers.342 
On the basis of the very sketchy ‘evidence’ that exists, it seems, on the contrary, that 
Dürer’s ‘maniera’ was not protected, if it can be said to have existed at all. Where 
maniera gives the ‘look’ of his prints, leading representation, Raimondi was at liberty to 
copy – it appears to have been only the monogram that he was forbidden from copying. 
Interestingly, Kostylo equates ‘expression’ with ‘monogram’, feeding it with the idea of 
‘autograph’ – for her ‘expression’ is simultaneous with maniera. It may be that Dürer’s 
use of a monogram is paradigmatic because his use of it conflates trade and ‘personality’, 
but the monogram is more mechanistic than expressive. 
                                                
342  Kostylo, op. cit. p43 
  240 
6. SIGNATURE AS STANDARDISATION: I PROMISE 
 
 
6.1 SUBSTITUTIONALITY 
 
The notion of signature plays a prominent role in Forgery, Replica, Fiction, a work 
which was considered in the last Chapter in connection with the notion of ‘mutual 
substitutionality’. Wood argues that print technology was a necessary motor for the new 
science of archaeology which emerged in the 15th and 16th centuries, and that 
concomitantly, artefacts acquired a documentary value resulting in a displacement of 
their ‘magical authority’. The temporal element of ‘magical authority’ as a constant 
present, a general maintenance, is opposed to chronology, which becomes operative by 
organising images and objects in a linear fashion. For Wood, it is mechanized replication 
of the image in prints, however rudimentary, that created the distinction, fundamental to 
modern culture, between rational and irrational thinking about time and also between the 
‘artwork’ and other forms of representation. Linear, chronological organisation is 
‘rational’; magical authority and  general maintenance is irrational. When print culture 
was established specifically as a means of disseminating images for the purposes of 
scholarship: 
…the time-bending referential rhetoric of the image was from this point on quarantined 
inside a new institution, the work of art. The artwork, the merely fictional image, became 
the new natural habitat of anachronistic thinking. Outside such fictions, the once-
universal temporal confusion was carefully untangled, redistributed into the poor 
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binarism of error and truth. Under the new regime of print, the substitution was 
criminalized as a forgery. Anachronism became the attribute of bad scholarship and good 
art.343 
The work of art is thus necessarily historical, located in rational, linear chronologies. 
Wood’s theory understands the place of artefacts in ‘pre-modern’ culture as mutually 
substitutional vehicles for general ‘truths’, the genesis of which is accepted rather than 
questioned: the implication is that ‘truths’ are not dependent on ‘facts’. In the scheme of 
substitutionality, the particularity of artefacts is not of primary importance because the 
artefacts represented omnipotent truths that originate elsewhere, (unseen or lost). The 
production of icons as acheiropoieta fits with the scheme of substitutionality - icons 
demonstrate potential fungibility. Fungibility shares the etymology that was explored in 
relation to Derrida’s use of fungal metaphors in Signsponge (i.e. fungibilius, derived from 
fungor - present infinitive fungi - means ‘to perform’). Substitutionality is effective 
because it’s dynamism is a performative dynamism holding together a simple field in 
which individual elements are approximate and dispensible - it is not a dynamism 
directing a chronological trajectory. Substitutional artefacts describe functions rather than 
present themselves as entities. Wood’s theory of substitutionality is not incompatible with 
the Foucauldian épistème, grounded in similitude, which was postulated as governing the 
era between the 9th and 16th centuries.344 George Kubler’s treatise The Shape of Time: 
Remarks on The History of Things, also approaches the notion of what Wood frames as 
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substitutionality though it tends to mitigate against the importance of the notional work of 
art as an historical form at all.345  
 
So unlike a substitutional artefact, the artwork is, according to Wood, necessarily specific 
and historical, documenting its own truth as a ‘fact’, presenting itself as singular and non-
fungible. It is adjunct to historicity that ‘originality’ is imputed into this ‘new category of 
relic’: an artwork is an ‘auto-original’ because it cannot be replicated - auto-originality is 
a principle of discontinuity. In this respect, discontinuity is self-sufficiency as self-
referential completeness, and on this basis, originality is not a quality that flows from ex 
nihilo creation or invention, (although this is one of the myths that supports the otherwise 
inconsequential cultural value of the artwork). Discontinuity is the action of separating 
and isolating, and the signature is very much implicated in this action - signatures appear 
to perform the separation. Originality is ‘merely’ the marking or drawing of trait: 
superficial self-similarity or the simultaneity of multiple images and versions do not 
present any necessary problem in determining ‘originality’.  
 
Wood explains the place of the auto-original as follows: 
No work by Duchamp or Andy Warhol threatened even minimally the basic axiom of 
originality that still governs the idea of art in the modern West. The artwork that takes up 
banality and interchangeability as subject matter does not want to be banal and 
interchangeable. To represent the copy is to reassert the distinction between copy and 
original. The auto-original work affects insouciance about copies and substitutes… The 
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originality, or auto-originality, of the modern artwork is simply the principle of its 
noncontinuity with everything around it (the normal, the real, the functional, etc.). There 
may be an author behind the work; authoredness may be part of the content of the work; 
or not. The distinction that art insists on is the distinction between art and non-art – and 
never more so when the erasure of that distinction is taken up as a theme or as a 
desideratum. 346 
In Wood’s opinion, authoredness and originality have been confused - they are 
interchangeable. Since the Renaissance, in art history, originality has gradually assumed 
the quality of creative exception and been brought to the foreground by myths of genius, 
gift and organic exception. Scrolling back to Medieval and Classical precendents, genius 
might thus be understood to involve discontinuities validated by authorities masquerading 
as instances of originality. The instrumentality of the rhetoric of originality in promoting 
lines of authoritarian inheritance are buried by the conceptualization of genius as 
something which is embodied in the exceptional (biological) individual and made 
manifest in the ex nihilo creations of that individual.  
 
Obviously, ‘Duchamp’ and ‘Andy Warhol’ represent endpoints in what Wood perceives 
as ‘modern art’ because Duchamp and Warhol appear to push the limits of what is 
accepted aesthetically as original, using what Wood figures as banal and interchangeable, 
(for example, pre-made industrial goods). Bearing in mind Wood’s position on the auto-
original, it is perhaps possible to say that Duchamp and Warhol are not so much pushing 
limits in the sense of breaking new ground in a formal sense, rather they are revealing 
aspects of what has been suppressed in the artwork in favour of the artist. The mechanism 
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which both employ - with a heightened awareness of its function and power - is signature, 
and what has been supressed in the artwork is fungibility. The double movement in 
signature is what permits such a suppression, (it is the same but different, here but 
elsewhere).  
 
Both Duchamp and Warhol understood that signature is the apparatus of insertion into 
history, the principle of discontinuity. What they have in common is their exploitation of 
the very low level ‘authoredness’ that can be seen to be transferred in signature, and they 
have an appreciation of the dilations and contractions of aperture that signature allows. 
They understand that the very slight, banal fact of the empirical unrepeatability described 
by the sequential co-ordinates of chronological ‘time’ and taxonomical ‘place’ is what 
gives an artwork non-substitutional ‘originality’. As vectors, time and place might be 
seen to intersect in signature, describing the contours of originality. Here - explicitly - to 
sign is to date.347 Signature is what reserves an artefact from the continuum of everyday 
life, appearing to fix it while covertly making sure it is never fixed, never wholly 
separated from the continuum of everyday life. Signature is always ready to respond to, 
or allow, investment. The notion of standardisation - the general theme for this Chapter - 
appears to stand in the face of originality, and it is signature’s ability to mediate the 
relationship between that which is unique and that which is standard that is of interest. 
 
 
                                                
347  Notable in this context are ‘Otobiographies’, Copy Signature Archive, ‘9/11 and 
Global Terrorism: A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida’. 
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6.1.1 AUTHENTICA 
 
Wood reveals a critical place for signature in the construction of the modern artwork. In 
the scheme of substitutionality and in the genesis of print culture, Wood emphasizes the 
catalytic importance of the Medieval practice of attaching labels to relics.348 Claims to 
holiness were based on the provenance of relics, (especially saintly bones). However, 
these claims were open to doubt, competition and counterfeit – for example, records 
dating to the 15th  century show that the Cathedral ‘signed’ by Giselbertus at Autun was 
involved in a dispute over the authenticity of the relics of St Lazarus it purportedly 
held.349 Doubt necessitated a process of correction. Unlike icons, whose secure, abstract 
typology is an effective guarantee of the theology they represent, (a truth that is 
elsewhere), the claim that relics make to be the genuine remains of a mortal human is not 
representational but embodied. Bones are indistinguishable from each other on the basis 
of form, but the claim they make to holiness is based on an essential, if imperceptible, 
embodied difference: a provenance. In schematic terms the problem that they raise might 
be described as a problem in which realism confronts naturalism as seamless mimesis, (a 
variant of this confrontation is involved in the problem or enigma ‘embodied’ in the 
Arnolfini signature, which is a ‘real’ signature within the scheme of a less than perfectly 
mimetic ‘naturalisitic’ image). When ‘counterfeit’ general bones are passed off as 
authentic holy relics, the (naturalist) copy abuts against the (realist) original with no 
appreciable clues as to which is which. Despite being representational, icons are more 
                                                
348 Wood, op. cit. pp53-59 
349 Seidel, op.cit. p38.  Parts of Lazarus, including his skull, were held at Autun - a 
rival claim to Lazarus’s skull existed nearby at Avallon: the existence of 2 skulls making 
the same claim presented a problem. 
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unproblematically ‘realist’ because their truth is not tightly circumscribed on the basis of 
embodied difference and in terms of its image, the authenticity of an icon necessarily 
proceeds on the basis of sameness. 
 
Wood observes that in the Middle Ages, authentic relics were ‘corrected’ by the 
application of an authenticum to differentiate them from imposter-relics: 
Because bones look alike, the entire connection to the past rested on trust in the labelling 
process. A bone is nothing without a label. The twelfth- or thirteenth-century excavator 
hoped to find a label called an authenticum attached to the bones with string, or a bronze 
plate with an inscription lying alongside the corpse or inside the skull. Discovery reports 
from the twelfth or thirteenth centuries placed special emphasis on such labels; bishops 
and popes guaranteed their authenticity. Modern scholarship, however, considers such 
“found” labels to be forgeries, in the sense that they postdate the death of the saint or holy 
personage by many centuries.350 
As Christianity established and travelled across Europe, blending with topographically 
assignable pagan practices, the physical and temporal distance from defining holy 
experiences and personalities increased, with the consequence that - to recall the terms 
Derrida works with in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ - links to chains of ‘living memory’ (mneme) 
were stretched to breaking point. Labelling (which might be thus read as hypnomnesis) 
papered over the cracks and opportunities for falsification wich arose in the stretched 
chain. As pharmakon, the authenticum sought to negate counterfeits and imposters as it 
simultaneously became the most effective device for constructing them. Wood speculates 
that the authenticum was ‘one of the templates for the modern artwork’ and says: 
                                                
350  Wood, op. cit. pp54-55 
  247 
The spatialization of the referential message, and the difficult claim to analogicity or a 
resemblant relation with an original, alienated the label from its referent and pulled it 
towards its won peculiar, uncontrollable sort of truth. The differential relations among 
labels produced meanings that quickly fell out of phase with the original referential 
pretext for the image. Relic hunting was an enterprise. Relics were not found but made, 
framed for use by creative labelling.351 
Here, as différance, labelling organises the field of self-similar, non-fungible others and 
development of the modern artwork proceeds on the basis of alienation from material. In 
Wood’s analysis, the modern artwork develops in relation to the processes of the 
verification of relics by guarantee, or the manufacture of them by counterfeit. The 
(Renaissance) genius of the individual artist is not involved.  
 
Wood says that print culture gradually allowed the dissemination of a sort of refined 
authenticum which illustrated and documented relics and shrines in pictorial form. In this 
trajectory, the relic-substrate became increasingly distant with the result that interest in 
the prints themselves increases. When the print presents an image, the need to visit and 
experience the relic or shrine represented is diminshed. Incidentally, and over time, 
interest in print images results in the substitution of the skills of the artist for the relic-
substrate, (hence the early copyright case involving Dürer and Raimondi), and in the 
multiplication of images in circulation that reference the relic-substrate.352 In terms of 
what has already been discussed, once again, the artist can be seen to emerge against the 
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object, (in this instance the relic-substrate), not out of the artisan. The artist (print-maker) 
is someone who can be seen to generate and authenticate multiples. 
 
 
6.1.2 CARTELLINI 
 
The form of the authenticum as a paper label might be seen to be repeated in the later 
appearance of cartellini as a vehicle for signatures in Italian Renaissance art. Cartellini 
take the form of trompe l’oeil depictions of inscriptions on paper within the pictorial 
scheme of a painting. Cartellini are not exclusively signatory, but signatures feature in 
the cartellini of the Venetian workshops with which they are significantly associated – 
the workshops of Jacopo Bellini (1400 – c.1470) and Antonio Vivirani (1440 – c.1484). 
Conventionally, cartellini are thought to have originated in the depiction of biblical 
scrolls and the lettering they carry, in Gothic or cursive script, is associated ‘more often 
[with] writing in the vernacular’ than with official pronouncments.353 In this, a distinction 
can be drawn between cartellini and trompe l’oeil inscriptions which revive engraved, 
Classical Roman lettering on stone tablets or columns - the cartellino is more informal 
and playful than trompe l’oeil engravings. For Matthew, the fact that cartellini sometimes 
depict air-bourne paper is an indication that the artist is engaged in a demonstration of 
skill which triumphs over the normal behaviour of materials in time and space. In this, 
her view of painterly skill is sympathetic to that of Preimseberger who sees painting 
competing to master three dimensions. Matthew observes that trompe l’oeil effects in 
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cartellini are heightened when paper is shown to be creased and crumpled – the illusion 
of ‘reality’ requires evidence of use, age and handling. This illustionistic ‘wear and tear’ 
is a narrative element rather than an attempt to directly represent ‘real life’, and the 
proasic, shallow geometry of a piece of paper is especially suited to creating false ‘depth’ 
through foreshortening. Matthew credits the first cartellino to Fra Filippo Lippi, a 15th 
century Florentine painter whose only known cartellino was painted into the Madonna 
with Child (Tarquinia Madonna) (1437) (Fig. 8). The conjunction between ‘first’ and 
‘only’ in Lippi’s Tarquinia cartellino is the same conjunction that Derrida notices in 
naturalised readings of signature, (the same conjunction is also found in The Master of 
the St Bartholomew Altarpiece), and this conjunction conceals the imperative to read the 
Renaissance as a time for painterly invention: the implication is that Lippi ‘invented’ the 
cartellino. 
 
On the basis of invention, there is no room for locating a meaningful precedent for 
cartellini in the indicative ‘everyday’ Renaissance habits of annotating and cataloguing 
collections.354 The antiquarian and naturalist tendencies of Renaissance artists resulted in 
the acquisition of sculptural artefacts. The 14th century Paduan artist and pedagogue, 
Francesco Squarcione, kept a wide collection of fragments and sculptures to use as 
models for teaching. However, despite the possibility that such collections conceivably 
carried annotations and labels, the rhetoric of invention debars the suggestion that the 
cartellino is a pictorial element derived from a low-level practice located in the 
‘everyday’. It would seem that there is no room for any generative connection between 
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the authenticum and the cartellino as labels, bits of paper or aide-memoires. In tracing the 
journey of the cartellino from Florence to Venice, where it established in the 15th and 
early 16th centuries, Kandice Rawlings is persuaded that Lippi’s adoption of the form 
could have been a response to ‘lost cartellini’ in the work of Squarcione.355 However, in 
the absence of direct evidence, she immediately dismisses the possibility that cartellini 
could have developed in relation to an everyday practice connected with the possibility of 
studio labels, despite his pedagogical collection. Conceivably, Squarcione’s collection of 
studio models could have carried identification labels, (unattached paper labels are 
known to have been lost from panel paintings), so it is at least possible that an artist 
would have used this ‘lived’ experience in their paintings: ‘life’ models were very much 
used to inform other aspects of the paintings in which cartellini appear.356 At least in part, 
it is the persuasiveness and naturalized establishment of the rhetoric of Renaissance 
invention - coupled with the impossibility of recovering a full understanding of studio 
practice from history - that seems to have prevented Rawlings from admitting this 
possibility.  
 
On the face of it, Hall’s explanation of the route by which the signature appeared in the 
Arnolfini Portrait (as a veritas wall inscription) looks to be methodologically opposed to 
Rawlings’ understanding of the route by which the cartellino signature appears in 
Reanissance paintings (as invention). Hall insists on the entiriety of the scene ‘out there’,  
(in reality, in the Arnolfini chamber), and Rawlings believes the cartellino can be nothing 
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but a painterly invention, wholly ‘in there’. What Hall and Rawlings share is a desire to 
circumscribe the development of signatory practices within the idiom of painting - Hall 
wants to explain the Arnolfini painting wholly as an achievement in naturalism; Rawlings 
wants to explain the cartellino as an achievement in illusionism, (a camp valence of 
naturalism). Despite the (documented) antiquarian interests of Renaissance Humanists, 
Rawlings constructs the ‘reality’ of the cartellino as an effect of trompe l'oeil: it is 
explicitly not connected to material culture or the studio environment - she wants to 
establish the significance of a fictive paper substrate as a vehicle for invention through 
the cartellino, and locates its development within conventional, Vasarian history. Both 
Rawlings and Hall fail to appreciate the significance of the everyday to signature and 
labelling. Though Wood concentrates on print culture and not Renaissance painting, his 
work on authentica could be seen to augment the case for seeking precedents for this 
element of Renaissance practice outside a painterly idiom. 
 
 
6.1.3 SUPERSCRIPTION 
 
Whatever their origins, cartellini are involved in the tactics of super-subscription, or the 
use of signatures to insinuate objects or artists in broadly relevant cultural or 
geographical contexts. As such, they have had a role to play in standardising art 
production. Matthew views the cartellino almost like an A.O.C (appellation origine 
controlée) - ‘a recognizable clue to specific geographical identity’, (a connotation that 
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had been eroded by the 17th century).357 The strong export and speculative art markets 
which developed in Venice in the 15th century form the context in which the cartellino 
could function as a branding device. In this period, Matthew observes that Venetian 
artists signed their work more frequently than did artists in comparable Italian centres of 
artistic production. At this time, they were beginning to access new markets by shipping; 
to sell work direct from shop inventories (and at art fairs), rather than agree to work on 
commission for private patrons; and to be dominated by the presence of the highly 
successful workshops of Bellini and Vivirani.358 These three conditions, access to new 
‘foreign’ markets, speculative production and successful workshop organisation are of 
critical importance to making Venetian artwork more visible. Recognition of cartellini as 
a form specifically associated with Venice reinforces the grounds for stating that as a 
convenience, signature has the ability to restate physical proximity to place (as well as to 
the individual signatory) at a distance.  
 
Matthew comments that the geographical distinctiveness of the signatures of Venetian 
artists was affected by an ‘influx of ideas and visitors from artistic centres elsewhere’, by 
the evolving identity of painters, and by the increasing narrative/symbolic complexity of 
their work. The artist’s signature, in her analysis, is not only related to the particularity 
and success of Venice as a centre for commerce, but part of a trajectory that moves from 
standardized commercial device and guarantee to a mark of personal preference, wit and 
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inventive skill. It is used explicitly to link commerce and (open) market competition to 
notions of artistic singularity and invention. 
 
Commercial pragmatism was not the only reason that geographical designation or super-
scription was an important function for signature during the Renaissance. Goffen, who 
notes that by the 14th century Italian artists were ‘voluble’ in signing their work, observes 
that Lorenzo Ghiberti use his signature on the first set of doors he produced for the 
Battistero di San Giovanni in Florence to indicate his place of origin and make a 
declaration of city-state allegiance.359 Ghiberti uses his signature to mark a political 
affiliation. Names are not stable or fixed by virtue of being names, they admit 
instrumental changes, volitional or otherwise - the classic example used to denote the 
speech act (wedding vows), effects a nominal change. So the inclusion of a geographical 
designation in the names of artists at this time is not necessarily a stable assignment or an 
indication of an origin inherited at birth from the artist’s biological parents. For example, 
the names that Mantegna employed or was assigned vary considerably across his career - 
an irony conisdered alongside his mastery of rendering stone and the notional 
permanence that his inscriptions thus represent. As already mentioned, the names of 
Renaissance artists often carry forward connotations related to places of work or training 
as well as birth - Andrea Pisano is also known by the surname da Pontedera; Jan Van 
Eyck was known to Vasari as Giovanni da Bruggia, etc. Thus, the signatures of 
Renaissance artists deliberately designate and assign qualities of connection which are 
not only outside painterly idiom, they are outside lines of patrilineal inheritance. 
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Signatures are employed to make connections that are artistically and politically useful or 
desired. The process of making and declaring such connections has the potential to prime 
spectators when they view artworks. 
 
 
6.1.4 ROMAN SIGNATURE 
 
Geographical designations and indications of cultural origin pre-date the Renaissance as 
factors which are involved in mediating the ‘quality’ of artworks. They can fulfill certain 
intangible expectations of patrons and have an intimate relationship with the signatory 
process and this is evidenced during the time of the Roman Empire when Greek art was 
considered superior to that produced natively in Italy. Conventionally, art history reads 
the strength of Greek precedents at this time and the exceptional achievements of Greek 
artists not only as an effective prohibition on the growth of any distinctive Roman art 
forms, but also as a prohibition on the development of artistic skills within the native 
Roman population, i.e. there was no distinctive ‘Roman’ art because there were few 
‘Roman’ artists and those few were inferior craftsmen. Gombrich comments: ‘Most 
artists who worked in Rome were Greeks, and most Roman collectors bought works of 
the great Greek masters, or copies of them.’360 This comment in The Story of Art 
illustrates a pejorative take on the process of copying at the same time as it makes 
assumptions about the ethnicity of artists in Rome. More recent scholarship controverts 
both. Although it is supposed that a significant number of Greek craftsmen and artists 
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migrated to Italy at the time of the Roman territorialization of the Eastern Mediterranean, 
Peter Stewart cautions against making the assumption that a Greek name on an artwork 
indicates a Greek artist. Historians like Gombrich assume that immigrant Greek artists 
‘naturally’ dominated artistic production in Italy. The signatory inscriptions on Roman art 
would appear to confirm this because there is a prevalence of Greek names, written in 
Greek, amongst those inscriptions that exist.361 Stewart speculates that some of these 
Greek names may have been a mark of ‘quality’ rather than the indication of an ethnic 
individual, particularly where the inscription includes mention of the artist’s supposed 
geographical origins in a city with an established reputation for producing art (e.g. 
Athens).362 If this is the case, superscription in Roman art trades on intangible ‘goodwill’ 
derived from the positive associations conveyed by a Greek name in this context. 
Effectively, quasi-Greek inscriptions operate like cartellini - like an A.O.C. As a mark of 
quality the artist’s signature persistently opens out onto other stamps and brands. The 
goldsmith’s monogram, which is linked to the requirement to provide assurances about 
the quality of gold, is, for example, a direct precedent for the signatory monograms of 
Schöngauer and Dürer. If Schöngauer’s and Dürer’s monograms transubstantiate links to 
the material value of gold, Roman ‘Greek’ signatures transubstantiate the value of place 
and ethnicity. In both instances, signature can be seen to permit the creation of 
immaterial, abstracted brand value from gold and cultural specificity respectively. 
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Supporting his contention that Roman inscriptions make qualitive artistic connections, 
Stewart points out that some Roman artists went by the names of illustrious Greek 
predecessors: a family of sculptors using the name ‘Phidias’ is known to have been active 
in Rome, and the coincidence seems suspiciously fortuitous.363 The quality of being 
Greek is not an originary quality and the indicative power of the name to secure ethnic 
identity is compromised.  The standardization of signature inscriptions in this way effects 
an integration of ‘common cultural’ aspects (or expectations) related to art production 
with discrete ‘individual’ artefacts through a process of signatory superscription. 
Common cultural aspects of art production may be arranged around controlled religious 
principles, (as in Byzantine practice) or around geographical designation (for the 
speculative market in Renaissance Venice), or around notional individual expression, (the 
19th century bourgeois artist), but the means of their integration remains the same - it is 
always a signatory process. The standardization of signatory forms is the basis on which 
Derrida challenges the naturalized assumptions that underscore the construction of 
signature as a unique tethering to source. In autographic signatures, the operations of 
standardization are still present though they may appear to be suppressed at a stylistic 
level, but this is really a question of position on a scale which runs (typographically) from 
autographic gesture to stamp or print. When material and visual culture is structured 
according to the principles of non-fungibility, artefacts are relevant when they are seen to 
be ‘unique’ because signature and signatory processes tend to the gestural. When material 
and visual culture is structured according to the principles of substitutionality, artefacts 
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are relevant when they conform to type and signature and signatory process tend towards 
the brand or seal.  
 
 
6.1.5 INDIVIDUATION AND PERSONALITY 
 
Understanding the place of cartellini in Renaissance art necessitates an understanding of 
the intersection between the individual artist, (marked by the capacity to execute 
inventions), and the process of superscription which locates the artist in networks of 
broader associations, be they geographic, commercial, political or social, (and not simply 
‘artistic’ in any pure, idiomatic sense). If the mastery of representational skills appears to 
have allowed the artist to emerge against the object as an inventive individual and autopic 
authority, that emergence is nonetheless superscripted, as analysis of cartellini might 
suggest. In general, the notion of an inventive individual and expressive artistic 
personality is one which appears to counteract the idea that art production might be 
standardised. When the rhetoric of invention is dominant, signatures are accepted as signs 
which validate the uniqueness of artworks and artists. In the previous Chapter, the 
concept of artistic personality as a single point of collection was addressed in the context 
of the those ‘fictitious’ artists desired and constructed by art historians, who read notional 
traces of invention and idiosyncracy as evidence of creative coherence in and across 
artworks. Concomitantly, the concept of invention was read as a device through which 
Renaissance artists are differentiated from their Medieval predecessors in terms of self-
awareness and personal ‘boldness’. 
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This thesis is not predicated on an in-depth, philosophical interrogation of the ‘subject’ 
but, in default readings of artists’s signatures from the Renaissance onwards, 
‘subjectivity’ is held to empower the signatory to make a signature. Thus, the artistic 
subject is empowered to use signature to authenticate and designate artistic production 
(whatever the means of production may be). If signature is indicative of ‘lowest common 
denominator’ authorship, the signature of an empowered artistic subject is not necessarily 
indicative of creativity. Derrida does not subscribe to the determining power of authorial 
or artistic intent and holds the question of ‘intention’ for speech acts, and signature 
testifies to speech acts, to be spurious - a beguiling conceit which covers a relentless and 
unforgiving functionality with the guise of totality, integrity and (‘creative’ or ‘political’) 
control. As an expression of the subject, the involvement of invention with constructions 
of ‘personality’ would seem to produce methods of individuating artists in ways that are 
incompatible anything designed to standardize and guarantee aspects of superstructural 
production. Personality, at least in the modern sense, implies that issues of interior life, 
spirituality and pyschology are determinants of a human being’s irreducible singularity. 
Derrida demonstrates that signature can never manifest ‘wholeness’ or an integrated 
version of being because ‘being’ is not a state of singularity (it is an explosion of frames). 
The production of an aide-memoire necessiates the ‘sender/signatory’ becoming absent to 
the self and the signing subject at this most effective moment of surrogacy is shown to be 
incomplete, infected, never pure. The Derridean subject is a ‘dehiscence’ - signature is an 
extension, a surrogate, a prosthetic and proxy that cannot seal intent anymore than it can 
autonomously mark creativity. 
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Artistic personality is a difficult issue to tackle, situated as it is as a dynamis at the 
boundaries drawn between life and work; individual and society; private and public 
realms. It is easy to forget that personality is a historically contingent concept, especially 
given the centrality of the place it occupies in the modern and contemporary formulations 
of what an artist is and does. Williams included ‘personality’ as one of the terms he 
analysed in Keywords. He recounts that the roots of ‘personality’ derive from dual Latin 
roots - persona, which was used to indicate actor’s masks - and personalitas - which 
conveyed the sense of a being that was a ‘person not a thing’, (it could also be used to 
indicate personal property).364 ‘Genius’ has a similar and sympathetic dual root in ingenio 
and genius.365 Williams links the etymology of personality to notions of ‘character’ and 
‘individuality’, with the former etymologically connected to the Latin character - a word 
used to describe an instrument for engraving or impressing, and which has significance 
for Agamben’s understanding of signature - and the latter (given its own entry in 
Keywords) to the Latin indiviuus, a word which gives onto the notion of indivisibility. 
These are terms that orbit signature as something that is the same but different. Williams 
notes that the meaning of ‘personality’ moves ‘from a general to a specific or unique 
quality’, though there is not scope in Keywords to explain how this historical variation 
occurs within the concept of indivisibility, (e.g. the modern personality as an indivisible 
individual). The trajectory from genre-defined generality to specificity is one that is 
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prominently marked in the function of the artist, and the impossibility of the indivisible 
individual is what Derrida brings forward in his dealings with signature. 
 
The concept of artistic personality has required certain scaffoldings in its development, 
including marking the importance of technical skill; the elevation of the artist in social 
hierarchies; the establishment and reiteration of doxographical inheritances; reliance on 
myths of genius and on anecdotal narratives that construct exception as a feature of 
creativity. Kris & Kurz’s work on Classical sources for Renaissance biographical 
leitmotifs is relevant to any analysis of how the idea of personality came to occupy a 
central place in the make-up of the artist.366 Though it does not tackle the issue of 
signature per se or really develop any analysis of it, Kris & Kurz credit signature with 
breaching anonymity prior to the establishment of the fully fledged, artistic subject: 
The rare instances of an artist’s fame in the early Middle Ages always hark back to 
antiquity; wherever in the Romanesque or Gothic periods a breach of the tradition of 
artistic anonymity occurs - beginning, as before, with the appearance of artists’ signatures 
- the formal characteristics of the work of art are borrowed from Classical sources. 
Finally in the late Middle Ages, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the figure 
of the artist emerges on the historical scene and gains independent stature in every way, 
biography of the artist as an independent entity emerges as well. 367 
Kris & Kurz recast some of the apparently fallacious aspects of Vasari’s Lives as 
doxographical precedent and advance a reading of Vasari that views his hyperbole not as 
poor scholarship, rather as a necessary method. Thus, the noticeable occurrence of fixed 
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biographical themes in the histories of Renaissance artists indicate to Kris & Kurz that 
the history of art has proceeded mythopoetically from ‘the threshold of written history’, 
and that, in general, the urge to name an artist demonstrates that the (art) work no longer 
serves a religious or ritualistic purpose: rather, the work is a ‘creative achievement’.368 On 
this point, Osbourne's work demonstrates that this is not a universally applicable rule: 
there is no necessary incompatibility between ‘naming’ and ‘ritual’. Similarly, where 
signatures are supplications, ‘naming’ has an important religious purpose. With this 
caveat in mind, it is true to say that signatory names are necessary in the construction of 
artworks and the history of artworks because naming and signature permit chronology. It 
is temporal linearity that attenuates cultural artefacts as art along chronological lines 
under the guise of ‘creative achievement’. To clarify, individuation of the artist by name 
does not generate chronology as a necessary consequence, but chronology is one of the 
functions that individuation allows. One of the things Kris & Kurz demonstrate in the 
course of their analysis is the fallacy that marks names and signatures as self-contained 
points of origin or ‘personality’ in the attenuations of chronology. Biographical anecdotes 
and accounts of Giotto’s life have many points of connection with the biography of 
Lysippus, which itself was commingled with themes from Homeric epic: 
The fragments of the earliest Greek biographies of artists that can be reconstructed from 
subsequent borrowings all stem from a period in which the figure of the artist had only 
just emerged from the realm of myth; they preserve the conception and many elements of 
myths and transmit them to posterity… Pliny drew on both the biographical and 
doxographical traditions of Greece. He conferred a dual role on artists, attempting to 
honour the innovator for inventing a particular technique or making a particular advance, 
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and yet to set out as detailed pupil-teacher genealogies as possible. Pliny’s method 
formed one of the bridges across which this basic conception was transmitted to 
subsequent historical writings. We encounter this constellation at the very beginning of 
modern biography of artists in modern times - in the famous story of Giotto’s youth.369 
Giotto is not merely ‘Giotto’, he is also Lysippus, and he is also Odysseus. It is possible 
to see the operation of the Derridean abyss in this: just as the application of the name 
‘Vincent’ to a painting of some old shoes allows various ‘truth’ claims to be made, 
Giotto’s name and signature potentially brings a range of leitmotifs and anecdotes into 
view. If invention can be visibly appreciated in the demonstration of skill, or rationalized 
as technological progress, (Van Eyck’s ‘discovery’ of oil painting), when it is seen as a 
mythic link - biographical and doxographical - between, for example, Giotto and the 
revered artists of antiquity, it is allied to, and justifies, the artist’s naturalism in order that 
he might be constructed as recognizably and intrinsically ‘exceptional’ and talented. In its 
genesis, artistic ‘personality’ is superscripted or underwritten by precedents relayed 
informally and stealthily as anecdotes. The leitmotifs that Kris & Kurz write about are 
ways of rationalising ‘talent’, making it safe to appreciate. 
 
 
6.1.6 FAME 
 
Lysippus was Alexander’s ‘official’ sculptor and Appelles his ‘official’ painter, and some 
of the anecdotes detailed by Kris & Kurz exploit these connections. Connections between 
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Lysippus, Appelles and Alexander involve ‘personalities’ that were contemporaneous, 
and what works to establish doxographical inheritances across centuries also works to 
open channels of value between simultaneous individuals. To some extent, Lysippus, 
Appelles and Alexander profit by association. In his study of fame, Leo Braudy contends 
that these artists, whose work is reputed from copies and anecdotes, (so there is no 
‘original’ work extant), are substantiated as ‘great’ because it was Alexander who 
commissioned them to make work in the wake his first victories.370 A ‘great’ man himself, 
Alexander recognised and could afford superior talent; Appelles and Lysippus basked in 
his aura as he was vindicated by the monuments and images they constructed for him. 
This vital circuit of fame and profit is a short-circuit in which the recognized names of all 
parties conduct glory and honour as exception and value. 
 
Braudy’s history demonstrates that fame, like art, is a commingling of myth and history. 
Braudy recognizes ‘The Homeric Pattern’ and Odysseus as deliberate and determining 
precedents for Alexander’s self-creation and epochal pursuit of fame, (fame is something 
that Alexander had to work to create rather than receive or experience), and he recognizes 
the instrumental place art and monumentalisation played in that. From Braudy’s 
perspective, the history of fame is in no small sense a history of art, so entwined are the 
practices of image-making with the construction of fame and reputation. Considering the 
Renaissance, Braudy contemplates the issue of artists’ signatures directly: 
The supposed anonymity of medieval artists is part of a genial nineteenth century myth 
about a golden age before commercial ambitiousness ruined art. Artists have signed 
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works and their names have been known ever since art reached beyond the local village 
to a market where someone might admire the work but might not know where to get his 
own version of it. A signature on a piece of Greek pottery for example, where so many of 
the names of the earliest artists are found, was part publicity and part contract, displaying 
the patron’s taste in his purchase from so renown a master and guaranteeing the work by 
the master’s own name... From our point of view, every Greek artist painting the gods on 
a krater and every celebrator of the pharaoh in stone was adding a nuance to the visual 
terminology of divinity.371 
Braudy noticeably connects signatures to ‘export’ in a conceptual sense and also to issues 
of status and guarantee.  Given the scope of his project and angle from which he 
approaches it, Braudy has not conducted in-depth research into artists’s signatures. 
Consequently, he relies on several naturalized assumptions about them, the most telling 
of which in this passage produces the elision between ‘signature’, ‘art’ and ‘painting’ in 
Greek pottery, (the inference being that it is the painter, not the potter who is the ‘artist’). 
When he considers Renaissance artists, he suggests that the intention of artists when they 
signed works from the 15th century onwards was qualitatively different to those that 
preceded them, principally because artists were less constricted by guilds and were more 
mobile: 
...if he dared and had talent, he could travel to gather inspiration from other artists and art 
works, to seek out new patrons, and to become a member of an international class called 
“artists”. For the artists, signatures became calling cards. For the patron, the signature 
made the painting a more valuable possession, and the most prestige-sensitive rulers 
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began to collect artists as well. The pilgrimage to Italy and to Rome became an important 
part of the education of any artist of aspiration...372 
Trade monograms were, of course, important precedents for artists’s signatures, but 
interestingly, Braudy links signature to ‘export’ - here, it is artists themselves who travel, 
(as opposed to artworks). They become ‘pilgrims’, individuals on personal Odysseys, (in 
pursuit of fame), and Braudy reflects the view that the Reniassance signature segued with 
personal daring, talent and novelty. 
 
Braudy also alludes to the place of the ‘connoisseur’ in artists’ signatory practice, 
suggesting that the connoisseur’s habit of ‘collecting’ promoted it. This is an allusion that 
cannot be taken at face value - certainly by the 16th century, there is evidence to suggest 
that ‘prestige-sensitive rulers’ and connoisseurs were increasingly averse to signatures on 
artworks, preferring gestural ‘tells’. Signature has a more convincing relationship with 
speculative markets than with court patrons. So, although Giotto is known to have signed 
some of his work - for example, the Stefaneschi Triptych (c.1320) bears his name as does 
St. Francis of Assisi Receiving the Stigmata (c.1290) - these works are ‘generally 
regarded as school pieces bearing his trademark, whereas the Ognissanti Madonna, 
unsigned and virtually undocumented, is so superlative in quality that it is accepted as 
entirely by his hand.’373 Here, signature is a mark of an inferior product, something 
produced by a workshop and not wholly determined by the artist’s hand. It is read as a 
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mark associated with ‘trade’ rather than vocational talent, which is ideally unsullied by 
commerce.  
 
What becomes clear reading Braudy is that Renaissance individuation of artists can be 
seen to be part of a general trend manifest in religion and politics as well as culture. In 
other words, Renaissance artists were no more individuated or self-conscious than any 
other ‘profession’: individuation was a pose within the cultural mores of the day, so to 
mark the signatures of artists during the Renaissance as indicative of exception on the 
basis of an advanced self-awareness is somewhat misleading. What is read as a signal of 
differentiation from a class of ‘anonymous’ artisans can also also be read as a sign of 
affiliation with others engaged in the pursuit of fame in public life which enjoyed a 
superstructural revivification at the time: 
The imagistic preoccupation with fame from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries 
therefore indicates the way that artists identified their cultural importance with that of the 
public men they celebrated...374   
During the Renaissance, artists’s signatures deployed in cities and in public: this is an 
important condition to remember, (artists are not merely or primarily signing work in 
private supplication). It is a condition of signature that Camille’s analysis of 13th century 
marginalia underwrites to some extent. The relative visibility of artists’s signatures 
appears to turn on the proximity and structural anonymity of the critical masses described 
by urban populations, the division of labour precipitated in cities, and the presence of a 
number of trade competitors. Once again, the pragmatic considerations which precipate 
signature are located in everday life, not within the idiom of painting or sculpture. 
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In those histories that seek the emergence of the artist-genius in the Renaissance, fame is 
seen to follow to the artist’s desire to be credited for creative achievements. Vasari says 
that Michelangelo signed his Pietà because it had been mistakenly attributed to another 
sculptor and Michelangelo wanted to claim renown for himself.375 Influenced by Vasari, 
those signatures which appear in art made during or after the Renaissance are read 
retrospectively in the same vein and signature is seen to mark the pursuit of recognition. 
Investigating beyond this assumption reveals signatory practice as less an individual, 
creative expression than a social practice: if signatures mark ‘invention’ and ‘glory’, they 
simultaneously mark tradition and locale. 
 
 
6.1.7 ANONYMITY 
 
Fame exists as the antonym of anonymity, a topic that has already been broached in 
relation to the production of icons and the St Bartholomew Altarpiece. Anonymity is a 
huge topic in itself, and an extended consideration of it here is not possible. Suffice to say 
that framing material and visual culture around the concept of fungibility or 
substitutionality, rather than the elevation and suppression of talent, inflects the 
conceptualisation of anonymity. Consequently, the conventional grounds for 
conceptualising the artistic subject are somehwat displaced. When artefacts are fungible, 
artists, artisans, donors etc. are essentially irrelevant, so the question of their being 
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anonymous or extra-historical is not germane, (objects are more important than people). 
It is in the hierarchical attenuations of linear time and in the urbanisation of populations 
that the relationship between the artist, donor and artwork (mutually individuated) seems 
to require signature (public or private). That is not to discount the possibility that when 
artefacts are fungibile and artists are ‘anonymous’, signatures (or more specifically the 
idea of signatures) cannot be seen to play a role in intertextual performance, a point 
Osbourne makes in relation to Greek pottery and North makes in relation to the complex 
authorial stances to be found in Renaissance literature. 
 
The conventional position in art historical narrative is to understand the condition of 
artistic anonymity as a condition of the Middle Ages, and consequently, it denies a more 
nuanced understanding of the interxtuality of authorship. Anonymity is condition can be 
pitched against the individuation of the artist because the Medieval artwork, (which, in 
the scheme of substitutionality, has an integrity preventing it from ever being 
anonymous), is approached from a position in which the artist is more important than the 
object, so, the historical default is to read the anonymity of the artist as inevitable and 
‘primordial’ when it deals with Medieval artefacts (or artworks). In the pejorative 
judgments of 19th and 20th century art historians, Medieval art is seen to have acquired 
anonymity from the high achievements of Classical forebears as a result of poor 
craftsmanship and intellectual laxity.376 
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At this point, Kubler’s work The Shape of Time suggests itself because Kubler concerns 
himself with the issue of ‘invention’ and ‘individuation’ at the level of ‘prime objects’ 
rather than human artists, (who thus ought to be relegated to anonymity).377 Kubler 
believes that undue attention has been paid to biographical imperatives in art history, and 
that this has been exacerbated by the metaphorical shaping of history in the 19th century 
as a rational, evolutionary process. Kubler appreciates the somewhat arbitrary nature of 
individual ‘success’ in art: 
Each man’s lifework is also a work in a series extending beyond him in either or both 
directions, depending upon his position in the track he occupies. To the usual coordinates 
fixing the individual’s position - his temperament and his training - there is also the 
moment of his entrance, this being the moment in tradition - early, middle or late - with 
which his biological opportunity coincides.378 
For Kubler, the issue of entrance determines the extent to which invention and creative 
achievement can be credited to an individual. Derrida’s understanding of signature has 
some bearing on theorizing this kind of entrance because as the moment of insertion into 
tradition, ‘entrance’ is like signature, (always requiring countersignature; impossible to 
contain within a moment). When Kubler mentions artists’s signatures, it is to rebut the 
(apparent) assumption that signatures necessarily mark important works: 
Signatures and dates inscribed upon works of art by their authors in no way assure us that 
they are prime. Most works of art, moreover, are anonymous, and they fall naturally into 
large groups. Under most circumstance the prime objects have disappeared under the 
mass of replicas, where their discovery is most difficult and problematic...379 
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For Kubler, entrance is not as important as conventional art histories would have it - he 
wants to expunge the artist’s signature from art history’s toolbox. Despite his 
protestations against the biographical imperative in art history (signified, for him, by 
signature), Kubler wishes to assert prime objects as coherent points of origin and in this 
he imitates the signatory process: he merely shifts the focus from the artist (back) to the 
object. If there is a case for stating that the artist emerges against the object during the 
Renaissance, the value of Kubler’s theory is to raise the possibility that this emergence 
was the realignment of the signatory process, rather than its commencement in any 
absolute sense. Kubler’s prime objects may be read as ‘ur-signatures’ and in this respect, 
there is a sympathy with Foucauldian transdiscursivity: Kubler is in pursuit of the prime 
object as the visual equivalent of an ‘-ism’ since prime objects are those objects which 
beget new series and an ‘-ism’ ‘abstracts and essentializes a corpus of originary texts as it 
institutes the hermeneutic spirit that they demand’.380 Ultimately, like Beazley, like 
Berenson, Kubler dispenses with artists’s signatures in favour of constructive anonymity 
because individual signatures are too particular, inconsistent and troublesome to fit with 
the ur-signature and narrative he wishes to promote. 
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6.1.8 GESTURE 
 
Insistent on the value of hand-craft in the genesis of prime objects, Kubler nevertheless 
chooses to ignore the theoretical issue of ‘gesture’ in The Shape of Time. Of all the 
devices that individuation employs, as a sum-zero empiricism, gesture is the most 
reductive and unarguable. If personality renders the subject an indivisible individual, in 
art that indivisibility is expressed generically in the gestural trace of physical engagement 
with material. In art, skill and gesture can appear to have an intimate relationship: the 
practice of former enables the latter, (as in the case of Chinese calligraphy and 
watercolour painting). Conversely, talent manifests gesture in that quotient of skill that 
cannot be copied, learnt or practiced, (and is thus ‘God-given’). Gesture and skill exist 
together in mutually dependent paradox, divided by their relationship to repetition. 
Inevitably, given the premium placed on individuation, during the Renaissance the 
balance swings towards ‘unrepeatable’ talent rather than ‘repetitive’ skill as a method for 
discerning gesture and value in artworks, so by the 16th century, artworks are appreciated 
on the basis of sprezzatura.  
 
The relationship between gesture, chance and materiality has not only been presented as 
‘unreadable’, but used to vindicate the vicissitudes of artistic ‘success’ by means of 
rationalising ‘luck’ and ‘talent’ - ‘chance’ and ‘gesture’ are recurrent themes in the 
anecdotes analysed by Kris & Kurz. When gesture, (which does not admit correction), is 
seen to irreducibly embody the trace of talent and exception through material - in the 
brushstrokes of a painting, for example - the appending of a written signature is not only 
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unnecessary but too obvious for connoisseur-initiates, privy (by virtue of their own 
superior aesthetic experiences) to recognising the superiority of an artwork or the 
handiwork of specific individuals on the basis of a developed ‘eye’. This is aesthetic 
appreciation as aristocratic virtue. The concept of sprezzatura relies upon the variability 
in visibility that superficially illegible, unwritten signatures (signatory gestures) permit. 
 
Gesture is heavily implicated in the Romantic construction of genius which promoted the 
assumptions of individual creative omnipotence. As the unrepeatable, physical trace of a 
particular individual working in a particular way at a particular time according to his or 
her own determination, it might be read as marking an ‘event’, and the event appears to 
oppose standardisation. Ideologically, in the 17th and 18th centuries, as industrialization 
began to replace the artisan with the machine operator, the skills associated with artisan-
craft were understood to be ‘reproducible’. In parallel, in art, a concomitant premium was 
placed on those skills which were valued as ‘unreproducible’. Gesture, already the 
vehicle for the expression and recognition of genius, was gradually recognised as the 
vehicle for unreproducibility at a material level per se. The involvement of gesture in the 
ideology surrounding industrialization, the reproducibility of manual skills and the 
alienation of man by machine, are implicated in the construction of artistic labour as 
exemplary and unalienated. The artistic subject (an indivisible individual) covers all 
production processes involved in the realisation of an artwork. Any division of labour is 
hidden from view. Art seems to present work as an opportunity to resist the ‘commodity’ 
because it appears to allow all of its moments of production to be determined by the 
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artist’s subjectivity.381 The artist overwrites production so it is presumed that the work of 
art cannot be standardised. Ironically, given its relationship to the hand and ‘touch’, 
gesture trades on a notional ability to infuse artworks with an ‘intangible’ quality, and of 
course, in order to be recognised this quality has to operate exactly like signature, (there 
is no more tethering to source in a characteristic sweeping brushstroke than there is an 
enigmatic paraph). For the Renaissance connoisseur, who became antipathetic to 
immediately legible, vulgar names on artworks, gesture (as sprezzatura and maniera) 
offered the satisfaction of tying the artwork to knowledge that is reserved elsewhere, (i.e. 
the identity of the artist, other works by the artist, other works by other artists and the 
characteristics of specific ‘schools’). In this an artist’s characteristic gesture is merely a 
less accessible signature and admits standardization in the need for attribution. 
 
 
6.2 SIGNATURE AS DESTINATION  
 
Considering the pursuit of fame, Braudy mentions the lure of Italy and Rome for artists of 
‘talent and ambition’, and in doing so, he hints at an incipient connection between travel - 
the ‘export of artists’ - and signatures. Renaissance signatures act much like landmarks. 
Like Braudy, Wood - discussing the fame of Dürer and his predecessor, Martin 
Schöngauer - touches upon the ‘landmark’ function of signature: 
Martin Schöngauer was the first famous German artist, because of his initials. Initials and 
other marks on prints were originally marks for trade insiders, quality control, meant to 
be inconspicuous. On early prints they are never expanded into full names. With 
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Schöngauer, who began monogramming prints in the early 1470s, the initials became a 
signature, for his fame was such that everyone, or at least quite a lot of people, could 
expand the initials into a name. The initials became a return address, literally a 
destination for a young artist like Dürer. 382 
Wood’s metaphorical description of Schöngauer’s monogram as a return address is not 
incidental. The relationship between signature and destination is an important one: 
genius, afterall, is founded in the ‘spirit of place’. In its descent as a mark of authority, 
signature inherits a geographical function which ultimately allows the artwork to operate 
nomadically. Those art historical narratives that accept the Renaissance as an era of 
singular ‘greatness’ formulated at the level of personal individuation and creative self-
consciousness, suppress signature’s pragmatic geographical lineage. Matthew’s study of 
cartellini reveals the geographical connection, as does Wood’s analysis of authentica, 
which assesses them as correctives for the inadequacy of ‘place’ and ‘thing’. Wood lays 
bare the circumstances which contributed to the increasingly adopted mobile and portable 
forms adopted by Renaissance artworks. Artworks retain the vestiges of their origin ‘in 
place’. 
 
Derrida says that as an aperture effect, signature is ‘topologically assignable’ and that in 
signature, ‘nothing will have taken place but the place’.383 In his post 9/11 interview with 
Giovanni Borrardi, Derrida discusses the means by which ‘September 11’ crystallises as 
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a destination/designation.384 These ‘means’ are signatory processes and it is worth 
quoting at length what he says: 
…to be an event that truly marks, that truly makes its mark, a singular and, as they say 
here, ‘unprecedented’ event… ‘To mark a date in history’ presupposes, in any case, that 
‘something’ comes or happens for the first and last time… ‘Something’ took place, we 
have the feeling of not having seen it coming, and certain consequences undeniably 
follow upon the ‘thing’. But this very thing, the place and meaning of this ‘event’, 
remains ineffable, like an intuition without concept, like a unicity with no generality on 
the horizon or with no horizon at all, out of range for a language that admits its 
powerlessness and so is reduced to pronouncing mechanically a date, repeating it 
endlessly, as a kind of ritual incantation, a conjuring poem, a journalistic litany or 
rhetorical refrain that admits to not knowing what it’s talking about. We do not in fact 
know what we are saying or naming in this way: September 11, le 11 septembre, 
September 11. The brevity of the appellation (September 11, 9/11) stems not only from 
an economic or rhetorical necessity. The telegram of this metonymy- a name, a number -
points out the unqualifiable by recognizing that we do not recognize or even cognize that 
we do not yet know how to qualify, that we do not know what we are talking about. 385 
In a similar fashion, in his novel White Noise, Don De Lillo neatly encapsulates the 
interplay between geographic and signatory processes when he describes the ‘Most 
Photographed Barn in America’: 
‘No one sees the barn,’ he said finally. A long silence followed. ‘Once you've seen the 
signs about the barn, it becomes impossible to see the barn.’ He fell silent once 
more.  People with cameras left the elevated site, replaced by others. ‘We’re not here to 
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capture an image, we’re here to maintain one. Every photograph reinforces the aura. Can 
you feel it, Jack? An accumulation of nameless energies.’ There was an extended 
silence. The man in the booth sold postcards and slides. ‘Being here is a kind of spiritual 
surrender. We see only what the others see. The thousands who were here in the past, 
those who will come in the future. We've agreed to be part of a collective perception. It 
literally colours our vision. A religious experience in a way, like all tourism.’ Another 
silence ensued.386 
Place is established by repetition. When the ‘event’ becomes familiar it is as place, and 
geographical designation is revealed as a signatory process, opening, for example, onto 
historically delimited ideas concerning the ‘picturesque’. The notion of the ‘picturesque’ 
was formulated in the 18th century, contemporaneously to the establishment of Grand 
Tour itineraries with their emphasis on recognisable attractions.387 The picturesque turns 
upon the determination of the ‘best’ (i.e. singular) viewpoint from which to experience a 
landscape.388 Through its relationship to viewpoint, the picturesque belies a relationship 
to signature. 
 
The issue of ‘convenience’ - the convenience afforded by landmarks and ‘views’ - is an 
important one for signature and is allied to abbreviation, ‘short-hand’. In Foucault’s 
Renaissance épistème, ‘convenience’ (convenienta) describes a form of similitude based 
on physical proximity. When physical proximity is challenged - as it is when the 
authenticum, separated from its relic-substrate, is put into circulation and becomes the 
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template for the modern work of art - one of the functions of the document is to impute 
‘convenience’, in the sense of restating a specific propinquity and origin. The testimony 
of the document - and the signatures which verify documents - supplants the material 
evidence of place, (which is ideally experienced directly). Signature aspires, ultimately 
unsuccessfully, to carry the integrity of place (or person) within itself. 
 
 
6.2.1 THE GRAND TOUR 
 
The picturesque developed as a correlate to tourism. The Grand Tour - an extended trip to 
visit famous sites and ruins in the Southern Mediterranean - was established in 18th 
century Europe. By this time, the fame of Renaissance artists was widespread enough to 
attract the attention not only of ‘artists of talent and ambition’, but of those wealthy 
individuals generally engaged on the Tour. For Tourists, the signatures of artists 
performed as landmarks and were seen by some to have a detrimental effect on the 
educative potential of the artworks that carried them. Coupled with the general character 
of the Tourists (who lack expertise or Fine Art training), the signatures of artists appear to 
separate from the image or object and progress forward, with the consequence that the 
physical, visual substrate is relegated to the background. Signatures interfere with the act 
of contemplative aesthetic appreciation, which retains an enigmatic quality. The English 
painter, Sir Joshua Reynolds, complained in a letter written during travels in Italy about 
the behaviour of Tourists: 
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Instead of examining the beauties of the works of fame, and why they are esteemed, they 
only enquire the subject of a picture, and where it is found, and write that down. Some 
Englishmen while I was in the Vatican came there and spent about six hours in writing 
down whatever the antiquary dictated to them. They scarcely looked at the paintings the 
whole time.389 
Reynolds’s opinion expresses one problem with artists’s signatures: like the ‘subject’ of a 
painting, they risk becoming more important, more ‘visible’ than the work they relate to 
and not only do they prevent any ‘objective’ aesthetic appreciation, they are a siren-like 
distraction from the presence of the artwork. This is the same criticism that Panofsky 
makes of Van Eyck’s signature on the Arnolfini Portrait; that Seidel makes in relation to 
the signature of Gislebertus at Autun, and that Kubler makes in general. It is a criticism 
of signature’s ability to accelerate encounters and information. Once more, signatures are 
seen to act as ‘short-circuits’. The bourgeois vulgarity of Tourist-Philistines, who want 
immediate access to knowledge without devoting time to learning, is not only a vulgarity 
despised by educated aristocrats who appreciate sprezzatura, it relays the fear of 
Thaumus that Derrida describes in Plato’s Pharmacy. The issue is one of pace. 
 
 
6.2.2 COUNTERFEITING 
 
Like many travelling artists in Italy in the 18th century, Reynolds acted as a dealer as well 
as an artist. The synthesis of these roles was common enough, and Reynolds had many 
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varied first-hand dealings with Tourists.390 Bernard Denvir refers to Horace Walpole’s 
view of the Grand Tour’s affect on Italy, which swarmed with: ‘picture jobbers… 
importing, by ship loads, Dead Christs, Holy Families, Madonnas and other dark dismal 
subjects, on which they scrawl the names of Italian masters.’391 Denvir carries on to say: 
… a whole host of Jacobite refugees such as Andrew Lumisden and Robert Strange, who 
supplemented their meager salaries or pensions they received from the Stuarts by 
dabbling in the sale of paintings and classical statues. Behind these dealers were the 
native Italian painters and sculptors ‘restoring’ Greek and Roman statues, faking 
Leonardos and Guido Renis, or sometimes, as with the immensely successful Pompeo 
Batoni, painting portraits of visiting Milords.392 
In Denvir’s view, the vulgarity of the legible, trade-piece signature is connected to the 
explicit opportunities for counterfeit. Unlike the more dissolute gestures carried in 
sprezzatura or maniera, written signatures have a prima facie legibility and tightly 
designed self-similar forms that quite explicitly permit ‘passing off’. In Derridean terms, 
signature always already requires countersignature - a counterfeit of itself - in order to 
become effective. This necessary division makes room for fraud as well as legibility. It is 
easier to copy a tightly described paraph than it is to sustain a convincing gestural 
imitation, so often for curators and dealers, the presence of a signature on an artwork 
raises suspicion, rather than providing reassurance.  
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Nicholas Barker says, in relation to a group of fakes and forgeries which have made their 
way into the British Museum: 
The final strand in the story… is the new demand for the ‘autograph’… The substitution 
of hand-made signs, by definition none the same, for the hieratic uniformity of seal, 
tughra, paraph, mason’s mark or brand was a product of Renaissance humanism. The 
concept of personality spread from the writing of a name to the individuality expressed in 
the making of any artefact.393  
Although artistic gesture also becomes recognisable through a signatory process of 
comparison, the methods of stylistic comparisons are more diffuse with the result that the 
opportunities for deliberate fraud are relatively more complex. Until the advent of highly 
scientific, technological analyses of the physical processes and materials which constitute 
artworks (work on pigments, for example), recognition and verification of artist style by 
experts was the highest test of authenticity available. In a speculative market or a trade in 
antiques (as opposed to a market which proceeds on the basis of commission), 
unscrupulous artists and dealers can pass-off inferior goods to unenlightened and 
unexperienced clients by the devious application of a ‘fake’ signature, or by bearing false 
witness. Fake signatures work by fulfilling the expectations of clients, utilising 
signature’s apparent ability to speed up delivery of information, and in this respect they 
point to standardisation as an operational ideal within art. 
 
 
                                                
393 Jones. op. cit. p25 
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6.2.3 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MUSEUM COLLECTIONS 
 
The magnetic qualities that Reynolds saw signatures exerting over Tourist-Philstines 
conspire to make signatures conduits for familiarity and convenience. They are short-cuts 
and an anathema to proper education, the device of Sophists. The ‘fake Leonardos and 
Guido Renis’ produced by picture-jobbers are connected by Denvir to the flourishing 
trade in importing Italian paintings to England. England was at the forefront of 
industrialisation and embourgeoisment in the 18th century. Denvir suggests that this gave 
rise to an associated need to furnish newly built or extended mansions: 
Whereas in the seventeenth century there were about twenty English art collectors of 
importance, by the middle of the eighteenth there must have been well over two hundred, 
and they were no longer confined to the aristocracy. 394 
The question of how the new cadre of collectors negotiated their way towards building a 
collection is one that is intimately bound together with the development of Grand 
Tourism and the role signatures play as landmarks. Signatures appear to allow uncultured 
industrialists to acquire culture, becoming landmarks in itineraries and travelogues like 
Jonathan Richardson the Elder’s An Account of Some of the Statues, Bas-Reliefs, 
Drawings, and Pictures in Italy (1722), Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman 
Empire (1776) and the etchings of Giovanni Piranesi, which were instrumental in shaping 
the developing body of knowledge related to issues of artistic taste, (the developing 
science of aesthetics). In the 18th century, taste and Tourism were in a symbiotic 
relationship. If sprezzatura notionally dissolved the literal signature in the 16th century, 
                                                
394 Ibid. p.7 
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the combination of Grand Tourism and growing Academicism seems to have reasserted it 
in the centuries that followed. 
 
The establishment of these collections relied on the familiarity of markers provided by 
signatures, biographies and itineraries. These same markers, which on a functional level 
permit counterfeits, (permission that, in a ‘hot’ market, encourages opportunists to exploit 
signatures), are noticeable in narratives connected with the establishment of state 
collections too. Jenny Graham links the revival of Van Eyck’s reputation to the Grand 
Tour circuit, the growth of connoisseurship in the 18th century and the literary narration 
of art history by pioneering commentators such as Andre Félibien, whom she notes 
brought Van Eyck’s name into the lexicon of the French Academy with the publication of 
Entretiens sur les vies et les ouvrages de plus excellens peintures.395 Graham does not 
discuss Van Eyck’s signatory practice in any great detail, but she notes that Van Eyck’s 
signature on the Portrait of a Man with a Red Turban (1433) ‘with its perceived proofs of 
great age and celebrity authorship’, had enough cachet to prompt forgery of ‘Van Eycks’ 
as early as the 1720s: The Enthronement of St Romold of Malines, was given a Van Eyck 
signature and a date of 1421 in the 1720s (probably) by William Sykes, a ‘noted 
trickster’.396 In particular, Graham looks at the way the reputation of Van Eyck was 
resurrected during the 19th century and became considered a ‘proto-modern’ artist. She 
attributes the ‘worldwide celebrity’ that Van Eyck enjoys today principally to the work of 
                                                
395 Graham, J. Inventing Van Eyck: The remaking of an artist for the Modern Age 
(Oxford: Berg, 2007) p24 
396 Ibid. p39 
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Jean-Baptiste Descamps.397 When Napoleon directed his army to loot panels, they did so 
on the basis of Descamps’s scholarship and the ‘booty’,  including the Ghent Altarpiece, 
was put on display in the Louvre. Ensconced in museums and public collections, 
artworks were not only overwritten by institutional imprimaturs, but established in the 
imaginations of the growing ‘publics’ for art too: ‘[The] Arnolfini portrait in particular 
carrying Van Eyck’s name to a new audience when it made its debut at London’s 
National Gallery in 1843 to crowds of visitors…’398 
 
 
6.2.4 19th CENTURY SIGNATORY PRACTICE 
 
Van Eyck’s elevation to art historical prominence during the 19th century is simultaneous 
with a time in which artists’s signatures took a fully fledged vernacular, calligraphic form 
and were cemented in position as autographs. Reviewing the Joconde database which 
holds information relating to the collections of some 300 French Museums, Charlotte 
Guichard observes that during the 17th and 18th centuries, signatory practice was 
irregular, seemingly dictated by the whim of the (individual) artist.399 It was, according to 
Guichard, only in the 19th century that signatory practice became more systematic. Her 
contention is that this is due to the interlinked development of the art market, 
(antiquarian) connoisseurship and the establishment of new museums which benefited (in 
                                                
397 Ibid. p5 
398 Ibid. p6 
399  Guichard, C. ‘La signature dans le tableau aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles: identité, 
réputation et marché de l'art’ Sociétés & Représentations 1 (2008) pp47-77  
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France) from the seizure and dispersal of aristocratic art collections. At this time, 
discussion about the authenticity of artworks in Museums took on a public character and 
the significance of artists’s signatures was newly prominent.400 In the second half of the 
18th century, attribution became more important than ‘aesthetic’ consideration, because 
the artist’s name as la griffe (a ‘label’) had a transformative, magic quality, propagated in 
part by the desire to catalogue and list paintings as objects for sale in the dispersal of 
aristocratic collections.401 
 
Keen to stabilize the irregular practice of signature within an objective framework prior 
to the 19th century, Guichard looks to its appearance in morceaux de réception between 
1648 and 1793. Morceaux de réception are paintings or sculptures which were supposed 
to demonstrate the artist’s technical and intellectual accomplishment, acquired through 
training at L’Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Beaux-Arts, on the occasion of the artist’s 
admission to L’Academie Royale. Guichard notes that until 1750, these paintings were 
almost never signed; in the 1750s, 3 out of 30 morceaux were signed; in the 1760s, the 
proportion was 7 signed out of 26; in the 1780s, 10 from 37. By her account, during the 
second half of the 18th century, the proportion of signed paintings submitted to the 
Academy was small but growing, and she suggests that in the absence of a larger 
statistical analysis, the habits of the Academicians can be used as the basis for forming a 
view of artists’s habits more broadly. 
 
                                                
400 Ibid. p52   
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Guichard concentrates her analysis on the practice of two French, 18th century genre 
painters - Joseph Vernet and François Boucher. She contends that Vernet, a prolific 
painter of seascapes who frequently signed his work, exploited his association with 
prestigious, public commissions by assiduously applying his signature on work for 
private sale. Subsequently, collectors buying Vernet’s paintings paid for ‘his name’ and 
he became symbolically associated with the fashionable, cultivated élite in France. 
Boucher similarly made his signature an element of value in his pastoral allegories. In 
Guichard’s reading of signature, market awareness is put before self-expression, 
assertions of skill or creative pride. She contends that the signatory habits of Vernet and 
Boucher (and by extension artists like them) cannot be read in opposition to ‘artisanal’ 
practice, in fact, their practice is ‘inscribed in corporate traditions’.402 Signature is in this 
analysis, not a practice that developed within the idiom or expressive space of painting. If 
the Renaissance saw the integration of signature within the image as trompe l’oeil 
illustrations of skill, for Guichard, the 18th century marks the time when signature is 
noticeably released from the representative schema of paintings and its equivalence to an 
artisan’s mark is unmasked. There is a noticeable and increasing heterogeneity between 
image and signature. Accompanying such hetereogenity is an increasing use of 
vernacular spelling, the gradual abandonment of qualifying words like faciebat, pinxit, 
fecit etc. and the ‘triumph’ of cursive script, which is more personal and discrete than a 
signature written in Roman capitals.  
 
                                                
402  Ibid. p53 (cf. McGregor and the painters of Sèvres) 
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Guichard remarks on the increasingly ‘notaristic’ form of signatures.403 Bracketing 
artists’s signatures with those of notaires, Guichard shares an approach with Smith and 
Seidel, who remark on the notaristic aspects of Van Eyck’s Arnolfini signature. The 
autographic value of the manuscript signature is precisely what allows the assumptions 
that underscore the conceptual understanding of signature as a unique tethering to source 
to become naturalized. The apparent ubiquity of handwritten signatures in the 19th and 
20th centuries, (in art and in ‘everyday’ life - general literacy in Europe improved at this 
time), and the concomitant desire to seal the (signing) subject as an expressive, 
empowered individual, established the autograph as a form which presented itself as 
immemorial, beyond history. The individual is held to become accountable in everyday 
life (through the signature) parallel to becoming an expressive and creative personality in 
art (through the signature). The gestural aspects of the autograph supress its functional 
ancestry in tooled stamps and seals because the presumption that the artist is an 
individual expressing unique thoughts or visions is tied to an ideology that requires the 
bourgeois artist to represent unalieneated labour and unrepeatable creativity. 
 
 
6.3 COURBET AND DUCHAMP 
 
Guichard opens her consideration of signatures with a quote from Oscar Wilde’s The 
Portrait of Dorian Gray: ‘… “It is quite finished,” he cried at last, and stooping down he 
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wrote his name in long vermillion letters on the left hand corner of the canvas’.404 In 
Wilde’s novel, the signature of Sir Basil Hallward on the portrait is an apparently final 
gesture, an action which simultaneously alludes to the completion of the painting and the 
birth of the work of art, (which, in the case of Dorian Gray, is literally living).405 
Guichard points out that the artist’s signature is the only element of the painting which 
does not change, (in Derridean terms, it is the principle of constant lack and motion made 
visible). The form of Hallward’s fictive signature can be seen to imitate life closely when 
it is compared to that the ‘real’ signatures of Gustave Courbet, an artist who experienced 
fame and notoriety first-hand during his lifetime. Courbet habitually signed his work in 
what Michael Fried calls ‘carnal red, in letters that have an obdurate corporeality of their 
own: the signature in Courbet’s paintings and drawings is never merely a verbal 
signifier’.406 Widely recognised, Courbet’s signatory practice is a good indicator of the 
form and function of artists’s signatures in the 19th century, and it is, I suggest, the 
immediate precedent for the ‘R. Mutt’ signature on Fountain. 
 
 
6.3.1 COMMERCIALISM 
 
As can be seen in what has already been examined in relation to Roman artists signing 
their work with Greek names, the establishment of cartellini as an expedient sign of type 
                                                
404  Wilde, O. ‘The Portrait of Dorian Gray’, The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde, 
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405  Guichard, op. cit. 
406 Fried, M. Courbet’s Realism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) p108 
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in 15th century Venice, the counterfeit productions of 16th century ‘picture jobbers’ and 
the savy of an 18th century artist like Boucher, one of the functions that signature 
consistently performs is connected with the performance of art in a market. According to 
Bertrand Tillier, Courbet’s signatory practice shows him to be a commercial pragmatist 
who sought to establish his name in order to assert a claim to economic and financial 
freedom.407 In the mid-19th century, the Paris Salons of the Académie des Beaux-Arts 
were influential forums for showcasing new artworks. Courbet made a dramatic impact in 
the Salon of 1850-51 with the display of his realist Burial at Ornans (1849-50).408  
Whether or not the painting carried an ‘enormous signature in reddish-orange paint’ at 
the time (today, this signature is not visible) is a matter for speculation, but what is 
certain is that Courbet habitually signed his name prominently on work. His signatory 
practice has been associated with entrepreneurial nous and the apparent desire to 
‘advertise’.409 Patricia Mainardi suggests that conservative elements in 19th century 
France viewed the ‘heroic’ commercial independence of Courbet as alarmingly indicative 
of a capitalism that was eroding aristocratic privileges in French society generally.410   
 
Courbet’s apparent arrogance and autonomy was affrontery. In 1855, he arranged to 
exhibit work in a personal ‘Pavilion of Realism’ opposite the Salon held at the Palais des 
                                                
407 Tillier, B. ‘Signature du Peinture et sa Caricature: L’exemple de Courbet’, 
Sociétés et Représentations 25 (2008) pp79-96 
408  Mainardi, P. ‘Courbet’s Exhibitionism’, Gazette des Beaux-Arts 118 (December 
1991), pp253-266 
409 On the missing signature, see Fried. Loc.cit. 
410 Mainardi, op.cit. p254; on Courbet’s ‘entrepreneurialism’, see also Chu, P. t-D, 
‘The Most Arrogant Man in France: Gustave Courbet and Nineteenth Century Media 
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Beaux-Arts. He emblazoned his name in capitals on the awning above the entrance.411 
Provocatively, the Pavilion included The Artist’s Studio, a real allegory summing up 
seven years of my artistic and moral life (1854-55), a painting which had been debarred 
from the exhibition being held opposite. It is interesting to consider the use Courbet made 
of his name on the awning as a shift of signature from pictorial plane to architectural 
parergon. Deviating from the standards and controls of the quasi-courtly institution that 
was the Academy, Courbet used this signature quite literally to institute himself, address 
new patrons and reach a new (general) public. Courbet deliberately overwrote the 
institutional (Academic) imprimatur and used his signature to mediate the public 
perception of his artistic persona.412 Consequently, when Tillier notes that Courbet’s 
signature featured prominently in numerous cartoons that appeared contemporaneously 
with his work and observes that the cartoonists who made Courbet their subject routinely 
exaggerated his signature, (even when they were satirising his most modest paintings), 
there is a degree to which this can be attributed to reactionary disapproval of the artist’s 
apparent insolence and his political tendencies. Courbet’s signature becomes short-hand 
for an artistic ‘personality’ who exceeds his métier.413 Satirized, it configures him as a 
uniformly flashy, egotistical individual engaged in self-promotion: his signature is 
monumentalised and enlarged in cartoons based on paintings in which his signature is 
only discretely present.414 Tillier says that coupled with depictions of inflated signatures, 
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cartoonists undermined Courbet’s realism and the political import of his choice of prosaic 
subject matter: they turned Courbet’s signature against him and against his paintings.  
 
One of Tillier’s examples is Une scène de chasse parodie by Nadar, (the nom de plume of 
Gaspard Félix Tournachon), which was published in La Gazette de Paris in 1866. It 
depicts a group of deer in a painting that are apparently so life-like that a gallery-goer’s 
pet dog is seen to be jumping on its lead in an attempt to chase them: Courbet’s signature 
looms disproportionately large. The signature is used to suggest, apocryphally, the artist’s 
misdirected mimetic ability, and thus it relates to the leitmotifs explored by Kris and 
Kurz: it is a conceit that opens the cartoon out onto the legend of Parrhasius and 
Zeuxius). An earlier cartoon, also considered by Tillier, L’Enterrement d’Ornans par 
Courbet by Bertall, (Charles Albert d’Arnoux), directly parodies Courbet’s painting 
Burial at Ornans (1849-50). In the cartoon, Bertall’s (exaggerated) depiction of 
Courbet’s signature is critical because the imagery it is attached to is deliberately 
presented as incoherent and ridiculous. Tillier says that Bertall’s cartoon suggests that 
Courbet did not know how to paint but applied his signature ‘like a cancer’ to any old 
thing.415 In Bertall’s cartoon, Courbet, who is adjudged not to know how to paint, is 
described as an artist who is profligate with his signature, a glyph symbolising his 
arrogance, his deviance and his lack of quality control, (remember, the signature in the 
cartoon is ‘missing’ in the painting today). So, in the cartoons, Courbet’s signature is 
used to illustrate a point about the artist’s vulgarity and debased aesthetic sense, his 
bourgeois tendencies and unrefined pursuit of money. To this extent, Courbet’s signature 
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permits him to be read in opposition to established ideas used to promote painting as a 
noble, Fine Art, (i.e. as more than the manufacture of images). 
 
 
6.3.2 COURBET AS A PRECEDENT FOR DUCHAMP 
 
Courbet, a clever manipulator of his ‘media’ relationships, was a figure of some 
fascination for Duchamp: Étant Donées (1946-66) suggests a reference to Courbet’s 
L’Origine du Monde (1866) and, Jean Clair alleges, to another of Courbet’s works, 
Woman with White Stockings (1861); these references recur in etchings Duchamp made 
in 1968.416 In an interview with Alain Jouffroy, Duchamp made specific mention of 
Courbet, a conversational mention that was excised before publication.417 Hans De Wolf, 
whose archival research has brought to light this correspondence, speculates that the 
connections between Courbet and Duchamp are more complex than might be assumed, 
and if the former’s creation of a ‘new archetype’ for the artist - one which is attention-
seeking and anti-intellectual - is profiled as a point of sympathy with the latter, then 
Realism, problematic relationships with the Academy and the notion of ‘pure painting’ 
are also implicated in the Duchampian model. 
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Courbet’s ‘Pavilion of Realism’, his ‘Manifesto’ and his signatory practice have germane 
connections to the deployment and form of the signature on Duchamp’s Fountain. 
Courbet’s unmissable signatures, applied ‘carnally’ in thick red paint, are a close and 
necessary connection between the Readymade, the histories of painting and the narratives 
of artistic virility. His signatory practice makes a necessary contribution to the signature 
‘R. Mutt’ which punctures Fountain as a ‘spyhole’, scoping backwards and forwards, 
near and far, even as it historically delimits an event and form. Though there are some 
formal similarities between the vernacular calligraphy of Courbet’s signatures and that 
used to inscribe ‘R. Mutt’, (the letters applied by Duchamp do not quite conform to the 
standard French unical form as do Courbet’s), it is the equivalent visibilities of Courbet’s 
‘trademark’ red signatures and Duchamp’s ‘R.Mutt’ inscription, both in terms of their 
physical contrast to the objects against which they are posited and in terms of the way 
they preface those objects, that makes the link necessary. The link becomes more potent 
when each artist’s use of signature against art’s superstructural qualities is considered: 
Courbet’s ‘Pavilion of Realism’, which carried his name so prominently, was provoked 
by the rejection of his painting The Artist’s Studio from the official Salon; Duchamp used 
Fountain - arguably a moment of unmitigated realism, (but for the representation of a 
signature) - to court rejection from the first exhibition of the Society of Independent 
Artists (S.I.A.). 
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6.3.3 THE ARTIST-AT-LARGE 
 
Duchamp’s ‘R. Mutt’ signature was vital in effecting the network of countersignatures 
and subscriptions that allowed Fountain to solicit rejection from the S.I.A. exhibition: in 
1917, the signature indicated a satirical ‘choice’. Writing in The Blindman, using the 
pseudonym ‘Louise Norton’, Duchamp challenges ‘the meticulous monogamy’ of objects 
and ideas, preferring to locate aesthetics largely and operatively in the polluted human 
institution: 
Whether Mr Mutt with his own hands made the fountain or not has no importance. He 
CHOSE it. He took an ordinary article of life, placed it so its useful significance 
disappeared under the new title and point of view - created a new thought for that 
object.418 
De Duve’s pictorial nominalism, which was discussed in the Introduction, reads the 
Readymade (especially Fountain) as representative of Duchamp’s personal abandonment 
of painting, but also admites the issue of ‘choice’ at its core. The signature on Fountain, 
then, can be styled as an indication of an artist enacting art through choice. ‘Choice’ is 
the method of ‘production’ which the signature effects and guarantees and the 
Readymade presents the potential of Art as an absolute heterogenity. As an absolute 
heterogenity, notwithstanding any engagement with material, art must be negotiated by 
and indicated by choice, the orchestration of context, the enclosure and stabilisation of 
drifting equivalents as ‘property’, (material or immaterial). 
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For De Duve, Duchamp is primarily a ‘painter’. ‘The unopened tube of paint’ is the 
(indsutrial) paradigm for Fountain in Kant After Duchamp and this, alongwith the 
historically based analysis of Duchamp’s early work in Pictorial Nominalism, figures in 
his conception of the Readymade as Duchamp’s abandonment of painting: ‘Where 
impotent talent forces the painter to quit, the genius of impotence takes over!’419 The 
metaphorical use of potency is significant. Battersby, for example, understands genius as 
an attempt to express male virility as the preeminent creative force - thus, the ‘genius’ of 
‘impotence’ becomes the neurotic representation of lineages that cannot be guaranteed 
but by empirical assertion, (hence the importance of declaiming and signing a name). 
Derrida’s uncompromising reading of Searle’s authorship and the ‘3 + n’ model reveals 
the operation of a such a neurotic (authorial) lineage, a lineage that presents itself as a 
secure, unassailable name - a patrilineal fait accompli. Thus, impotent (neurotic) genius is 
what is laid functionally bare in the pictorial nominalism of the Readymade. On behalf of 
the (Duchampian) ‘artist-at-large’ (i.e. an artist without métier), the Readymade signature 
is seen to make claims to sire indiscriminately; it marks an ambition to claim and be seen 
to claim, (to be recognised as ‘Father’), hence De Duve’s view that in post-Kantian 
aesthetics, ‘taste’ and ‘beauty’ are debunked in favour of declarations of status - ‘speech 
acts’. 
 
Blinded by the achievements of Duchamp with the Readymades, (and especially 
Fountain), the tendency in visual art has been to treat the speech act as orientated (purely) 
towards transforming something that is manifestly not art into ‘art’, a tendency to which 
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De Duve subscribes. This results in ignoring the place that the speech act has had in the 
general scheme of art prior to Duchamp and his Readymades, in art that is manifestly 
‘art’.  The speech act is always indicated and obvious in written signatures, thus the 
signature of Van Gogh on A Pair of Shoes (1887), which provides the focus for Derrida 
in ‘Restitutions’, marks a speech act in the same way as the appearance of the pseudo-
signature on Fountain marks a speech act: the substrate and veracity of the latter 
signature are merely distractions. So, not only does ‘R. Mutt’ mark a place through which 
the strong theoretical links between Duchamp and Derrida might be considered, but 
because of the particularlity of its operation and form as ‘speech act’, it presents a serious 
challenge to those who would style Fountain a point of origin that ushered in an wholly 
‘new’ evaluative system. The rejection that Duchamp courted from the S.I.A., is linked - 
via ‘R. Mutt’ -  to Courbet, and so linked to the established French Academy and to the 
history that the Academy traded on. The signature ‘R. Mutt’ keys Duchamp into a 
specific history of official rejection and anti-authoriatarian tactics designed to subvert or 
circumvent ‘academies’ and traditions that predates Fountain. The germ of the subersive 
realism of Fountain exists in Courbet’s practice and declarations - the stupid triumph of 
the Readymade can be read as the stupid triumph of Courbet’s ambition ‘to be a man as 
well’, (as he declared in a statement in the catalogue published to accompany the 
‘Pavilion of Realism’).420 
 
The ‘counterfeit’ signature ‘R. Mutt’, (technically, a pictorial representation of ‘a’ or 
‘any’ signature), signifies the basic condition that, after this ‘prime’ signature, 
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irrespective of any residual artisanal or material qualities carried through in the 
appropriation of ‘everyday’ objects, art is a field of absolute heterogeneity constructed 
and navigated by speech acts, (something De Duve accepts by advancing the idea that the 
signature is the ‘first’ of a post-Kantian regime). Here, signature as a mark of possession 
is the mark of choice over and above the mark of manual production (on objects with 
‘integrity’). Indeed, the signature enables ‘bare-faced’ choice to operate as a process of 
production. One of the key points that De Duve makes in Kant After Duchamp is that in 
the new, evaluative regime apparently ushered in by the Readymade, the artist loses 
specificity in the sense that artistic skill is no longer tied to particular materials or 
techniques. A similar point is made by Roberts in The Intangibilities of Form: Skill & 
Deskilling in Art after the Readymade. The extent to which this loss of technical 
specificity might turn on the ideology of the signature is not something that has been 
theorized until now. Just as signature has been seen to permit the division of labour in 
artworks and to facilitate workshop production (as previously discussed in relation to 
Giotto and Venetian cartellini), by the beginning of the 20th century, it permits the 
dematerialisation and relocation of artistic skill, as demonstrated by Duchamp in 
Fountain. 
 
Thus, if Van Eyck’s Arnolfini signature is seen to mark the place of artist over object, a 
place achieved through virtuosity and mimickcry of solid material (specifically, marble), 
in a double move, the signature ‘R. Mutt’ on Fountain redesignates this place as one in 
which the production of art moves from specificity (material genre and discipline) to 
generality (‘anything goes’ or absolute hetereogenity). At the same time, the artist moves 
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gradually in the opposite direction - from rule-bound craftsman (who may, nonethless, be 
an imaginative, ‘creative’ practitioner) to specific individual or personality (with license 
to do ‘whatever’). ‘R. Mutt’ is a signature that permits and designates the artist-at-large 
(an extension of Courbet’s ‘man-as-well’) as a specific individual without specific or 
necessary skill - the artist is one who can chose. Subsumed into Duchamp’s ‘personal’ 
signature, with increasing potency and effect, ‘R. Mutt’ was vital in shaping the character 
of Conceptualism, and this has significant repercussions through the practices of 
Relational and Postproduction artists. 
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7.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
7.1  REALIST AND RELATIONAL BAZAARS 
 
The figure of Courbet, then, brings the thesis back to the questions which initially framed 
it, namely those which concern the place of signature in Relational and Postproduction 
Art practices that disavow what it apparently stands for in art: individual authorship; 
completion; integrity; the designation of tradeable objects for private connoisseurs and 
collectors. Mainardi casts Courbet as an innovator in the art market, someone who 
obviated the official Parisian Academy and presented a threat to the cultural hegemony 
by effecting a ‘democratic’ equivalence between the way that decorative objets d’art 
were sold (and encountered) and the way that the fine art market operated.421 She explains 
that conservative critics at the time condemned the debasement of the Salon in terms that 
reflect the influence the bourgeois market was seen to have on the exhibition: 
Ingres stated repeatedly: “The Salon is no longer anything more than a bazaar, where 
mediocrity displays itself with impudence”. E.J. Delecluze, the leading conservative 
critic, echoed his sentiments: “The Salons in the Louvre have assumed, more and more 
each year, the character of a bazaar, where each merchant is obliged to present the most 
varied and bizarre objects in order to provoke and satisfy the fantasies of his customers.” 
                                                
421 Mainardi, op.cit. p259. For the suggestion that Courbet represented the kind of 
relationships of economic dependence involved in ‘Institutional Critique’ avant-la-lettre 
see Graw, I. High Price: Art between the Market and Celebrity Culture, (Köln: Sternberg 
Press, 2009), pp205-206 
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Art historians have largely ignored the significance of these code words: exhibition, 
market, picture, shop, bazaar (exhibition, marche, boutique de tableaux, bazar) pejorative 
words never used by critics supportive of what we call the avant-garde.422 
In 19th century France, Courbet represents a descent into vulgarity, and the bazaar isa 
figuration used to describe the threat he posed. The extract from Mainardi’s text is 
particularly interesting to consider in the light of this one from Bourriaud’s 
Postproduction: 
The passage from the eighties to the nineties might be represented by the juxtaposition of 
two photographs: one of a shop window, another of a flea market or airport shopping 
mall. From Jeff Koons to Rirkrit Tiravanija, from Haim Steinbach to Jason Rhoades, one 
formal system has been substituted for another: since the early nineties, the dominant 
visual model is closer to the open-air market, the bazaar, the souk, a temporary and 
nomadic gathering of precarious materials and products of various provenances.423 
Here, the bazaar - the model through which the denigration of the Salon was mediated -  
is is used to figure the ‘flea-market’ as Relational Art’s liberatory ‘temporary 
autonomous zone’.424 If there is to be salvation for art overwritten in the 1980s by the 
visual and object imperatives of an outmoded, highly regulated market which requires 
physical product to consume, Bourriaud thinks it may be found off-limits in an 
unregulated and proliferating ‘endlessly renewed conglomeration that does not depend on 
the command of a single author’.425 The nature of consumption appears to become 
‘artistic’ and global (liberatory) when it involves the appropriation of unbranded or 
                                                
422 Ibid. p255 
423 Bourriaud, Postproduction, op. cit. p22 
424 For the origins of the term ‘temporary autonomous zone’ see: Bey, H. T.A.Z. 
(New York, NY: Autonomedia, 2004) 
425  Bourriaud, ibid. p28 
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counterfeit products of dubious provenances. In the Salon, Courbet’s startlingly coloured 
signature is a sharp, deliberate punctuation and mark of distinction on overcrowded walls. 
It was seen to reduce paintings to the level of objets d’art and bring the general (as 
opposed to specialist) public into an immediate, superficial relationship with art. It was 
read as a sign that Courbet had debased Academic conventions in favour of commercial 
profiteering. In Relational and Postproduction practices, artists can be seen to be engaged 
in the reverse process, exploiting the unruly bazaar to do what Bourriaud terms ‘wrong’ 
shopping. By ‘wrong’ shopping, an artist like Orozco, (the example used in the 
Introduction), exercises the power to assign a ‘proper’ place to perishable and non-
perishable materials and practices alike, gathering them together under an appropriate 
signature for the duration of the artwork (whether that is notionally permanent or not).  
 
When the bazaar is figured as an excepted pirate space, ideally subverting or operating 
beyond the reach of legislation - a domain of sub-branded knock-offs, counterfeits and 
shanzhai copies - it is a model which is seen to obviate, interrupt or negate signature, 
(‘distinctive branding’, ‘individual authorship’). Distinctive branding and individual 
authorship are seen to be cohesive and entire, to represent those Academic,‘White Cube’, 
mainstream commercial or material attributes which are lost or abandoned in general 
melée of the bazaar, a place where goods are interchangeable, unpretentious and often 
overtly counterfeit (illegaly signed). The paradox, which Bourriaud does not approach, 
concerns the establishment of individual authorship by artists in this context.  
 
Fleshing out his description of the flea-market he says: 
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Here, past production is re-cycled and switches direction. In an involuntary homage to 
Marcel Duchamp, an object is given a new idea. An object once used in conformance 
with the concept for which it was produced now finds new potential uses in the stalls of 
the flea market.426 
He could be (in fact he is) describing the operation of signature as it relates to the 
reassignment and resurrection of past-production, of the salvage operation 
(counter)signature performs. He uses unsigned examples drawn from ‘involuntary’, 
everyday life as ideological illustrations that appear to permit him to discuss the flea-
market in terms that avoid dealing with signatory operations. Signed objects are no more 
complete or conclusive in their object-forms anymore than unsigned ones: they may be 
re-assigned with similar ease. The reference to Duchamp in Bourriaud’s passage is not 
surprising: he uses the inframince to figure his Relational ‘interstice’, and it is the 
inframince that he appears to be using to describe the impact of a ‘new idea’ on an object. 
Of course ‘newness’ is a quality Reniassance signatures have been seen to impute into 
artworks. I have suggested that Derrida’s différance - a concept which is essential to the 
operation of signature - might be considered equivalent to Duchamp’s inframince. Re-
reading Bourriaud’s statement with this in mind, is it possible to see flea-market objects 
participating in a process of countersignature? Does the ‘newness’ of the idea not require 
that it is recognised as new (and how does that work)? What does the quality of 
‘newness’ bring to the object if not an attempt at authorship? The fact that Relational 
Artists work with unbranded goods and ‘re-mix’ culture is accepted as proof that they 
interfere with ‘traditional’ authorship. In fact, what they do is gather aspects of cultural 
and commercial production to themselves and assert signature (the test for which is lower 
                                                
426 Ibid. p23 
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than authorship) as a colonizing force. As Derrida’s ‘Sarl’ formulation makes clear, 
signature is a corporate action. If the Realist bazaar is a model of descent into vulgarity, 
the Relational bazaar is a model of discrimination and elevation from it. As a means of 
communication and a mode of production, signature allows for both.  
 
 
7.2  PROVENANCE AND PRODUCTION 
 
Bourriaud marks up ‘multiple provenances’ in his passage on the ‘bazaar’, and his use of 
the word in its plural form indicates objects with disparate and unclear origins, rather 
than legitimate attribution. He uses ‘provenances’ to allude to the global nature of 
manufacture, the excesses and obsolescences that result from industrialized capitalism 
and the impossibility of tracing verifiable sources in counterfeit or unmarked goods. In 
the Realist bazaar, Courbet was an artist seeking to establish his name by appealing to an 
everyman public. Relational and Postproduction artists - so much more conventional - are 
those whose market-finds are carefully regulated by signature. If Courbet declared his 
signature speculatively in the open market to a general public; Orozco aligns his with the 
Salons in which his work (eventually) manifests, riddling materials and stories from the 
Bourriaudian bazaar with a self-reflexive provenance, hiding his signature for a court of 
initiates (connoisseurs). Signature is what produces his visibility and recognition of his 
mastery of ‘newness’or ‘realignment’. In the tradition realised and propagated by 
Duchamp, (alluding by way of ‘R. Mutt’ to Courbet), the Relational Artist might be 
determined as an ‘artist-at-large’ - ‘a man as well’ - one whose practice is free of 
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specificity in terms of material or technique. Bourriaud makes it clear in Postproduction 
that he sees post-Duchampian consumption-as-production as appropriative, enunciative 
and inventive - ‘immaterial’.427  
 
When the artist-at-large is an ensemble of functions and signature is a point of 
accumulation, methods of artistic production do not necessarily involve the manufacture 
or use of physical objects, legitimate materials or genres. The method of artistic 
production can be described as spectral. Several of Derrida’s chosen metaphors enhance 
understanding of how spectral production works, but one of the most apt for Relational 
Art alludes to the etymology of ‘salvage’ (as payment for saving or retrieving 
shipwrecked property) to describe the operation of the revenant.428 The idea of salvage is 
one way of understanding the operational relationship Derrida construes between 
signature and countersignature because it can be related to the way legitimation may be 
mobilized to establish provenance - chains of attribution and ownership - as property. In 
‘Restitutions’, Derrida makes clear the principal movement in signature is proprietorial: 
‘let us posit an axiom that the desire for attribution is a desire for appropriation. In 
matters of art as it is everywhere else’.429  
 
Like genius, ‘provenance’ relates etymologically to place of origin. In contemporary 
everyday use, provenance gives onto the notion of the ‘A.O.C.’, mentioned previously in 
connection with cartellini as superscripted, geographic designators. Provenance is a 
                                                
427 Ibid. pp18-19 
428 ‘This word shipwreck: before here connoting the abyss, the ghost, or the return of 
some feared catastrophe…’ Derrida, The Paper Machine, op. cit. p9 
429  Derrida, The Truth in Painting, op. cit. p260 
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descriptor which has particular application in the production of ‘slow’ food and 
‘artisanal’ manufacture, (and it is surely not a coincidence that one of Bourriaud’s pre-
eminent Relational Artists, Rikrit Tiravanija is celebrated for cooking and serving meals 
as art practice). Provenance has a long history of specific application in art, establishing 
chains of connection between artworks and to the authentic, singular point of origin that 
is the artist through bills of sale, transfer of ownership, exhibition and mediation.430 
Provenance documents the chronological passage of artworks as property travelling 
through ownership, ideally tracing the moment of departure to the hand of a specified 
individual. Often, the signature of an artist on a work of art raises the presumption of 
authenticity so bluntly that in practice signatures without (additional) provenance are 
rarely accepted at face value. A signature on a work of art is insufficient: there is work to 
be done in verification - importantly, provenance shows how ‘owning’ can be construed 
as ‘producing’. 
 
Relational Art and Postproduction artists are concerned with artistic provenance because 
they are concerned with the re-assignment of ‘proper’ place - of locus - to cultural 
practices and pre-existent products ‘out-there’, in standardised, everyday life.  This is 
diameterically opposed to the commercial levelling between things that was feared by the 
19th century French Academy. Signature performs a significant function in relation to the 
assignment of place - indeed this is a primary function. In Derrida’s post-9/11 interview 
with Borradori, it is clear that the determination of place was very much an aspect of the 
signatory process for him. Understanding and emphasizing signature’s role as a mapping 
                                                
430  The emphasis on ‘provenance’ rather than aesthetic judgment in the process of 
attribution is something that increases in the 20th century, See Jones, op. cit. p162  
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device addresses some of the misunderstandings brought about by concentrating on the 
humanist enigma of its paraph or its semiotic appearance.  
 
The cartographic function of signature has been revealed by interrogating narratives and 
examples outwith the confines of era-dependent historical specialism. The intimate 
relationship between artwork and place (rather than object) is thus established at a 
conceptual level. The relevance of movement and travel to art, in terms of the mobility of 
people and the portability of things, is long-established and is suggests a deeply rooted 
precondition for speculative production and market exchange. Boltanski & Chiapello 
draw attention to the ideological importance of mobility to capital in the Projective City, 
which allows the dematerialisation and reconstitution of wealth as ‘pockets of 
accumulation’ through encounters and events, (signatures, which carry the power of 
abbreivation, manifest productive associations and networks). Signature makes art mobile 
and signifies its historical tendency to dematerialise - artworks and artists become 
landmarks with no necessary attachment to place; marbled frames replace material as a 
source of value. Since the Early Reniassance, artists have gradually become more 
important than objects in art and this anticipates the imperative of Third Spirit Capitalism 
to rid itself of obstacles.  
 
The gradual ingressions of signatory practice into Medieval illuminations and marginalia 
accompanied the ‘decluttering’ of textual space in favour of legibility and interrupt the 
unity of the visible Word, which could no longer be treated as representative of an 
autocratic entity. The marginal location of signatures and self-inscriptions permitted a 
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degree of freedom and play resulting in ornament. The self-conscious subject can be seen 
to emerge through social affiliation rather than simple, conclusive individuation. 
Signature challenges entireity and self-sufficiency at a conceptual level. Van Eyck’s 
Arnolfini signature likewise occasions the displacement of material, asserting the value of 
skill. Displacements of material can be read as an interruption of presence, of voice (as 
theorised in Plato’s Pharmacy), and it is accompanied by the non-fungibility of artefacts. 
When the voice is whole and omnipotent, the varied particularities of its manifestations 
do no matter. Conversely, when the skill of the artist moves into the space vacated by 
material, the artefact is seen to acquire singularity as an artwork - the power of speech 
appears to devolve to the individual. Signature is a dynamis, a process of production and 
simultaneously, a replacement for material. When Derrida talks of the signature of 
‘September 11’ and De Lillo writes of the ‘most photographed barn in America’, they 
allude to the construction of place through familiarity and repetition, through 
countersignature. Physical location is rapidly of secondary significance. Thus, when 
method of production in Relational and Postproduction art is recognised as the 
assignment of proper place, the importance of signatory processes in these practices may 
be revealed. Relational and Postproduction Art represent the ideological reservation and 
realignment of product (material or cultural) in service of a specific artist (or ‘curator’), 
whose signature is a colonial and industrial force.  
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7.3  SIGNATURE, COMMODITY AND MARKET 
 
Signature has a close relationship with the form and location of the commodity in art, 
which, like signature itself, is always split, deferred and differed elsewhere – 
dematerialised - incapable of being embodied entirely within any artwork. In art, the 
signature and the commodity are, in Derridean terms, both spectral and both have a 
temporally complex relationship to the market, which has a place to play in establishing 
them both to some extent. Velthius has produced a useful and relevant analysis of the 
operations of the contemporary art market based on interviews and data collected in New 
York and Amsterdam in the early part of the 21st century, (largely from dealers and 
gallerists).431 Velthius states that in this market, straightforward capitalist logic is 
rejected. It appears to ‘endorse the more profound goals of the aesthetic and the artistic’, 
and mystique is attached to the commercial strategies of galleries through the interplay of 
of arcane role-play, the affirmation and destablisation of social status, and ‘horse-trading’  
which involves artists, dealers, collectors, and the nominal public or art audience.432 
Primary art markets, i.e. those to which ‘new’ artwork is released are those especially 
marked in the complex interdependency of personalities, events, and institutions which, 
Velthius points out, can take on almost familial cast.  
 
His characterisation of the art market shares features with the operations Duchamp put 
into play when he enacted the Fountain, and it has a demonstrable sympathy with the 
                                                
431  Velthius, O. Talking Prices: Symbolic Meanings of Prices on the Market of 
Contemporary Art (Princeton: Princeton University, 2005) See also, Graw, I. High Price: 
Between the Market and Celebrity Culture (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2009) 
432 Ibid. p17 
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mode of networked organisation in the Projective City - he believes not that the art world 
is becoming more commercial, ‘but that the economy is becoming more cultural’.433 The 
way it becomes more cultural involves signature: ‘In unmasking the equivalence between 
art and economy, the signature plays an important role.’434 Velthius considers Duchamp’s 
financial works - Tzanck Check (1919) (Fig. 9), a hand-made, facsimile cheque made out 
to Dr Tzanck, Duchamp’s dentist in New York; Monte Carlo Bonds (1924), which were 
intended to finance a scheme to play roulette; Czech Check (1965), a psuedo-cheque 
made out for John Cage to auction and Cheque Bruno (1965), which was produced on 
paper clippings in response to a request from Philippe Bruno - to represent early 
examples of ‘imaginary economics’ at work.435  Signature in Duchamp’s work is seen to 
have the capacity to import Readymades from the anonymity of their industrial 
manufacture to the subjective world of art, and to ‘export’ the subjective world of the 
‘craftsmanly artwork to an anonymous, monetary economy’ via works like the Tzanck 
Check.436 Velthius says that Duchamp’s signature ‘breaks the seal of value’.437 The 
hermeticism of any seal - even that apparently fixed numerically on the face of currency - 
is questioned by Derrida: he assumes the constant flux between inflation and deflation. 438  
‘Value’, like ‘presence’, is always already here and there, found and retrieved in an 
unstable overlap or dynamis. That is what signature can be seen to mediate and 
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436  Ibid. p41-42 
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438  For a recent examination of Derrida’s metaphors of credit/debt see Butler, J. ‘On 
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rationalize in art. Duchamp emerges as an artist who anticipates and reflects upon 
‘imaginary economics’ because he is actuely aware of signature as a complex process. 
 
Velthius states that the ‘objectifying’ effect that market transactions have on artworks are 
‘deobjectified’ by the artworld’s (dealers) propensity to nurture long-term social 
relationships (with artists, collectors, critics, curators, museums etc) through dinners, 
gifts and informal ‘lifestyle’ exchanges. Such ‘relational’ practices in this iteration of the 
artworld: ‘are so endemic on the art market that the distinction between a non-market 
logic which equals sociability and a market logic which equals anonymous exchange is 
ultimately a false one’.439 Velthius is of the opinion that the art market can never be one 
in which anonymous consumption can play a part, and this goes to the heart of why issues 
of signature are so important, especially if we accept that the post-Duchampian artist is 
an artist who exercises choice (De Duve) or enacts consumption (Bourriaud). In art 
historical narratives, the notion of anonymous consumption is linked to the individuation 
of art production at the level of the connoisseur (who has a productive, aesthetic role) - 
‘signed’ artworks are speculatively produced outside of courtly commission. Long-range 
historical precedents for this - rites of purification and deobjectification (ridding the 
object of its commerical taint) - may be found in the decline in the incidence of cartellini 
as visible signatures indicative of origin in late 16th century Venetian works in favour of 
sprezzatura, something which is much more dissolute in conveying ‘origin’ and requires 
individuated, expert appreciation rather than anonymous, uninformed purchase. In 
Velthius’s analysis, sociability elevates participation in the market beyond the level of 
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bald commerical exchange as courtly connoissuership elevates appreciation of art beyond 
that which is literally inscribed.  In the contemporary art market, commodities can be 
seen to be socially reserved and this social reservation is an aspect of their capital 
production. 
 
Velthius alludes to the role of genius in the social construction of aesthetic and economic 
value in his discussion of the ‘pricing scripts’ which govern contemporary art markets. 
Pricing scripts are informal conventions - ‘the most subjective thing that happens in the 
gallery’ - which help gallerists/dealers ‘find’ the right price for an artwork according to 
certain variables,  (previous prices, museum shows, reviews etc), in the artist’s 
biography/cv: 
A brief excursion through the economic history of the art market teaches us that pricing 
scripts are stable in the short run. In the long run they evolve under large-scale social and 
cultural processes such as the emancipation of the artist in the Renaissance, the rise of the 
notion of genius and innovative urges…440 
Variables in the artworks materiality, (its dimensions, medium and/or technique), are not 
as important as an artist’s biography. In the Projective City, this much might be guessed. 
Noticeably, Velthius also links the evolution of pricing scripts to the ‘cult of the creative  
individual’ in the 19th century and the emphasis on the careers of artists rather than on 
individual works/canvases. I have argued in that Courbet, a ‘creative individual’ who 
attempted to use his signature to break the co-ordinated action of the Academy, is an end-
marker in the movement of intrinsic value away from ‘works’ to ‘artists’, (as Van Eyck is 
a marker in the movement of intrinsic value away from ‘material’ to ‘skill’). He 
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represents the imminent emergence of the ‘artist-at-large’, a function anticipated in older 
historical precedents. The displacement of material and relocation of value in artists’s 
skills during the Early Renaissance, coupled with the significance of the implications of 
Van Eyck’s decision to employ a verb connotating ‘presence’ rather than ‘production’ in 
the Arnolfini inscription, very gradually give onto the establishment of the ‘artist-at-
large’, an individual empowered by virtue of individuation rather than skill. 
 
 
7.4  LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR AUTHORSHIP 
 
Signature’s relationship is in the first instance to place and provenance, then to 
commodity. The perception of provenance varies across history: in Byzantine icons, 
provenance may be seen to reside in the object and its materials; in Reniassance panel 
paintings, the provenance of the artist (established by skill) gradually becomes more 
important; in post-Duchampian and Relational Art, the quality of connections an artist 
makes by orchestrating projects is of primary significance (and this reiterates what 
Boltanski & Chiapello say). Provenance is also represents how ownership is mobilized as 
a value-adding process. The signature on Fountain anticipates and represents the manner 
in which artistic skills or competences can be seen to change over the course of the 20th 
century. When the artist can be prized as a specific individual (without any necessary 
skill) the signature is fetished as an autograph that can be applied to anything without any 
other necessary qualification. According to Roberts, the Duchampian artist-at-large 
precedes the: 
  312 
…reinvention of the artists as creative entrepreneur (under the increased glare of celebrity 
culture). This produces an intense conflict of ideologies: the artist’s identity may be 
deconstructed under the impact of the social relations of advanced art but it is 
simultaneously reconstructed as an enchanted image under the reified forms of the mass 
media. The idea of the artist as an ensemble of functions, becomes a set of multitasking 
career opportuntities.441 
When the artist is ‘an ensemble of functions’, as a lowest common denominator without 
attachment to an idiom, signature becomes the means of rationalizing everything useful 
as an individual point of accumulation and is a useful vehicle for carrying forward deeply 
sedimented ideas about singular talent and creative expression. 
 
Boris Groys has written that the 21st century is an era of mass art production (rather than 
mass art consumption) which is facilitated by the wide and increasing accessibility of 
digital image-making and distributing technology.442 In this era, contemporary art is a 
‘mass cultural practice’ and all images are equivalent. Equally indiscriminate and 
profligate, as a mark of potential ‘authorship’ at the level of a lowest common 
denominator, signature is in step with the prevalent conditions of cultural production. 
Signature does not sort documents, works and ephemera into discrete categories as does 
the author-function. In fact, it works as a pollutant: there is nothing which signature 
touches that can be wholly reserved. As lowest common denominator authorship, 
signature points to corporate (rather than bodily) traits and the necessarily corporate 
author is described by Derrida’s ‘Sarl’ formula, (3 + n). The consequences of figuring 
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signature as the lowest common denominator in authorship means that the production of 
art has no necessary connection to the narratives of creative individuation that stem from 
the Renaissance, (because art has never had a necessary connection to creative 
individuation). The visibility of images (and artists) is produced through affirmation and 
repetition. The character of that repetition (as unique and the same) is best described as a 
signatory process, and the difference between Renaissance and Byzantine art is best read 
as a relocation of the signatory process, rather than merely a technical separation of 
‘copybook’ images from ‘originals’. The indiscriminate profligacy of signature and the 
range of potential equivalences it can make allows the kinds of visibility it constructs to 
be dissolved, blurred and complicated.  
 
Repeatedly in the work of art historians, signtaure is described as problematic. It is seen 
to be a frustration when it attracts too much attention (as can be seen in treatments of the 
signature of Gislebertus at Autun, and the signature of Van Eyck on the Arnolfini 
Portrait), and it is seen to be a frustration when it stands in the way of an overarching 
theory, in the methodology of Beazley, for example. It permits contesting narratives to be 
constructed, as the dispute between Heidegger and Schapiro over the remains of Van 
Gogh demonstrates, and it allows claims to ownership and legitimacy to be made without 
approval: signature necessarily draws disparate parties together in ongoing acts of 
dissolution in spite of attempts to prevent that, (Searle’s attempts to control Austin’s 
legacy addes to the proliferation of illegitmates). Derrida’s revelatory understanding of 
‘countersignature’ describes the necessarily unstable structure of signature, and gives on 
to considerations of signature’s peculiar temporality. Signature’s temporality works to 
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present the past in an effectively truncated form as a promise to present (again) in future. 
Furthermore, in the operation of signature, it is clear to see past and future become 
commuted (in the fleeting, impossible moment of the present) to that which is 
‘elsewhere’. Signature permits equivalence between different forms of corporeality and 
capital, mediating the passage between material and immaterial. 
 
 
7.5  METHODOLOGY REVIEWED 
 
My historical analysis of signature spans several centuries - using examples from the 6th 
century BC to the early 20th century. The value of this analysis lies in its ability to 
characterise of signature as a variable, culturally and historically determined process. As 
a subject for study in art history, signature is most often treated as a point of interest 
within a specific period, (most often the Renaissance); or within the practice of a specific 
artist. Inevitably, these analyses are iconographic, departing from the appearance of 
signatures within a pre-determined field of study. While these studies are extremely 
important - and this thesis would have been impossible without them - their necessarily 
narrow focus tends to underscore naturalized assumptions and commonsense 
understandings about what and why signatures ‘do’ and ‘are’. Thus, in studies of 
Renaissance artists, there is a demonstrable tendency to accept that signature is (only or 
primarily) a mark of creative pride or invention. As a result, signatory practice is seen to 
start then, as a mark of individuation. Indications of creative pride and invention are seen 
to individuate the artist as something a more than an artisan. Marking invention and 
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personal satisfaction cannot be extracted from the general function of signature to 
guarantee and verify. Tracing the history of signature through a broader range of 
examples illustrates this, and provides a way to challenge naturalized assumptions -
signature is not merely or always a mark of individuation as has been generally 
understood. Studies of the appearances of written signatures are significant indicators of 
how and where the division essential to the signatory process is excised, and illustrate its 
historical contingency, but they privilege signature as an appearance - a sign - rather than 
an operation. In itself, the exercise of tracing signature across defined art historical eras 
provides a foundation for rethinking historical narratives which use the idea of the 
expressive signature to constitute grounds for making distinctions between artists and 
artisans per se, and thereby provides the opportunity to review the nature of the 
distinction. 
 
Where signature has been treated broadly, as it was in the early days of semiotic studies, 
it has been divorced from its variable, historical context in order to be treated 
‘scientifically’, (iconographically), according to its appearance. This is an approach that 
is limited in its utility because it is idiomatic and it divorces signature from meaningful 
relationships with general social practice. Perhaps one of the most important aspects of 
signature in art lies in its heterogenity; its necessary appeals to the circumstances in 
which names are written and applied in situations ‘outside’ the art object or image. This 
is the basis on which the relationship between art and the economy is mediated. 
Consistently in his work on signature, Derrida emphasizes its ability to pollute idioms 
(whether they are philosophical, literary, aesthetic). At a superstructural level, the general 
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function of signature to communicate presence in the absence of the signatory does not 
change, but the operation of this function reveals the necessary unstable, impure 
condition of texts (and ‘things’). Signature is a device that presents itself as singular, yet 
must operate through (impossible) repetitions of itself.  
 
Reviewing and comparing historical exemplars across a timespan which can be measured 
in millenia rather than decades, allows the operative split upon which signature relies to 
be clearly configured, regardless of its historical forms and denials. It is an operation 
which requires distance to be understood as a function, the subtle commonalties of its 
functions across history are something that narrow chronologies tend to misunderstand. 
Armed with a functional understanding of signature, the instrumentalism of signature’s 
historical forms, which reflect the extent to which it denies or affirms its distance from 
‘truth’, can be better addressed. The significance of signature can be reimagined and new 
perspectives on how and why it works can be generated. Duchamp’s representation of a 
signature on Fountain establishes grounds for considering both Courbet’s realism and the 
sympotic Aristonothos Krater necessary precedents for the Readymade. It is an 
instructive coincidence that the signatures on Fountain and the Aristonothos Krater are 
both satirical, pseudonymous and found on functional ceramic objects. The coincidence 
has enough points of contact that it can be considered a ‘heuristic parallel’ so the Salon-
style exhibition from which Fountain was rejected can be considered equivalent to a 
Sympoisum, a drinking vessel is made equivalent with a urinal, and the role of satire 
(rather than taste) in mediating experience on an aesthetic level is brought to the fore. In 
this heuristic parallel, ‘R. Mutt’ represents the signature not as a point of origin, rather as 
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an instance in a long history of aesthetically constructed satire, as important a basis for 
understanding the Readymades as the abandonment of painting, or their subsequent 
influence on Conceptualism.  
 
What Derrida’s work on signature and countersignature makes explicit is the essential 
infelicity, division or différance in signature, a split which makes every signature 
‘counterfeit’. In Derrida’s etymology, the word counterfeit is understood in terms of its 
components: ‘counter-’ gives us ‘against’ and ‘beside; ‘-feit’ gives us ‘truth’, so the 
fracture which signature relies upon in order to function is against and beside truth. 
Signature always operates in the manner of a counterfeit or fraud and in this respect it is 
not surprising to discover the satirical quality of the ‘first’ signatures which both the 
Aristonothos Krater and Fountain purport.  To recall a statement which was quoted in the 
Introduction, Bourriaud says the Relational Artist ‘dwells in the circumstances the 
present offers him so as to turn the setting of his life, (his links with the physical and 
conceptual world), into a lasting world.’443 Mention of the ‘present’ is telling. When 
Derrida describes the written signature as claiming general maintenance,  he describes 
the unusual temporality that the signature trades on in order to function: in the 
temporality of the signature, the ‘present’ is deferred, elsewhere, equally a past-present 
and a future-present but never solely the impossible, constantly receding present-present. 
If the personal setting of life is to become ‘lasting’, i.e. a general maintenance rather than 
lived or living, how can that state be produced and mobilized? 
  
                                                
443  Bourriaud, Relational Art, op. cit. pp13-14 
  318 
APPENDIX  
 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1.      Marcel Duchamp Fountain (1917) [online image] Available at: 
http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/duchamp-fountain-t07573 (accessed 21st January 
2015) 
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Fig. 2      Jan Van Eyck Arnolfini Portrait, (1434) [online image] Available from: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Van_Eyck_-_Arnolfini_Portrait.jpg (accessed 
21st January 2015) 
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Fig. 3      Michelangelo, Pietà (1498-99) [online image] Available at: 
http://thearkofgrace.com/2013/10/26/pieta-1498-1499/ (accessed 21st January 2015) 
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Fig. 4      Detail from the Aristonothos Krater, (c. 650 BC) [online image] Available 
from: http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Mythology/AristonothosKrater.html (accessed 
21st January 2015) 
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Fig. 5      ‘Signature’ of Gislebertus, The Last Judgment, Cathedral of St-Lazare, Autun, 
(c.1120) [online image] Available from: 
http://www.paradoxplace.com/Photo%20Pages/France/Burgundy%20Champagne/Autun/
Autun_Portal.htm (accessed 21st January 2015) 
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Fig. 6      Lando di Pietro, Crucifixion (1338) [online image] Available at: 
http://www.viaesiena.it/en/mendicanti/itinerario_o/basilica-dell-osservanza/il-convento-
osservanza/museo-dellosservanza/Crocifisso-di-Lando-di-Pietro (accessed, 21st January 
2015) 
  324 
 
 
Fig. 7      Detail of inscriptions from Lando’s Crucifixion, [online image] Available at: 
http://www.stilearte.it/in-quel-crocifisso-ce-un-manoscritto-nascosto/ (accessed 21st 
January 2015)  
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Fig. 8      Fra Filippo Lippi, Madonna with Child Enthroned (Tarquinia Madonna) 
(1447) [online image] Available from: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lippi_Madonna_Tarquinia.jpg (accessed 21st 
January 2015) 
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Fig. 9      Gustave Courbet Self-Portrait (The Desperate Man) (1443-45) [online image] 
Available from: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustave_Courbet#mediaviewer/File:Gustave_Courbet_-
_Le_D%C3%A9sesp%C3%A9r%C3%A9.JPG (accessed 21st January 2015) 
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Fig. 10      Albert d’Arnoux, C. (‘Bertall’) L’Enterrement à Ornans, par Courbet, maître 
peintre, Le Journal pour rire, 7th March 1851 [online image] Available from: 
https://cecile1968.wordpress.com/2010/04/ (accessed 21st January 2015) 
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Fig. 11      Marcel Duchamp Tzanck Cheque (1919) [online image] Available at: 
http://www.toutfait.com/unmaking_the_museum/Tzanck%20Check.html (accessed 21st 
January 2015)  
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